SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
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Details
- Case
- [2018] ACTSC 89
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In Kazolis v Registrar of Firearms, the plaintiff, Kazolis, appealed against the decision of the Registrar of Firearms to cancel his firearms licence. The Registrar decided that Kazolis had knowingly borrowed his son's licence in contravention of the Firearms Act 1996 (ACT). The primary issue before the court was whether Kazolis knowingly borrowed his son's licence and, if so, whether the Tribunal's decision to cancel the licence was procedurally fair.
The court examined the meaning of 'borrowed' in the context of the Firearms Act. It found that the term implies a temporary transfer of possession with the expectation of return. The court also considered whether the Tribunal's decision denied Kazolis procedural fairness. The court noted that Kazolis did not have the opportunity to challenge the evidence against him in the Tribunal due to its limited evidentiary powers, which contrasted with the powers of an ACT court under the Evidence Act. The court held that the Tribunal's reliance on this limited evidence, without the opportunity for cross-examination or the issuance of a privilege certificate, was unfair.
The court found that the Tribunal's decision was flawed due to the denial of procedural fairness. It quashed the decision of the Registrar and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration. The court also made an order that the Registrar pay Kazolis's costs of the proceeding.
The court examined the meaning of 'borrowed' in the context of the Firearms Act. It found that the term implies a temporary transfer of possession with the expectation of return. The court also considered whether the Tribunal's decision denied Kazolis procedural fairness. The court noted that Kazolis did not have the opportunity to challenge the evidence against him in the Tribunal due to its limited evidentiary powers, which contrasted with the powers of an ACT court under the Evidence Act. The court held that the Tribunal's reliance on this limited evidence, without the opportunity for cross-examination or the issuance of a privilege certificate, was unfair.
The court found that the Tribunal's decision was flawed due to the denial of procedural fairness. It quashed the decision of the Registrar and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration. The court also made an order that the Registrar pay Kazolis's costs of the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
See [88]
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The parties (and the Tribunal member hearing the case) took the view that an adjournment was necessary because the Tribunal lacked the power to issue a certificate concerning the privilege from self-incrimination, such as an ACT court has power to issue under s 128 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) (Evidence Act). I interpolate that the issue arose because ‘ACT court’ is defined in the Dictionary to the Evidence Act as meaning ‘the Supreme Court or Magistrates Court, and includes an entity that, in exercising a function under a territory law, is required to apply the laws of evidence.’ Under s 8 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) (ACAT Act), the Tribunal need not comply with the rules of evidence applying in the ACT. Further, under s 26 of the ACAT Act, the Tribunal may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate in the circumstances. It does not appear (from a review of the transcript of the Tribunal proceedings in evidence) that consideration was given by the parties at that time to s 83 of the ACAT Act, which provides that if the parties to an application jointly apply to have the matter removed to the Supreme Court, the Tribunal must order that the matter be removed to the Supreme Court. That may have been the most appropriate course given the evidentiary difficulties faced by the plaintiff in not being able to avail himself of a certificate and the statutory construction issues that are now before the Court by way of the grounds of review. Returning to the procedural history, it then took until November 2016 for criminal charges to be laid against the plaintiff, one of which (relevantly to the judicial review application), was the charge that the plaintiff knowingly had possession of a borrowed licence, in contravention of s 256(c) of the Act. On 28 February 2017, the plaintiff was committed to this Court to stand trial and the criminal proceedings are listed for hearing on 30 April 2018. The delay between March and August 2017 (when these judicial review proceedings were commenced) can be seen as attributable to the procedural ping pong that the parties were engaged in, moving between the Tribunal and this Court in respect of evidence supporting the criminal charges, including an interlocutory application brought by the defendant seeking to use material filed in the Tribunal in this Court: see Kazolis v ACT Registrar of Firearms [2017] ACAT 48, delivered on 3 July 2017. The above recitation of the procedural history establishes that the cause of the delay in commencing proceedings in this Court was not through the plaintiff’s inertia or neglect. The plaintiff has sought to challenge the Cancellation Decision since it was made, but the issues arising on administrative and judicial review were intermingled with criminal consequences and the resolution by means of commencing the more limited judicial review proceedings in this Court was not straightforward. Part of the delay is attributable to the time it took for the defendant to lay charges against the plaintiff and in the interlocutory application made to the Tribunal to use documents filed in the Tribunal in the criminal proceedings. I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case are sufficiently out of the ordinary to warrant a departure from the requirement to commence proceedings within 60 days of the decision being given.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi