Jonathan Mitchell v University of Tasmania

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[2023] FWC 810 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2023/2154) was lodged against this decision.]

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.739 - Application to deal with a dispute

Jonathan Mitchell
v

University of Tasmania

(C2022/1761)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT COLMAN

MELBOURNE, 4 APRIL 2023

Dispute arising under enterprise agreement – whether employer met consultation obligations in respect of COVID-19 vaccination policy – whether direction to comply reasonable – whether compensation can and should be paid to applicant – considerations of power and merit in relation to ‘remedy’ – dispute determined.

  1. This decision determines an application made in March 2022 by Mr Jonathan Mitchell under s 739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) for the Commission to deal with a dispute in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure in clause 15 of the University of Tasmania Staff Agreement 2017-2021 (2017 Agreement). The procedure in clause 15 applied to any dispute regarding the application of the terms of the 2017 Agreement and stated that, where a dispute remained unresolved at the workplace level, it could be referred to the Commission for resolution by conciliation or arbitration. The dispute in question arose in early 2022, and concerned the decision of Mr Mitchell’s employer, the University of Tasmania, to introduce a policy that required employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 as a condition of entry to the university’s premises. Mr Mitchell did not wish to become vaccinated. He found the policy to be unreasonable and considered that the university had failed to consult with him about it in the manner required by the 2017 Agreement.

  1. On 15 March 2022, Mr Mitchell filed his application asking the Commission to arbitrate the dispute. The application stated that the university had not complied with its obligation to consult with employees in relation to the introduction of significant change and that the university had now required him to show cause why his employment should not be terminated. It asked the Commission to determine whether the university’s direction to comply with the policy was a lawful and reasonable direction. It also sought an interim order that Mr Mitchell not be dismissed or disciplined until the application was determined. On 18 March 2022, the university terminated Mr Mitchell’s employment. On 21 March 2022, Commissioner Lee made an ex-tempore decision declining to make interim orders. The application was listed for further hearing on 12 April 2022. In a decision dated 27 May 2022, the Commissioner dismissed the application on two bases: first, Mr Mitchell was no longer an employee, which meant that the 2017 Agreement no longer applied to him; and secondly, the dispute did not fall within the scope of matters to which clause 15 applied, because the giving of lawful and reasonable directions was not a matter dealt with by the Agreement and the dispute was therefore not one about the application of the agreement.

  1. On 31 August 2022, a Full Bench of the Commission upheld Mr Mitchell’s appeal against the Commissioner’s decision (Mitchell v University…

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Details
Case
[2023] FWC 810
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jonathan Mitchell applied to the Fair Work Commission (FWC) for a dispute to be arbitrated in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure in clause 15 of the University of Tasmania Staff Agreement 2017-2021 (2017 Agreement). The dispute arose when the University of Tasmania (University) introduced a policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 as a condition of entry to university premises. Mr Mitchell was dismissed for failing to comply with the vaccination requirement. The dispute concerned whether the University was required to consult with Mr Mitchell in relation to the introduction of the vaccination policy, whether the University had done so, and whether the vaccination requirement was a lawful and reasonable direction. On 21 March 2022, the Commissioner dismissed Mr Mitchell’s application on two bases: first, that Mr Mitchell was no longer an employee, which meant that the 2017 Agreement no longer applied to him; and secondly, that the dispute did not fall within the scope of matters to which clause 15 applied, because the giving of lawful and reasonable directions was not a matter dealt with by the Agreement and the dispute was therefore not one about the application of the agreement. On 31 August 2022, a Full Bench of the Commission upheld Mr Mitchell’s appeal against the Commissioner’s decision (Mitchell v University of Tasmania[2022] FWCFB 165). It concluded that Mr Mitchell’s application had identified the subject matter of the dispute as being the question of whether the University had complied with its consultation obligations under clause 12 in respect of the introduction of the vaccination requirement, that this was clearly a dispute that fell within the scope of the dispute resolution procedure in clause 15, and that the question of whether the vaccination requirement was a lawful and reasonable direction followed from Mr Mitchell’s contention that the consultation requirements in clause 12 had not been met. The Full Bench quashed the Commissioner’s decision and remitted the application to him for determination consistent with its reasons. The Commissioner subsequently listed the matter for conference. Efforts to conciliate the matter were unsuccessful. The Commissioner then decided to recuse himself from determining the application on the basis that certain observations that the Commissioner had made during conciliation might raise an apprehension of bias. The application was subsequently reallocated to Deputy President Colman. The questions that the Deputy President was required to determine were whether the introduction of the vaccination requirement was a ‘significant change’ to which the consultation requirements in clause 12 applied, whether the University complied with clause 12, whether the 2017 Agreement invalidated the vaccination requirement, and whether any remedial orders should be granted. The Deputy President found that the introduction of the vaccination requirement was a significant change to which the consultation requirements in clause 12 of the 2017 Agreement applied, and that the University did not meet its obligations under that clause. The Deputy President also found that the 2017 Agreement was not to be construed as invalidating the vaccination requirement, nor did it invalidate the direction. The Deputy President concluded that the vaccination requirement was not unreasonable, and that the 2017 Agreement did not authorise the Commission to make the compensation orders that Mr Mitchell sought.

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