FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Davis v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCA 686MIGRATION – application for review of decision of the Migration Review Tribunal – application for subclass 820 (spouse) visa – procedural fairness – use of material for which a Ministerial certificate had been issued under s 375A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether s 362A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) requires the Tribunal to produce material for which a Ministerial Certificate had been issued under s 375A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – reasons – whether Migration Review Tribunal must set out findings in relation to criteria in sub-regulation 1.15A(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 – apparent bias – whether statement in reasons as to the relevance of age difference and difference in culture in a marriage constitutes bias
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5, 357A, 359A, 362A, 368, 375, 375A, 376, 379A, 474
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002
Migration Regulations 1994 reg 1.15A, Schedule 2 cl 820.211Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 followed
Bretag v Immigration Review Tribunal (unreported, O’Loughlin J, 29 November 1991) appliedMARION GABRIELE DAVIS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Q 159 OF 2003
DOWSETT J
1 JUNE 2004
BRISBANE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 159 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
MARION GABRIELE DAVIS
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
DOWSETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 JUNE 2004
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 159 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
MARION GABRIELE DAVIS
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
DOWSETT J
DATE:
1 JUNE 2004
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND
On 9 August 2000, the applicant applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). The application was refused by a delegate of the respondent (the “Minister”). The applicant applied to the Migration Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) for review of that decision but was unsuccessful. This is an application for review of the decision of the Tribunal.
THE ISSUE
In order to qualify for grant of the visa, the applicant had to satisfy certain criteria as at the date of application. Such criteria are set out in cl 820.211 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Of particular relevance is subcl 820.211(2) which provides:
‘An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:
(a) the applicant is the spouse of a person who:(i)is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen; and
(ii)...’
Regulation 1.15A provides:
(1)For the purposes of these Regulations, a person is…
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- Case
- [2004] FCA 686
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legal issues surrounding the Tribunal’s consideration of factors such as the age difference and cultural background of the parties. It was noted that while these factors could be relevant to the assessment of the relationship, they must be considered with care to avoid bias or prejudgment. The court held that the Tribunal’s observation regarding the age and cultural differences did not indicate prejudgment or bias. The Tribunal had appropriately taken into account the unusual nature of the marriage and the potential challenges the applicant might face in integrating into Australian society, which were relevant to the assessment of the relationship's genuineness.
The court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the relationship and dismissed the application. It was further ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application. This decision underscores the importance of careful consideration of all relevant factors in assessing the genuineness of a relationship for visa purposes, while ensuring that such considerations do not lead to bias or prejudgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: DOWSETT J
The applicant and Mr Davis had been living together for more than six months at the relevant time. The Tribunal was aware of the evidentiary significance of this fact and referred to it expressly in its reasons. See par 39. However that provision did not fetter the power of the Tribunal to determine the weight to be given to other evidence. Even in the absence of a provision such as subreg 1.15A(5), it would obviously be necessary to give great weight to the fact that the parties had lived together for a substantial period of time prior to the application. There is no reason to believe that the Tribunal did not do so. There is nothing in this point.Effect of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 The submissions made under this heading are designed to demonstrate that the relevant legislation did not deprive an applicant of the right to judicial review of the decision. As much was conceded on behalf of the Minister. Apparent Bias At par 50 of the reasons, the Tribunal noted that the applicant had ‘initiated marriage with a man very much older than herself and from a very different culture’. The applicant submits that the Tribunal was:‘... making a value judgment based upon the Tribunal’s perception of social norms rather than a genuine assessment of the facts. It suggests that the Tribunal has not considered the matter with an open mind. Such a statement would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the Tribunal has prejudged the matter based on age and cultural considerations.’ The Tribunal’s observation no doubt touches on two sensitive areas. Comments concerning interracial marriages sometimes disclose racial prejudice or may be mistakenly thought to do so. The word “culture” is sometimes a euphemism for “race”. The question of marriage between people of widely different ages is also sensitive. That these issues may be sensitive is not a reason for avoiding a discussion of them when it is appropriate to the decision-making process. However great care should be taken in so doing. I am not satisfied that these factors were irrelevant to the discharge of the Tribunal’s duty to resolve this matter. For a person to marry at age 76 is itself a little unusual, although by no means unknown. An age differential of 32 years is also somewhat unusual, although again not unknown. It is also not unknown for a younger party to enter into a marriage with an older party for reasons of personal advantage extrinsic to those which usually motivate marriage as a lifetime union between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others. In those circumstances it was appropriate for the Tribunal to have regard to the age differential, although as I say, it was a matter to be considered with some care. Similar considerations may arise in the case of an inter-cultural or inter-racial marriage. The applicant and Mr Davis were from very different backgrounds and had not known each other for very long. The applicant, in particular, was apparently committing herself to a future which was quite different from her past experiences. It may be that the Tribunal had in mind the difficulties which a person who has lived all her life in Europe might face in coming to Australia, particularly rural Australia, as well as the differences between European and Aboriginal cultures. In any event, I am unpersuaded that this aspect of the relationship was irrelevant to an assessment of the parties’ commitment to the marriage. It would certainly be inappropriate to pre-judge that commitment having regard to age and race differences, particularly as they are not matters specified in subreg 1.15A(3). However the passage under consideration occurs in a passage which also refers to the circumstances in which the parties came to marry and events which occurred thereafter. I do not think that any fair-minded observer, appreciating the possible relevance of these matters, would consider that the Tribunal had pre-judged the matter. There is nothing in this criticism.