NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
CITATION:
Johnson v R, Moody v R [2010] NSWCCA 124
FILE NUMBER(S):
2009/2869
2009/2870
HEARING DATE(S):
21/05/2010
JUDGMENT DATE:
25 June 2010
PARTIES:
Paul Robert Johnson, Regina
Michael Ronald Moody, Regina
JUDGMENT OF:
James J Simpson J Barr AJ
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
2009/2869, 2009/2870
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Frearson DCJ
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
14/05/2009
COUNSEL:
H Dhanji - Applicant Johnson
F Veltro - Crown
SOLICITORS:
S O'Connor - Applicant Johnson
Applicant Moody in person
S Kavanagh - Crown
CATCHWORDS:
Application for leave to appeal against sentences - multiple offences of robbery armed with a dangerous weapon - whether sentences manifestly excessive
LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900 - ss 95, 97(1), 97(2)
Firearms Act 1996 - s 7(1)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 - ss 23, 37, Pt 3 Div 3
CATEGORY:
Principal judgment
CASES CITED:
R v Goundar [2001] NSWCCA 198; 127 A Crim R 331
R v JW [2010] NSWCCA 49
R v Breedon (NSWCCA, 3 December 1992, unreported)
R v Hoschke [2001] NSWCCA 317
R v Wright [2009] NSWCCA 3
GAS v The Queen [2004] HCA 22; 217 CLR 198
The Queen v Pearce [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610
Attorney General's Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 [2002] NSWCCA 518
R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566
Veen v The Queen(No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465
R v Wickham [2004] NSWCCA 193
Hillier v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] NSWCCA 312
Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629
R v Baleiovalau [2009] NSWCCA 153
R v Ta [2009] NSWCCA 196
R v George (2004) 149 A Crim R 38
R v Henry (1999) 36 NSWLR 346
TEXTS CITED:
DECISION:
In the application of Paul Robert Johnson - grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal.
In the application of Michael Ronald Moody - grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL
2009/2869
2009/2870JAMES J
SIMPSON J
BARR AJFRIDAY 25 JUNE 2010
Paul Robert JOHNSON v R
Michael Ronald MOODY v R
Judgment
JAMES J: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of Barr AJ and the judgment of Simpson J.
In her judgment Simpson J agrees with the orders proposed by Barr AJ and, subject to one reservation, with his Honour’s reasons. Her Honour’s reservation concerns what weight, if any, should have been given to the different roles played by the two offenders in committing the common offences, in determining Moody’s ground of appeal based on the alleged disparity between the sentences imposed on him and the sentences imposed on Johnson.
As regards the sentencing of offenders who were parties to the same joint criminal enterprise, Simpson J has in her judgment referred to statements of principle in previous decisions of this Court and in particular R v Goundar [2001] NSWCCA 198; 127 A Crim R 331 and
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- AGLC
- Johnson v R [2010] NSWCCA 124
- Case
- [2010] NSWCCA 124
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the applicant's argument that the sentencing judge failed to recognise the significantly less serious nature of the matters on the record was unfounded. The judge's brief reference to the lengthy criminal history was deemed accurate and sufficient. The court rejected the applicant’s assertion that the sentencing judge must have reasoned in an impermissible way and emphasised that the synthesis of a sentence is an instinctive process, not subject to rigid sequential consideration of each factor. The court concluded that the sentences were not manifestly excessive and denied the application for leave to appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: JAMES J
The submission continued to the effect that his Honour failed to acknowledge the different nature of the offences on Johnson’s record. It was pointed out that there were no prior robbery offences and no offences of violence. In the absence of an express limitation, it was submitted, it must be assumed that his Honour increased the weight to be given to personal deterrence to deter the applicant from crimes similar to those for which he stood for sentence but of which he had no prior history. Alternatively, his Honour increased the weight to be given to personal deterrence that failed to recognise and properly take into account the significantly less serious nature of the matters on the record. The additional weight that could be given to personal deterrence when sentencing for the robbery offences was extremely limited but no such limitation was acknowledged.Consideration His Honour said that the Form 1 offences were being taken into account in accordance with the guideline judgment. I accept that that was a reference to Attorney General’s Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 [2002] NSWCCA 518 and that his Honour had in mind the manner in which such matters may sound in sentence. So much appears from his Honour’s reference to “retribution and deterrence”. I note that in para [44] of the same judgment Spigelman CJ said this -44 The manner and degree to which the Form 1 offences can impinge upon elements relevant to sentencing for the principal offence will depend on a range of other factors pertinent to those elements and the weight to be given to them in the overall sentencing task. For that reason it will rarely be appropriate for a sentencing judge to attempt to quantify the effect on the sentence of taking into account Form 1 offences. (See R v Kay at [69].) It seems to me that there is no reason to suppose that his Honour did other than he said he would do, namely take the Form 1 matters into account in the manner required by this Court. His Honour’s reference to Johnson’s criminal history was brief but accurate. The history was long, stretching back to 1998, when Johnson was 16 years old. He had many convictions for offences of or involving theft and unlawful entry on to premises. Those offences were the “matters of dishonesty” that his Honour was referring to. It would not have been lost on his Honour that robbery includes theft. In my opinion his Honour was entitled to come to the view that Johnson’s record was an aggravating feature. His Honour was not required to state whether or exactly how he took account of “the interplay (and overlap) between the considerations relevant as a result of the Form 1 and those resulting from the applicant’s prior history”. It seems to me that the applicant’s submissions proceed on two misconceptions. The first is to assume by reference to things his Honour did not say that he must have reasoned in an impermissible way. The second is to assume, because his Honour said first that he intended to give effect to the Form 1 offences and then that he intended to give effect to the criminal record, that his Honour considered the first without regard to the second and vice versa. Such a construction is not warranted. A sentencing judge who has to take into account a number of matters is obliged to mention them one at a time. One may not infer from that that the judge deals with any before any other or without regard to any other. The synthesis of a sentence is an instinctive process.