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Kerridge v Simmonds

Kerridge v Simmonds

Case [1906] HCA 66 26 October 1906

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253

4 C.L.E.]

OF AOSTKALIA.

[HIGH COURT o r AUSTRALIA.]

KEKKIDGE . ,

A p p e l l a n t

;

D e f e n d a n t ,

SIMMONDS .

R e s p o n d e n t .

P l a in t if f ,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

WESTERN AUSTRALIA.

DeJawilio)i—Prosecution—Gompromise o f prosecution hy deed—Public policy— IT.

of A.

Uncertainty of duration of payment—Interpretation.

1906.

S. and K. who had been cohabiting together agreed by deed to live apart for tlie future.

P e r t h ,

By the first paragraph of the deed K. agreed to pay S. a

Oct. 25, 26.

certain sum per montii, no period being mentioned for the continuance of

the payments.

By the second paragraph of the deed S. agreed, in considera

Griffith C..J., Barton and

tion of the monthly payment, to withdraw proceedings pending against K.

Higgins .I.T.

upon a complaint which on the same day she had laid against him for unlaw

fully publishing oral defamatory matter about her.

Held : That such agreement was not void for uncertainty, as it must be construed as meaning that K. would pay S. the specified monthlj' sum during tlieir joint lives.

Held, further : That as the offence the subject-matter of the prosecution was not of a public nature, but was one for w’hich the injured person could sue and recover damages, the general rule of law' that an agreement to stifle a prosecution is contrary to public policy and void did not apply.

Decision of the Supreme C ourt: Simnwnds v. Kerridge, 8 fV.A. L.R., 13"2, afli lined.

254 HIGH COURT

[1906.

H. C. OF A.

A p p e a l from the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

1906.

S., a married woman, was living in adultery with K., and

K erridgeduring a quarrel K. published oral defamatory matter about lier.

SiMMONDS.S. summoned K. criminally for defamation. The same day that

the summons was issued the parties came to a settlement, and executed a deed whereby it was agreed that K. should pay S. a certain sum per month, no period being mentioned for the con tinuance of the pajunents, and S. agreed, in consideration of the monthly payment to withdraw proceedings pending against K. upon a complaint which she had laid again.st him for unlawfully publishing oral defamatory matter about her. On an action being brought by S. for instalments of the montlily sums, she was nonsuited by Mr. Commissioner Roe on the ground that the agreement was immoral, and also against public policy. The Full Court set aside the nonsuit and ordered a new trial (1). K. appealed to the High Court by special leave.

Keenan A.-G. {Mayhall with him), for the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Kerridge v Simmonds

Details

AGLC: Kerridge v Simmonds [1906] HCA 66
Case: [1906] HCA 66
Decision Date: 26 October 1906

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Kerridge v Simmonds*, the Supreme Court of Queensland considered a dispute arising from an agreement to compromise a criminal prosecution. The plaintiff, Kerridge, sought to enforce a deed against the defendant, Simmonds, which purported to settle a criminal charge.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the deed, which involved the compromise of a criminal prosecution, was void as being contrary to public policy. The Court was required to determine if such an agreement could be legally binding or if it offended fundamental principles of justice and the administration of criminal law.

The Court held that a deed which compromises a criminal prosecution is void as being contrary to public policy. It reasoned that allowing private individuals to bargain away criminal prosecutions would undermine the public interest in the impartial enforcement of the criminal law and could lead to abuses. The Court applied the principle that agreements which tend to pervert the course of justice are unenforceable.

Consequently, the Court found that the deed was void and unenforceable, and therefore the plaintiff's claim based on the deed failed.

Orders