SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Johnson v Parole Board of Queensland [2020] QSC 108
PARTIES:
RODNEY JOHN JOHNSON
(applicant)
v
PAROLE BOARD OF QUEENSLAND(respondent)
FILE NO/S:
BS No 2729 of 2019
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at BrisbaneDELIVERED ON:
11 May 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
5 February 2020
JUDGE:
Bradley J
ORDER:
The application for judicial review is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – UNREASONABLENESS – where the applicant is serving life sentences for murder and attempted murder – where the applicant became eligible for parole in 2009 and has made five applications for a parole order – where the applicant has been of good behaviour since 2008 and in residential accommodation since 2014 – where the applicant has completed all available custodial programs to address risk factors linked to his offending behaviour – whether the respondent’s decision to decline the applicant’s fifth application was so unreasonable that no reasonable person would decline the application
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS – FAILURE TO CONSIDER – where the applicant completed numerous custodial programs to address risk factors linked to his offending behaviour – where the facilitators of one of the programs produced a report detailing the applicant’s involvement in the program – where the report contained conclusions which were favourable to the applicant – whether the respondent failed to consider the report
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – FETTERING DISCRETION – where the respondent commissioned psychiatric assessments of the applicant – where those assessments were, in general terms, unfavourable to the applicant – where reports produced by prison authorities were more favourable to the applicant in some respects – whether the respondent inflexibly applied a policy to adopt the conclusions of the psychiatric assessments
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 3, s 242E
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 20, s 23Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Cervantes (2012) 61 MVR 443, cited
Calanca v Parole Board Queensland [2019] QSC 34, cited
Calanca v Queensland Parole Board [2013] QSC 294, applied
Flegg v Crime and Misconduct Commission [2014] QCA 42, cited
Gough v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board [2008] QSC 222, cited
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291, applied
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, cited
Mahoney v Chief Executive, Department of Transport and Main Roads (2014) 206 LGERA 302, applied
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, cited
R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2006] 2 AC 148, cited
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, citedCOUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
W R Ness for the…
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- Case
- [2020] QSC 108
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the Board's decision and found it to be rationally open on the relevant material before it. The Board was entitled to weigh the competing interests of the applicant and the public, and to consider the statutory purpose of corrective services. The court found that the Board did take into account the completion reports for the programs Mr. Johnson had completed, including the HISOP completion report. While Mr. Johnson may believe the Board gave insufficient weight to the comments of the facilitator in the exit report, this was a matter going to the merits of his parole application and not a ground for judicial review.
The court further found that the Board had not inflexibly applied policy in its decision-making process. The Board was entitled to consider the unfavorable conclusions of the psychiatric assessments commissioned by the Board, as well as the more favorable reports produced by prison authorities. The Board's decision to decline Mr. Johnson's parole application was based on a consideration of all the relevant material before it.
Finally, the court dismissed the application for judicial review and made no orders. The Board's decision to decline Mr. Johnson's parole application was found to be rationally open and not so unreasonable that no reasonable person would decline the application. The Board had considered the relevant material before it and had not failed to take relevant considerations into account or inflexibly applied policy.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application for judicial review is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The matters in the statement of reasons, noted above, make it impossible to conclude that the Board’s decision lacked an evident and intelligible justification when all the relevant matters were considered. Others, including Mr Johnson, may consider the Board gave insufficient consideration to some parts of the completion reports or gave excessive consideration to some of the other matters there identified or to opinions expressed in the reports of Dr Sundin and Dr Palk. However, the Board’s decision was rationally open on the relevant material before it for consideration. Failure to Take Relevant Considerations into Account A decision may be set aside where the decision-maker failed to take into account a consideration that it was bound to consider in making the decision.[31] Mr Johnson’s second ground of review asserts that the Board made such an error. [31]Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 (Mason J, Gibbs CJ and Dawson J agreeing). If the matter was one that the Board was obliged to take into account, then the only question is whether or not the Board did so. As Basten JA observed in Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Cervantes:[32] “How it is to be taken into account and what weight it is to be accorded in all the circumstances are matters within the authority of the decision-maker. Thus, assuming for present purposes that the assessor was bound to take into account the particular statement set out above, he could do so by dismissing it, by giving it little weight, or by giving it decisive weight.” [32](2012) 61 MVR 443 at 448-449 [16] (McColl and Macfarlan JJA agreeing). In his further and better particulars of the application, Mr Johnson refers to observations of program facilitators about his participation and contends that the Board “failed to consider the contents of Mr Johnson’s HISOP exit report”. The statement of reasons records that the Board “reviewed the completion reports” for the programs Mr Johnson had completed “where available”. The Board made specific mention of having regard to the completion reports for four of the programs, including the HISOP completion report dated 27 March 2013. The statement of reasons, at paragraph 8, includes an extract from the HISOP completion report and notes the program facilitator’s opinion.[33] The Board has not overlooked the matter in making its decision. [33]See paragraph [27] of these reasons. In the circumstances I am not satisfied that the Board failed to take into account the HISOP exit report. Mr Johnson may think the Board gave insufficient weight to the comments of the facilitator in the exit report about the improvement in his motivation and engagement with the program as it progressed. However, that is a matter going to the merits of his parole application and not a ground for judicial review.[34][34]Mahoney v Chief Executive, Department of Transport and Main Roads (2014) 206 LGERA 302 at 317 [39] (Gotterson JA, McMurdo P and Applegarth J agreeing).Inflexible Application of Policy