SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application for Leave to Appeal to the Full Court)
PSEVDOS v FIRST MORTGAGE COMPANY HOME LOANS PTY LTD
[2020] SASC 1
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Lovell
16 January 2020
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT
The appellant seeks permission to appeal a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court, who dismissed the appellant’s appeal from a master of the Supreme Court.
Permission to appeal to the Full Court – whether a question of general principle arises – whether there is reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.
Held: the appellant is unable to show any error in the determination of the issues. No question of general principle arises on the facts of the case. Permission is refused.
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 117, r 242, r 288; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 191(1)(d); Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 55A(1), referred to.
Morgan v Workcover Corporation of South Australia [2011] SASC 113; Keung v Abbott & Anor (No 2) [2019] SASCFC 39, considered.
PSEVDOS v FIRST MORTGAGE COMPANY HOME LOANS PTY LTD
[2020] SASC 1LOVELL J:
Overview
The appellant seeks permission to appeal to the Full Court from the decision of Hinton J who dismissed his appeal from Judge Bochner. Permission to appeal is required pursuant to r 288 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (‘SCR’). Permission was sought from me, pursuant to SCR 117, as Hinton J was unable to hear the application.
Background
The appellant is an undischarged bankrupt, a sequestration order having been made in June 2016. In January 2017, the respondent took possession of a property at 108 South Terrace, Adelaide (‘the South Terrace property’) in its capacity as mortgagee, as the mortgagors jointly defaulted on a loan secured against the property.
The respondent arranged for the sale of the South Terrace property by public auction on 23 September 2017. On 20 September 2017, the appellant placed a caveat on the Certificate of Title.
On 20 October 2017, the respondent instituted proceedings against the appellant and two others seeking the removal of the caveat from the Certificate of Title pursuant to s 191(1)(d) of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) to enable it, as mortgagee in possession, to sell the South Terrace property. It also sought to remedy a potential defect in the default notice served pursuant to s 55A(1) of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) so it could sell the related property. The appellant argued that he did not own the South Terrace property in his own right but held it as trustee for the Orio Investment Trust. In December 2017, Judge Bochner found there was insufficient evidence before her to conclude that the land was beneficially held by a trust. Judge Bochner ordered that the caveat be removed from the Certificate of Title.
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- Case
- [2020] SASC 1
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the correctness of the orders of Hinton J were attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal and whether substantial injustice would be caused to the appellant if the orders stood. The court considered the principles established in Morgan v Workcover Corporation of South Australia and BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd v Oil Basins Ltd, which outlined the criteria for granting leave to appeal from interlocutory orders. These criteria included whether there was a reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and whether substantial injustice would result if the orders were not appealed. Hinton J found that the evidence did not support the appellant's claims and that the discretionary powers under SCR 242 were correctly exercised. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
In the final determination, the court refused permission for the appellant to appeal to the Full Court against the findings and orders of Hinton J. The reasoning was grounded in the principles of maintaining the finality of litigation, the discretionary nature of the powers under SCR 242, and the lack of substantial injustice if the orders were to stand. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to the principles of judicial finality and the need for careful consideration of interlocutory applications in the context of already concluded substantive proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
I refuse permission for the appellant to appeal to the Full Court against the findings and orders of Hinton J.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the correctness of the orders of Judge Bochner is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant their being reconsidered on appeal.
2. Whether substantial injustice will be caused to the appellant if the orders of Judge Bochner stand.
3. Whether there is reason to doubt the correctness of Hinton J’s review of the factual issues on appeal against the second interlocutory judgment.
4. Whether Hinton J’s interpretation of the powers contained in SCR 242 is correct.
5. Whether the discretionary power to reopen contained in SCR 242 was exercised appropriately by Judge Bochner.
Held
1. Whether the correctness of the orders of Judge Bochner is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant their being reconsidered on appeal.
The court concluded that there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of Judge Bochner.
2. Whether substantial injustice will be caused to the appellant if the orders of Judge Bochner stand.
The court concluded that there was no substantial injustice that would result from the orders of Judge Bochner standing.
3. Whether there is reason to doubt the correctness of Hinton J’s review of the factual issues on appeal against the second interlocutory judgment.
The court concluded that there was no reason to doubt the correctness of Hinton J’s review of the factual issues.
4. Whether Hinton J’s interpretation of the powers contained in SCR 242 is correct.
The court concluded that Hinton J’s interpretation of the powers contained in SCR 242 was correct.
5. Whether the discretionary power to reopen contained in SCR 242 was exercised appropriately by Judge Bochner.
The court concluded that Judge Bochner exercised the discretionary power to reopen appropriately.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Morgan v Workcover Corporation of South Australia[1] Gray J helpfully distilled the principles to be applied when a litigant seeks to appeal a single judge’s decision to the Full Court. In relation to SCR 288, his Honour stated:[2]In BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd v Oil Basins Ltd Fullagar J of the Victorian Supreme Court addressed the practice in that State on an application for leave to appeal:As this is an application for leave to appeal from interlocutory orders, the authorities show that this Court should address itself to two questions, as follows: (1) whether the correctness of the orders of Murray J is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant their being reconsidered on appeal; and (2) whether substantial injustice will be caused to the applicant (OBL) if the orders of Murray J stand: see, for example Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VicRp 44; [1978] VR 431, at p 433, per McInerney J, and at pp 441-2, per Murphy J. At p 441, Murphy J said, inter alia: “If the order was correct then it follows that substantial injustice could not follow. If the order is seen to be clearly wrong, this is not alone sufficient. It must be shown, in addition, to effect a substantial injustice by its operation.”The Victorian practice has been followed in this State. An example is to be found in Glenauchen Pty Ltd v Circuit Finance Pty Ltd where the Full Court observed: The court's practice has been to grant leave to appeal only if a question of general principle arises. The court will usually consider whether there is reason to doubt the correctness of the decision under consideration. However, in the end the court must act as the interests of justice require.(Footnotes omitted)[1] [2011] SASC 113.[2] Morgan v Workcover Corporation of South Australia [2011] SASC 113 at [6] – [7].Consideration There were, before Hinton J, two challenges in relation to Judge Bochner’s ruling on FDN 36. First, a factual challenge and secondly, a challenge to the breadth of the powers contained in SCR 242. In dismissing the appeal against the second interlocutory judgment, Hinton J found that on a review of the evidence, the decision of Judge Bochner was correct and that the powers contained in SCR 242 were discretionary. The dismissal of FDN 36 led to the consequential dismissal of FDN 12. I have carefully considered the submissions of both the appellant and the respondent. In relation to Hinton J’s review of the factual issues on appeal against the second interlocutory judgment, I consider that there is no reason to doubt the correctness of his decision. In relation to the interpretation of SCR 242, I consider that Hinton J’s approach is correct. Hinton J (Kourakis CJ and Kelly J agreeing) in Keung v Abbott & Anor (No 2)[3] observed:[4][3] [2019] SASCFC 39.[4] Keung v Abbott & Anor(No 2) [2019] SASCFC 39 at [33].…The applicable principles drawn from Viscariello and the authorities to which it refers may be distilled to the following:I.the power to reopen is discretionary and is to be exercised with great caution having regard to the strong public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation;II. relevant considerations include:i. once a stage in the process of litigation has been completed, ordinarily it should not be revisited;ii. our system of adversarial litigation ordinarily obliges a party to present their whole case and to present their best case;iii. whether there is available an avenue of appeal;iv. whether the court has good reason to consider that in its earlier judgment it has proceeded on a misapprehension of fact or law in a significant respect which cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing;v. whether the party applying to reopen has had the opportunity to be heard on why orders should not be made;III.the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of re-agitating arguments already considered by the court or to elaborate on arguments previously put;IV.the jurisdiction is not to be exercised to afford an opportunity to a party to persuade the court that a matter considered and decided has been wrongly decided.In McAdam Doyle CJ added:As the High Court said in Smith (at 265) the power is discretionary. It is not a power that lends itself to detailed categorisation, but nor is the discretion an ample one. Indeed, it is fairly closely confined.(Footnotes omitted)