FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Josan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1418
Appeal from: Josan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 493 File number(s): VID 262 of 2016 Judge(s): DAVIES J Date of judgment: 29 November 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal of dismissal of application for judicial review – refusal of a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) Subclass 886 (Skilled-Sponsored) VISA – application for leave to cross-appeal – whether breach of ss 359A and 362A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 359A, 362A, 375A Cases cited: Burton v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1455; (2005) 149 FCR 20
Davis v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 686
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Dhillon [2014] FCAFC 157; (2014) 227 FCR 525
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 81 ALJR 1190
Date of hearing: 29 November 2016 Date of last submissions: 25 September 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 31 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: N Wood Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 262 of 2016 BETWEEN: HARVINDER SINGH JOSAN
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
DAVIES J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The time within which to file the cross-appeal be extended.
3.The cross-appeal be dismissed.
4.Subject to order 5, there be no order as to costs.
5.Any application to set aside or vary order 4 be made within 5 days.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DAVIES J:
The appellant was refused a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) Subclass 886 (Skilled‑Sponsored) Visa (“Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) Visa”) by a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) on the basis that he did not satisfy Public Interest Criterion 4020. The Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirmed the decision of the delegate and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“the FCC”) dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s determination. The FCC, however, declared that:
In the events and circumstances which have happened the Second Respondent, the Migration Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal), erred in finding that the Applicant, Harvinder Singh Josan, breached Public Interest Criterion 4020, having made that finding as a result of a failure to observe the requirements of procedural fairness
(“the declaration”) and ordered the Minister to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings (from the date that the Minister was taken to have considered the appellant’s amended…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1418
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in the appeal were whether the Tribunal had breached sections 359A and 362A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the Full Court had erred in dismissing the appeal. The appellant also sought leave to cross-appeal the decision of the Full Court. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had not afforded him procedural fairness by not allowing him to respond to certain information that the Tribunal considered would be the reason, or a part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. The appellant further argued that the Full Court had erred in dismissing the appeal and that the Tribunal’s breach of procedural fairness and its conclusion that he had given it a “bogus document” infected the exercise of discretion in relation to the question of “closely related” course of study and nominated occupation.
The court held that the appellant’s grounds of appeal were not intelligible and appeared to be misconceived. The court found that the issue of the expiry of the three-year exclusionary period only became relevant in the context of the Full Court’s consideration of the utility of granting declaratory relief. The court accepted the Minister’s submission that the three-year period ran from the date of the decision of the delegate, but concluded that the appellant was entitled to declaratory relief nonetheless. The court held that the appellant’s submissions relating to the impact of the Full Court decision in Singh were not accepted.
The appeal was dismissed, and the time within which to file the cross-appeal was extended. The cross-appeal was also dismissed. There was no order as to costs, subject to an application to set aside or vary the order being made within five days.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The time within which to file the cross-appeal be extended.
3. The cross-appeal be dismissed.
4. Subject to order 5, there be no order as to costs.
5. Any application to set aside or vary order 4 be made within 5 days.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The cross-appeal raised two grounds. In view of the Minister’s concession, it is only necessary to refer to ground 2, which is as follows:Further or alternatively, the trial judge erred in making the declaration in order 1 (set out above). There was no utility in making that declaration. In particular, any “general reputational benefit” obtained by the making of the declaration was illusory, including because the declaration did not affect the decision by the delegate of the Minister made on 21 February 2013 to refuse to grant Mr Josan a visa on the basis that he had failed to satisfy Public Interest Criterion 4020.CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL The grounds as formulated were not intelligible and appear to be misconceived. No written submissions were filed by the appellant and it appeared from the oral submissions put by the appellant, who represented himself at the hearing of the appeal, that he was not in fact challenging that the exclusionary three year period by force of Public Interest Criterion 4020(2) runs from the date of decision of the delegate (21 February 2013), as found by the FCC. The issue of the expiry of the three year exclusionary period only became relevant in the context of the FCC’s consideration of the utility of granting declaratory relief. It appears from the reasons of the FCC that it was submitted on behalf of the appellant (who was represented below) that if declaratory relief was not granted, the three year exclusionary period would run from the date of the Tribunal’s decision, being 2 June 2014 until 1 June 2017 whereas if the declaratory relief was granted, the period would run from the date of the decision of the delegate, namely 21 February 2013 and so expire on 21 February 2016. In response, the Minister argued that the three year period ran from the date of the decision of the delegate. The FCC accepted the Minister’s submission but concluded that the appellant was entitled to declaratory relief nonetheless for two reasons, namely that declaratory relief would tend to mitigate any reputational damage that the appellant may suffer by the Tribunal’s decision concerning the bogus document and, secondly, that the Court should follow as precedents, the like cases and decisions of Dhillon and Sandhu. In the circumstances, notwithstanding grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal, it is not necessary to address whether the Tribunal was correct to conclude that the three year period expired on 21 February 2016, not 1 June 2017. In the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant relating to the impact of the Full Court decision in Singh, it was contended that the Court should quash the Tribunal’s decision given the Minister’s acceptance that the Tribunal did not afford the appellant procedural fairness. It was argued that the Tribunal’s breach of the rules of procedural fairness precluded it from affording the appellant a “real and meaningful” hearing as required by s 360 of the Act. It was further submitted that the breach of procedural fairness and the Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant had given it a “bogus document” infected the exercise of discretion in relation to the question of “closely related” course of study and nominated occupation and once the Tribunal decided that the appellant did not satisfy Public Interest Criterion 4020 for the purposes of cl 886.225 of the Regulations, it was obliged to affirm the decision. As such, it was argued, the consideration of the “closely related” criterion was a nullity and had no practical significance for the outcome of the review. These submissions are not accepted.