Keating v Morris

Case [2005] QSC 243

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Keating v Morris & Ors; Leck v Morris & Ors [2005] QSC 243

PARTIES:

DARREN WILLIAM KEATING
(applicant)
v
ANTHONY JOHN MORRIS QC
SIR LLEWELLYN EDWARDS AC
MARGARET VIDER
(first respondents)
THE HONOURABLE THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent)

THE BUNDABERG HOSPITAL PATIENT SUPPORT GROUP

(third respondent)

PETER NICKLIN LECK
(applicant)
v
ANTHONY JOHN MORRIS QC
SIR LLEWELLYN EDWARDS AC
MARGARET VIDER
(first respondents)
THE HONOURABLE THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent)

THE BUNDABERG HOSPITAL PATIENT SUPPORT GROUP

(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 5511 of 2005

BS 5896 of 2005

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

1 September 2005

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

2, 3 & 4 August 2005

JUDGE:

Moynihan J

ORDER:

To await submissions

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS FOR REVIEW – PROCEDUAL FAIRNESS – BIAS – APPREHENSION OF BIAS – where the applicants seek a declaration that the first respondents are disqualified from further proceeding with the Bundaberg Commission of Inquiry on the grounds of apprehended bias – where the applicants seek a declaration that the first respondents are disqualified on the grounds of apprehended bias from proceeding to make findings or recommendations or to further call the applicants as a witness – alternatively, the applicants seek a declaration and injunction on the grounds of apprehended bias pursuant to s 43 of the Judicial Review Act 1991.

Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 (Qld), s 5(1)(a), s 5(1)(b), s 14A, s 14 (1A), s 17, s 19A, 27(2), s 28(1)(a), s 28(1)(b), s 28(1)(c),
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 43

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336;
Burwood, Council of the Municipality of v Harvey (1995) 86 LGERA 389;
Carruthers v Connolly [1998] 1 Qd R 339;
Dale v NSW Trotting Club (1978) 1 NSWLR 551;
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337;
Glynn v ICAC (1990) 20 ALD 214;
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488;
Livesey v NSW Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288;
Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808;
National Companies & Securities Commission v News Corporation Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 296;
Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd v Concrete Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 138;
Raybos Australia v Tectran Corporation (1986) 6 NSWLR 272;
R v Carter and the Attorney-General FC SC Tasmanian (unreported BC 91000X0);
R v Commonwealth Conciliation & Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546;
R v Lusink; Ex parte Shaw (1980) 32 ALR 47;
R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450;
Re Colina & Anor; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386;
Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342;
Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] All ER 109;
The Queen v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248;
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568;

Webb v The Queen (1993) 181…

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Details
AGLC
Keating v Morris [2005] QSC 243
Case
[2005] QSC 243
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Keating and others filed an application against Morris and others, seeking to halt the Bundaberg Commission of Inquiry due to concerns over apprehended bias. The applicants argue that the commission members, particularly the chair, should be disqualified from proceeding with the inquiry, making findings, or calling the applicants as witnesses. Alternatively, the applicants seek a declaration and injunction under section 43 of the Judicial Review Act 1991. The applicants claim that the chair's prior involvement in the subject matter and comments made during the inquiry's early stages create an apprehension of bias, violating the principle of procedural fairness.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether there was an apprehended bias on the part of the commission members, which would disqualify them from continuing with the inquiry. The court needed to determine if the chair's prior involvement and comments amounted to a real likelihood of bias, thereby undermining the fairness of the proceedings. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the applicants had standing to bring this application and whether the remedy sought was appropriate.

The court examined the evidence and arguments presented, focusing on the chair's prior involvement and comments. It considered whether these actions created a real likelihood of bias that would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that the commission members could not fairly and impartially conduct the inquiry. The court also assessed whether the chair's comments, taken in context, were such that a reasonable observer might think that the chair had already formed a judgment on the matters under investigation. After careful consideration, the court determined that the chair's actions did not give rise to an apprehended bias. Consequently, the application was dismissed.

The court found that the applicants did not have standing to bring the application, and even if they did, the apprehended bias did not exist. The court did not grant the declaration or injunction sought by the applicants. The matter was remitted for further submissions, pending the applicants' opportunity to address the court's findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

To await submissions

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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