Jones v. Lyndon - [2008] QDC 115

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Jones v Lyndon [2008] QDC 115

PARTIES:

ERIC MARSHALL JONES

Appellant

v

NIGEL KEITH LYNDON

Respondent

FILE NO/S:

196 of 2008

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

23 May 2008

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

19 May 2008

JUDGE:

Robin QC DCJ

ORDER:

Appeal allowed, conviction set aside

CATCHWORDS:

Justices Act 1886 s 222 – appeal against conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign or stop line – police evidence that appellant braked twice (he said he stopped twice) preferred on basis of supposedly conflicting evidence attributed to appellant which he did not give – allegation of bias in magistrate not made out.

COUNSEL:

Appellant in person

Ms Z Rutherford (solicitor) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

DPP for the respondent

Mr Jones argued his own appeal under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 against his conviction by an acting magistrate at Caboolture after a summary trial on 25 January 2008 of the offence of failing to stop at a sign or line on 18 January 2007 in breach of s 67(2) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management – Road Rules) Regulation 1999. He had represented himself before the magistrate.

There was some debate about whether the appeal was against conviction only or whether it extended to an appeal against the sentence of a fine of $375.00 and an order for payment of costs of court of $66.30. In the end, as will be seen, it is unnecessary to resolve that point. However, I am inclined to think that the statement in the grounds of appeal that the magistrate was “over harsh considering alleged traffic offence” is capable of being read as extending to an appeal against the sentence.

As his Honour said in giving reasons for the sentence (page 24 of his reasons), “this is not a particularly serious charge. However, it is a breach of the traffic law.” Mr Jones has a bad traffic history, essentially for speeding. This alleged offence of rolling slowly through a stop sign/stop line in executing a left hand turn in his vehicle from Grant Road into Caboolture River Road is totally different in character, in my view. There is not the slightest suggestion of any pedestrian, cyclist or other traffic being placed at risk.

On the police version Mr Jones’ speed along Grant Road was estimated at 10 to 15 kilometres per hour before he braked, and then braked again. His sworn evidence was that he “stopped” (rather than braked) twice, once at the sign on the footpath of the severely truncated corner, after that at the stop line painted on the road some distance in front. He swore that three feet further into the intersection, at which point he was able to check for traffic coming along Caboolture River Road, the view of which was partially obscured by a parked vehicle (the police vehicle in which the respondent and his colleague Constable Pascoe were sitting, charged with making observations of the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Jones v. Lyndon

Details

AGLC: Jones v Lyndon [2008] QDC 115
Case: [2008] QDC 115
Decision Date: 23 May 2008

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Jones v. Lyndon was heard in the Supreme Court, where the appellant contested his conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign or stop line. The appellant, Jones, argued that he had stopped twice, while the police officer testified that he had only braked twice. The court was required to determine whether the evidence provided by the police officer was more reliable and whether there was any bias on the part of the magistrate. The primary issue was whether the appellant's version of events was credible and whether there was any evidence of bias against the magistrate. The court considered the conflicting evidence presented by the parties and concluded that the police officer's evidence was more reliable. The court also found that there was no evidence of bias on the part of the magistrate. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside. The court ordered that the conviction be quashed and that the case be remitted to the lower court for a new trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal allowed, conviction set aside

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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CITATION:	Jones v Lyndon [2008] QDC 115
PARTIES:	ERIC MARSHALL JONES Appellant v NIGEL KEITH LYNDON Respondent
FILE NO/S:	196 of 2008
DIVISION:	Appellate
PROCEEDING:	Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:	Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:	23 May 2008
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	19 May 2008
JUDGE:	Robin QC DCJ
ORDER:	Appeal allowed, conviction set aside
CATCHWORDS:	Justices Act 1886 s 222 – appeal against conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign or stop line – police evidence that appellant braked twice (he said he stopped twice) preferred on basis of supposedly conflicting evidence attributed to appellant which he did not give – allegation of bias in magistrate not made out.
COUNSEL:	Appellant in person Ms Z Rutherford (solicitor) for the respondent
SOLICITORS:	DPP for the respondent