Jones and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy

This matter concerned an appeal by the Applicants against a decision of the Respondent, the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, which confirmed the Trustee's objection to the Applicants' discharge from bankruptcy. The Applicants had become bankrupt in May 2014, and various trustees were appointed. Between September 2014 and August 2016, the Trustee made multiple requests for information regarding the Applicants' property, specifically details about art pieces. The Trustee warned that failure to provide this information by 30 August 2016 would result in an objection to their discharge. The Applicants responded on 31 August 2016, stating they did not know the exact location of the art pieces and required an extension, providing contact details for one representative and indicating efforts to obtain the requested information. The Trustee subsequently lodged an objection on 13 September 2016, asserting the Applicants failed to comply with the request for information.

The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the Trustee's objection specified at least one "special ground" for objecting to discharge, whether there was sufficient evidence to support such a ground, and whether the Applicants had failed to establish a reasonable excuse for not providing the requested information. The relevant special ground was identified under section 149D(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), which pertains to a bankrupt's failure to comply with a written request from the trustee for information about their property, income, or expected income. The Tribunal was required to consider the operation of section 149N of the Act, particularly the interplay between subsections (1) and (1A), and the standard of proof applicable to the Inspector-General's satisfaction.

The Tribunal adopted the reasoning from previous decisions, notably *Rimanic and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy* [2010] AATA 875, which clarified that the Inspector-General (and by extension, the Tribunal) must be "satisfied" of the grounds, rather than a party bearing an onus of proof to establish them. The standard of proof was that of the balance of probabilities. The Tribunal found that the objection did specify a special ground under section 149D(1)(d). The core of the Respondent's contention was that the Applicants failed to provide the requested information and lacked a reasonable excuse. The Applicants argued that their response on 31 August 2016 constituted a valid attempt to comply and sought an extension, which the Trustee claimed not to have received.

The Tribunal determined that the decision under review was made pursuant to section 149N of the Act. The Applicants' appeal was heard, and various submissions and documents were presented as evidence. The Tribunal's ultimate decision was to set aside the Respondent's decision and substitute it with a new decision.