Weston and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy

Link copied
Case Copied 29 min read

Weston and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2022] AATA 1252 (17 May 2022)

Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2021/0705

Re:Paul Weston

APPLICANT

AndInspector-General in Bankruptcy

RESPONDENT

AndSalim Mehajer

OTHER PARTY

DECISION

Tribunal:Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member

Date:17 May 2022

Place:Sydney

The Respondent’s decision to confirm the Trustee’s decision to file the notice of objection is affirmed.

............................................[sgd].........................

Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

BANKRUPTCY – trustee’s objection to discharge – where special grounds specified in objection – failure to comply with request to provide written information about the bankrupt’s property, income or expected income – failure to pay an amount that the bankrupt was liable to pay under s139ZG – where there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of a special ground – where bankrupt does not have a reasonable excuse for the conduct or failure – decision affirmed

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act (1975) (Cth) ss 37, 43

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 139T, 139ZA, 139ZG, 149, 149B, 149C, 149D, 149K, 149Q

CASES

Jones and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2018] AATA 3260

Rimanic and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2010] AATA 875

Stolyar and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2021] AATA 3398

REASONS FOR DECISION

Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member

17 May 2022

Introduction

  1. This case is about whether the period of bankruptcy of Mr Salim Mehajar (the Other Party) should be extended.  The period of bankruptcy was due to end on 5 May 2021.[1]  The effect of the reviewable decision is that the bankruptcy will end on 4 May 2026.  The relevant legislation is the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

    [1] Pursuant to s 149(4) of the Act.

  2. The Applicant, the trustee in bankruptcy, lodged a written notice of objection to discharge from bankruptcy on 11 November 2020 pursuant to section 149B of the Act under the grounds specified in paragraphs 149D(1)(f) and 149D(1)(d) of the Act (Objection). 

  3. The ground in paragraph 149D(1)(f) is that the bankrupt failed to pay to the trustee an amount that the bankrupt was liable to pay under section 139ZG of the Act.  The ground in paragraph 149D(1)(d) was that the bankrupt, when requested in writing by the trustee to provide written information about the bankrupt’s property, income or expected income, failed to comply with the request.

  4. On 13 November 2020, the Other Party applied to the Respondent, the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, pursuant to section 149K of the Act requesting a review of the Objection on all grounds.[2] 

    [2] T5.

  5. On 12 January 2021, a delegate of the Respondent decided to confirm the ground of objection contained in paragraph 149D(1)(f) (the confirmed ground) and to cancel the ground of objection in paragraph 149D(1)(d) (the cancelled ground) (the reviewable decision).  As stated in the reviewable decision, the effect of the decision pursuant to subsection 149A(2) of the Act was that the Other Party will remain bankrupt until 4 May 2026.

  6. The Applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the reviewable decision pursuant to section 149Q of the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Weston and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2022] AATA 1252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an objection to a bankrupt's discharge, brought before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal by the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy. The bankrupt, referred to as the Other Party, disputed the grounds for objection, which were based on his alleged failure to provide requested information about his property and income, and his failure to pay a contribution assessed under section 139ZG of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

The Tribunal was required to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the existence of the special grounds for objection specified by the Inspector-General. Specifically, it needed to assess if the bankrupt had failed to provide written information regarding his property, income, or expected income, and if he had failed to pay an amount he was liable to pay under section 139ZG. Furthermore, the Tribunal had to consider whether the bankrupt had a reasonable excuse for any such conduct or failure.

The Tribunal found that the bankrupt's claims regarding the provision of information were contradictory and unpersuasive, noting that he had been requested to provide information over a long period and had been granted extensions for compliance, which he ultimately failed to meet. His engagement in other court proceedings and focus on property interests during the compliance period indicated a lack of prioritisation. Regarding the non-payment of contributions, the Tribunal noted that the bankrupt had received notice of his liability and had applied for a review, but there was no basis for his belief that payment was suspended during the review process. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the bankrupt had established a reasonable excuse for either the failure to provide information or the non-payment of contributions.

Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the Inspector-General's decision to confirm the Trustee's objection to the bankrupt's discharge, as there was sufficient evidence to support both special grounds and the bankrupt had failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his conduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 22 October 2020 the Other Party appeared in the Supreme Court proceeding he had launched. In an email to the Applicant’s office that same day, he wrote that he would be lodging a Notice of Motion to Stay those proceedings and would begin new proceedings the next day in relation to certain deeds of release in the Supreme Court rather than the Federal Court.Is there sufficient evidence to support the existence of the cancelled ground? The Other Party’s claims are two-fold and contradictory. He maintains that he has provided, directly or by way of search warrants, all documentation and information he has. He claims that he would have to use subpoenas to obtain other material. At the same time, he stated that he was going to provide more material, sought extensions of time within which to do so, and eventually did provide material which he maintained had already been provided. Doing the best I can, I understood the Other Party’s position was that he provided previously provided information to demonstrate that he was doing his best to co-operate with the Applicant. The only issue between the Applicant and Respondent was whether the Other Party had a reasonable excuse for his non-compliance. The evidence of the Applicant is persuasive. The Other Party has not provided the information requested. I do not accept the Other Party’s implied and direct claims that the Applicant has treated him unreasonably or unfairly in this matter. The dispute about the provision of information was longstanding. Evidence from the Other Party and his solicitor disclosed significant assets and details which gave rise to requests. The Other Party’s claims were contradictory and unpersuasive. I am satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of the cancelled ground of objection pursuant to paragraph 149N(1A)(b) of the Act Does the Other Party have a reasonable excuse for failing to provide the requested information? The Other Party had been requested to provide information over a long period of time prior to 22 September 2020. In response to the request on that date, he claimed that he would provide the information by 5 October 2020 and was later granted two extensions, the last for a week longer than he had requested. He did not seek the last extension until after the deadline. He was made aware sufficiently of the consequences of not providing the information requested. He initiated two court proceedings not long after receiving the 22 September 2020, was involved in another court proceeding, and was concerning himself with his real property interests in the period given to comply with the request. That the Other Party spent time on those other matters in October 2020 demonstrates that he was not prioritising complying with the Applicant’s request. I am not satisfied that the Other Party had a reasonable excuse for failing to provide the requested information. If behaviour after 11 November 2020 were considered, that would not assist the Other Party. His evidence about his health and the medical evidence he provided is not persuasive.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In this case, under subsection 149N(1A), the objection must not be cancelled under subsection 149N(1) because the objection specified two special grounds and there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of both and, and in respect of both special grounds, the bankrupt, the Other Party, has failed to establish that he had a reasonable excuse for the conduct or failure that constituted the special ground.Decision The Respondent’s decision to confirm the Trustee’s decision to file the notice of objection is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the Other Party submitted that the impact of the current pandemic should be considered, and that the extension of the bankruptcy would exacerbate pressure on him, his family and investors.Consideration of the confirmed ground There is no dispute that the Other Party has not paid the contributions. The 28 July 2020 notice stated:Your liability to contribute the assessed amount is not affected by the making of an application for review by the Inspector General of the assessed amount under Section 139ZA provides of the Act. Non-payment of the Compulsory Liability is grounds for objection pursuant to Section 149(1)(f) of the Act. The notice was issued under section 139ZG of the Act. Paragraph 139ZG(2)(b) provides that the liability to pay a contribution is not affected by a request to the Inspector for a review of the decision of the trustee to make the assessment. There is no basis for the Other Party’s claim that he was not liable to pay while there was a request for review before the Inspector General. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of a failure to pay income contributions The next question is, has the Other Party established a reasonable excuse for the non-payment? The Other Party did not maintain that he had been unaware that any income contribution was currently due and payable in his affidavit and Outline of Contentions. He accepted that he had received the Applicant’s Notice of Contribution of assessment dated 28 July 2020 and quoted from it, as set out above. He applied to the Respondent for review. No decision had been made. That the Other Party had applied for review to the Respondent was accepted. Based on the Other Party’s claim that he applied for review “in time”, that is within 60 days, and the statement in the Respondent’s SoFIC that the Other Party corresponded with the Respondent about the contribution assessment “at the end of September 2020”, I infer that the application was made just before the 60-day limit, 26 September 2020. The email from the Respondent to the Other Party dated 3 December 2020 refers to the review application. He said he did not receive it because he was in custody. At the hearing I understood the Other Party to maintain that he had never been advised that he was liable to pay and had never received the notice dated 28 July 2020. He did not refer to the email sent to him by the Applicant on 23 September 2020 that referred to the Income Contribution Reassessment dated 28 July 2020 and noted that “he was yet to pay the first two instalments under the reassessment” and directing him to pay the arrears of $3,957.60 immediately to his bankrupt estate administration account. It listed the BSB, account number and name. The email was sent to the same email address as the 28 July 2020 had been. The email did not provide information about applying to the Respondent for review of the contribution assessment. That the Other Party applied to the Respondent for review of the contribution assessment “within time” and relies on that fact to claim that he believed he did not have to pay while the review was underway, contradicts the evidence that he had never received it.