Davis v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Davis v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCA 686

MIGRATION – application for review of decision of the Migration Review Tribunal – application for subclass 820 (spouse) visa – procedural fairness – use of material for which a Ministerial certificate had been issued under s 375A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether s 362A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) requires the Tribunal to produce material for which a Ministerial Certificate had been issued under s 375A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – reasons – whether Migration Review Tribunal must set out findings in relation to criteria in sub-regulation 1.15A(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 – apparent bias – whether statement in reasons as to the relevance of age difference and difference in culture in a marriage constitutes bias

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5, 357A, 359A, 362A, 368, 375, 375A, 376, 379A, 474
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002
Migration Regulations 1994 reg 1.15A, Schedule 2 cl 820.211

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 followed
Bretag v Immigration Review Tribunal (unreported, O’Loughlin J, 29 November 1991) applied

MARION GABRIELE DAVIS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Q 159 OF 2003

DOWSETT J
1 JUNE 2004
BRISBANE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 159 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

MARION GABRIELE DAVIS
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 JUNE 2004

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 159 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

MARION GABRIELE DAVIS
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE:

1 JUNE 2004

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. On 9 August 2000, the applicant applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). The application was refused by a delegate of the respondent (the “Minister”). The applicant applied to the Migration Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) for review of that decision but was unsuccessful. This is an application for review of the decision of the Tribunal.

    THE ISSUE

  2. In order to qualify for grant of the visa, the applicant had to satisfy certain criteria as at the date of application. Such criteria are set out in cl 820.211 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Of particular relevance is subcl 820.211(2) which provides:

    ‘An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:
    (a)      the applicant is the spouse of a person who:

    (i)is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen; and

    (ii)...’

  3. Regulation 1.15A provides:

    (1)For the purposes of these Regulations, a person is…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 686
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Davis v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by the Tribunal under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central issue in this case was whether the Tribunal had correctly assessed the genuineness and continuity of the applicant’s relationship with Mr Davis, an Australian citizen, which was a prerequisite for her visa application. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had made value judgments based on social norms rather than a genuine assessment of the facts, and that the Tribunal had not considered the matter with an open mind.

The court examined the legal issues surrounding the Tribunal’s consideration of factors such as the age difference and cultural background of the parties. It was noted that while these factors could be relevant to the assessment of the relationship, they must be considered with care to avoid bias or prejudgment. The court held that the Tribunal’s observation regarding the age and cultural differences did not indicate prejudgment or bias. The Tribunal had appropriately taken into account the unusual nature of the marriage and the potential challenges the applicant might face in integrating into Australian society, which were relevant to the assessment of the relationship's genuineness.

The court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the relationship and dismissed the application. It was further ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application. This decision underscores the importance of careful consideration of all relevant factors in assessing the genuineness of a relationship for visa purposes, while ensuring that such considerations do not lead to bias or prejudgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

I do not understand the applicant to challenge this statement of principle. I am content to adopt it for the purposes of this decision. THE FACTS The applicant first arrived in Australia in October 1999. At that time, she had been estranged from her two children for over 20 years. They had emigrated to Australia with their father and his then de facto wife, Ms Beckert. Although Ms Beckert is now separated from the children’s father, it seems that she remains close to them. At some time prior to October 1999 she went to Germany and located the applicant. As a result the applicant visited Australia in October 1999. Shortly after her arrival she met George Gilbert Davis, an Australian citizen of Aboriginal extraction, who was a friend of the Beckert family. He was then aged 75 years. The applicant claims that a close relationship developed between her and Mr Davis. She returned to Germany on 31 October 1999. They maintained contact by telephone and, some time prior to 26 November 1999, agreed to marry. The applicant returned to Australia on 10 May 2000. She and Mr Davis married about six weeks later, on 23 June 2000. Mr Davis was then 76 years of age and the applicant, 44. At some stage the applicant and Ms Beckert fell out. On 5 July 2002 Mr Davis informed the migration authorities that he no longer wished to be the applicant’s sponsor in connection with her visa application. On 13 July 2002, he left the house which they were occupying and did not return. On 15 July 2002 the migration authorities informed the applicant that they had information which suggested that her relationship with Mr Davis had ended. On 22 July the applicant wrote to Mr Davis, asking him to return to her. On 12 August she took out a protection order against him. On 27 September 2002 he died. Although the relationship clearly ended no later than July 2002, the applicant may, in some circumstances, still be entitled to a visa, provided that as at the date of her application she satisfied the requirements of Regulation 1.15A for the purposes of subclause 820.211. In determining that question, events after the application may be taken into account. As O’Loughlin J observed in Bretag v Immigration Review Tribunal (unreported, O’Loughlin J, 29 November 1991):‘It is clear, of course, that the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to evidence that dealt with the relationship between Mr. Bretag and the applicant and between Mr. Bretag and Leanne subsequent to 28 January 1990 for the purposes of testing the claimed relationship between the applicant and Mr Bretag as at that date and as at the date of the application for the PEPAE – 7 February 1990. But the evidence of the subsequent history is only relevant so long as it “tends logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined”: Minister Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 4 ALD 139 at 160 per Deane J.’ The Tribunal considered numerous factual matters and concluded that ‘... the genuine and continuing nature of the relationship, as at the time of application, has not been demonstrated.’RELEVANT PROVISIONS

