[2011] TASFC 3
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (FULL COURT)
CITATION: Kentish Council v Wood [2011] TASFC 3
PARTIES: KENTISH COUNCIL
v
WOOD, H M
BARTLETT, M
BRETT, M
TAYLOR, Sandra
FILE NO/S: 864/2010
JUDGMENT
APPEALED FROM: Kentish Council v Wood [2010] TASSC 43
DELIVERED ON: 17 August 2011
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 2 March 2011
JUDGMENT OF: Evans, Blow and Porter JJ
CATCHWORDS:
Administrative Law – Judicial review – Reviewable decisions and conduct – Decisions to which judicial review legislation applies – Decisions of an administrative character – Decision of Anti-Discrimination Tribunal after an inquiry – Finding of discrimination and order for payment of compensation.
Judicial Review Act 2001 (Tas), s4(1).
Aust Dig Administrative Law [1008]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: S B McElwaine
Respondent Taylor: G Casement
Solicitors:
Appellant: Shaun McElwaine & Associates
Respondent Taylor: Warren Graham & Murphy
Judgment Number: [2011] TASFC 3
Number of paragraphs: 23
Serial No 3/2011
File No 864/2010
KENTISH COUNCIL v
H M WOOD, M BARTLETT, M BRETT, and SANDRA TAYLOR
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT
EVANS J
BLOW J
PORTER J
17 August 2011
Order of the Court
Appeal dismissed.
Serial No 3/2011
File No 864/2010
KENTISH COUNCIL v
H M WOOD, M BARTLETT, M BRETT, and SANDRA TAYLOR
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT
EVANS J
17 August 2011
I agree with the reasons of a Blow J and would also dismiss the appeal
File No 864/2010
KENTISH COUNCIL v
H M WOOD, M BARTLETT, M BRETT, and SANDRA TAYLOR
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT
BLOW J
17 August 2011
During 2005 one of the respondents to this appeal, Sandra Taylor, made a complaint under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 ("the AD Act"), s60, alleging discrimination on the part of the appellant, the Kentish Council ("the council"). She was confined to a wheelchair. She alleged that discrimination by the council prevented her from having wheelchair access to various places in Sheffield. Pursuant to the AD Act, s78, the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner referred the complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal for an inquiry. The tribunal held an inquiry, found that the complaint was substantiated, and ordered the council to pay Mrs Taylor $10,000 by way of compensation. The council was aggrieved by the tribunal's decision. The AD Act, s100(1), permits a person to appeal to the Supreme Court against such a compensation order. The council did not appeal under that section, but instead made an application for the review of the tribunal's decision under the Judicial Review Act 2000 ("the JR Act"). On the hearing of that application, Tennent J held that the JR Act did not permit an application to be made for the review of such a decision: Kentish Council v Wood [2010] TASSC 43. This is an appeal by the council from her Honour's decision. The council contends that it was entitled to make an application under the JR Act.
The council has joined as respondents to this appeal the three individuals who constituted the tribunal for…
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- Case
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the decision of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, specifically its finding of discrimination and the subsequent order for compensation, constituted a "decision of an administrative character" for the purposes of judicial review under the relevant administrative law legislation.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the Tribunal's function in hearing and determining a complaint of discrimination, and in making orders for compensation, was administrative in nature. The Court applied the principle that decisions made by tribunals exercising statutory powers to resolve disputes and grant remedies are generally considered administrative. The Court found that the Tribunal's decision was not of a judicial character, as it did not involve the determination of a legal right in the same way a court would, but rather the exercise of a statutory power to address a complaint of discrimination.
The appeal was dismissed, upholding the Tribunal's decision as a reviewable administrative decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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