| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
PERSONAL INJURIES LIST
S ECI 2021 01627
| BENJAMIN KELLY | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| MARIA PENZES | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | Gorton J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 9 February 2023 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 23 February 2023 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Kelly v Penzes |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSC 74 |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Appeal from judicial registrar – Legal professional privilege – Dominant purpose test – Where document created for the purpose of obtaining legal advice if needed but otherwise retained on file – Whether any privilege waived by reason of Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) s 126A(2) – Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) ss 118 and 119 – Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) s 126A.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr A D B Ingram KC and Mr Y C Chen of counsel | Maurice Blackburn Lawyers |
| For the Defendant | Mr C Blanden KC and Ms A Bannon of counsel | Transport Accident Commission |
HIS HONOUR:
A. Introduction
This case concerns whether two investigation reports obtained by the Transport Accident Commission (‘the TAC’) are privileged.
B. Background
Benjamin Kelly, the plaintiff, sustained injuries in a transport accident on 4 July 1997 when he was 14 years old. On 8 July 1997, his father completed a claim on his behalf for compensation under the Transport Accident Act 1986 (‘the Act’). The claim form indicated that Mr Kelly had suffered injury when his bicycle was hit by a car after he had ridden from the footpath onto a road, and that he had received injuries including a head injury. He was in hospital when the claim form was completed. On 28 July 1997, the TAC accepted his claim and commenced to pay no-fault benefits under the Act.
Shortly afterwards, on 11 August 1997, an employee of the TAC, Ms Angelie Marshall, engaged external investigators to prepare a report. Ms Marshall, who was not then legally qualified, was employed as a ‘Common Law Officer’. Her request to the investigators was in the following terms:
Please interview cyclist & driver to determine accident circs & establish fault. Thankyou.
The investigators provided their report. Then, on 3 October 1997, Ms Marshall provided to the investigators the contact details of a police officer, and asked them to prepare a second report. This request was in the following terms:
Please determine speed, point of impact, fault, evasive action taken by the driver, was there a crossing, skid marks. Thanks
Not long after this, the second report was provided.
More than twenty years then passed. There is no evidence of what, if anything, was done with the reports over that time. Then, in 2019, Mr Kelly commenced a proceeding under s 93(4)(d) of the Act in which he sought leave to commence a proceeding for the recovery of damages on the grounds that he had suffered a ‘serious injury’, as that term is defined in the Act. [1] On 16 July 2020,…
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- AGLC
- Kelly v Penzes [2023] VSC 74
- Case
- [2023] VSC 74
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court began by examining the dominant purpose test, which requires that the primary intention behind creating a document must be to obtain legal advice. It was noted that if the dominant purpose of the document was indeed to seek legal advice, then the document would be protected by legal professional privilege. However, if the document was retained for another reason, such as administrative purposes, the privilege would not apply. The court then considered whether the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) section 126A(2) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) sections 118 and 119 had the effect of waiving any privilege that might otherwise apply. The court found that the legislation did not explicitly waive privilege, but rather provided mechanisms for disclosure in specific circumstances.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the documents in question were not protected by legal professional privilege because their dominant purpose was not to seek legal advice, but rather for record-keeping. The court held that the possibility of needing legal advice in the future did not constitute a dominant purpose sufficient to grant privilege. The court further determined that the legislation did not result in an automatic waiver of privilege, but allowed for the possibility of disclosure in certain situations. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the judicial registrar was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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