Mitchell v University of Tasmania

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[2022] FWCFB 165

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.604—Appeal of decision

Jonathan Mitchell
v

University of Tasmania

(C2022/3507)

VICE PRESIDENT HATCHER
VICE PRESIDENT CATANZARITI
COMMISSIONER YILMAZ

SYDNEY, 31 AUGUST 2022

Appeal against decision [2022] FWC 1115 of Commissioner Lee at Melbourne on 27 May 2022 in matter number C2022/1761.

Introduction

  1. Mr Jonathan Mitchell has lodged an appeal, for which permission is required, against a decision of Commissioner Lee issued on 27 May 2022.[1] The decision concerned an application made by Mr Mitchell under s 739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the FW Act) for the Commission to deal with a dispute with his employer, the University of Tasmania (University), in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure in clause 15 of the University of Tasmania Staff Agreement 2017-2021[2] (Agreement). Clause 15 applies, relevantly, to any dispute raised by an employee regarding the application of the terms of the Agreement,[3] and provides that where such a dispute is not resolved at the workplace level, a party may refer the dispute to the Commission for resolution by conciliation or, if this fails to resolve the dispute, arbitration.[4] We will describe in greater detail shortly the nature of Mr Mitchell’s dispute with the University but, in broad terms, it concerned the University’s decision to introduce a requirement for employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 as a condition of entry to the University’s premises and the subsequent action taken by the University against Mr Mitchell for his refusal to comply with this requirement. On the motion of the University, the Commissioner dismissed Mr Mitchell’s application on two bases: first, because Mr Mitchell was no longer employed by the University from 18 March 2022, the Agreement no longer applied to him and the Commissioner therefore lacked jurisdiction to deal with the matter and, second, because the dispute, properly characterised, did not fall within the scope of matters to which clause 15 applied. The Commissioner also found that there would be no utility in arbitrating the dispute to the extent that it was within jurisdiction. Mr Mitchell contends in his appeal that these conclusions were in error and that the Commission had power to arbitrate his dispute and should have done so.

  1. The basic chronology of the dispute is as follows. On 23 November 2021, the University sent its employees (including Mr Mitchell) an email containing a survey for the purpose of obtaining employees’ views about the possible introduction of mandatory vaccination against COVID-19. Mr Mitchell completed this survey on 25 November 2021 and, in doing so, expressed his opinions about the safety and effectiveness of vaccination. On 9 December 2021, the University’s Vice Chancellor sent employees a letter, via email, informing them that the University had decided to introduce a requirement that, from 15 January 2022, staff and anyone else coming onto campus would be required to be fully vaccinated or have an exemption. The letter went on to explain the reasoning for this decision and that it was supported by…

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Details
Case
[2022] FWCFB 165
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jonathan Mitchell, a former employee of the University of Tasmania, has appealed against a decision of Commissioner Lee in which his application under s 739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act) for the Commission to deal with a dispute with the University was dismissed. The appeal was heard by a Full Bench of the Commission consisting of Hatcher VP, Catanzariti VP and Yilmaz C. The dispute in question concerned the University’s decision to introduce a requirement for employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 as a condition of entry to the University’s premises and the subsequent action taken by the University against Mr Mitchell for his refusal to comply with this requirement. The appeal was brought on ten grounds. The University conceded that, to the extent that the appeal related to the decision that the Commission had no jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute because Mr Mitchell’s termination meant that he was no longer covered by the Agreement, it would be in the public interest to grant permission to appeal. The Full Bench concluded that the Commissioner erred in finding that there was no jurisdiction for him to arbitrate the dispute. The Full Bench held that the Commissioner should not have re-characterised the subject matter of the dispute by reference to the fact that Mr Mitchell’s s 739 application posed as the question to be determined whether the vaccination requirement was lawful and reasonable. The Full Bench found that the dispute was one which clause 15 required or allowed the Commission to deal with, thus engaging s 739 of the FW Act. The Full Bench also found that the Commissioner erred in concluding that he did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute because the Full Bench held that the Commissioner’s decision was contrary to a long line of Commission authority which determined that there was no basis to read a limitation into s 739 of the FW Act preventing the Commission from arbitrating a dispute which had arisen at a time when there was there was an employment relationship between the disputants solely because the employment relationship had terminated after the Commission was seized of the dispute. The Full Bench also held that the Commissioner erred in concluding that, to the extent there was a limited dispute about clause 12, he would decline to exercise his discretion to arbitrate because the Full Bench found that there was no proper basis for the Commissioner’s conclusion that the most favourable outcome which Mr Mitchell could obtain would be an order for the University to undertake a further consultation process in compliance with clause 12, being a process in which Mr Mitchell could not participate because he was no longer an employee. The Full Bench concluded that the appeal should be upheld and remitted the matter to Commissioner Lee for determination.

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