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOWSETT J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOWSETT J

The applicant and Mr Davis had been living together for more than six months at the relevant time. The Tribunal was aware of the evidentiary significance of this fact and referred to it expressly in its reasons. See par 39. However that provision did not fetter the power of the Tribunal to determine the weight to be given to other evidence. Even in the absence of a provision such as subreg 1.15A(5), it would obviously be necessary to give great weight to the fact that the parties had lived together for a substantial period of time prior to the application. There is no reason to believe that the Tribunal did not do so. There is nothing in this point.Effect of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 The submissions made under this heading are designed to demonstrate that the relevant legislation did not deprive an applicant of the right to judicial review of the decision. As much was conceded on behalf of the Minister. Apparent Bias At par 50 of the reasons, the Tribunal noted that the applicant had ‘initiated marriage with a man very much older than herself and from a very different culture’. The applicant submits that the Tribunal was:‘... making a value judgment based upon the Tribunal’s perception of social norms rather than a genuine assessment of the facts. It suggests that the Tribunal has not considered the matter with an open mind. Such a statement would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the Tribunal has prejudged the matter based on age and cultural considerations.’ The Tribunal’s observation no doubt touches on two sensitive areas. Comments concerning interracial marriages sometimes disclose racial prejudice or may be mistakenly thought to do so. The word “culture” is sometimes a euphemism for “race”. The question of marriage between people of widely different ages is also sensitive. That these issues may be sensitive is not a reason for avoiding a discussion of them when it is appropriate to the decision-making process. However great care should be taken in so doing. I am not satisfied that these factors were irrelevant to the discharge of the Tribunal’s duty to resolve this matter. For a person to marry at age 76 is itself a little unusual, although by no means unknown. An age differential of 32 years is also somewhat unusual, although again not unknown. It is also not unknown for a younger party to enter into a marriage with an older party for reasons of personal advantage extrinsic to those which usually motivate marriage as a lifetime union between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others. In those circumstances it was appropriate for the Tribunal to have regard to the age differential, although as I say, it was a matter to be considered with some care. Similar considerations may arise in the case of an inter-cultural or inter-racial marriage. The applicant and Mr Davis were from very different backgrounds and had not known each other for very long. The applicant, in particular, was apparently committing herself to a future which was quite different from her past experiences. It may be that the Tribunal had in mind the difficulties which a person who has lived all her life in Europe might face in coming to Australia, particularly rural Australia, as well as the differences between European and Aboriginal cultures. In any event, I am unpersuaded that this aspect of the relationship was irrelevant to an assessment of the parties’ commitment to the marriage. It would certainly be inappropriate to pre-judge that commitment having regard to age and race differences, particularly as they are not matters specified in subreg 1.15A(3). However the passage under consideration occurs in a passage which also refers to the circumstances in which the parties came to marry and events which occurred thereafter. I do not think that any fair-minded observer, appreciating the possible relevance of these matters, would consider that the Tribunal had pre-judged the matter. There is nothing in this criticism.