Johnson and Commissioner of Patents

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Johnson and Commissioner of Patents [2020] AATA 3983 (5 October 2020)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2020/4614

Re:Mark Johnson

APPLICANT

AndCommissioner of Patents

RESPONDENT

AndSlyp Pty Ltd

JOINED PARTY

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President Boyle

Date:5 October 2020

Place:Perth

It is directed that Slyp Pty Ltd be made a party to these proceedings to be described as the Other Party.

................................[SGD]....................................

Deputy President Boyle

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to join party – person whose interests are affected – role of the Tribunal in conducting review – extension of time for lodging patent application – directed that party be joined

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – s 30(1A)

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – s 223(2)

CASES

Carter and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 809

Kang and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] AATA 758

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2007] FCAFC 59

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President Boyle

5 October 2020

BACKGROUND

  1. By an application lodged with the Tribunal on 31 July 2020 the Applicant seeks the review of the decision of the Respondent dated 7 July 2020 to grant an extension of time under


    s 223(2) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the Patents Act) for the lodging of a patent application (the patent application) associated with previously lodged provisional applications.

  2. The patent application was filed with the Australian Patent Office on 19 December 2019 by Paul Weingarth, Spiro Rokos and Paul Scully-Power (the patent applicants).

  3. The Applicant unsuccessfully opposed the patent applicants’ application for an extension of time for the lodging of the patent application associated with a previously lodged provisional application.

  4. By an application lodged with the Tribunal on 27 August 2020, Slyp Pty Ltd (Slyp) sought to be made a party to these proceedings. The Applicant opposes Slyp’s application to be made a party. It is that application by Slyp to be made a party that now falls for determination.

  5. On 16 September 2020 I directed that the parties file and serve submissions and any further evidence in relation to Slyp’s application to be made a party. The Applicant, the Respondent and Slyp duly filed submissions.

    LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

  6. The only statutory provision relevant to the present consideration is s 30(1A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) which provides:

    Where an application has been made by a person to the Tribunal for a review of a decision, any other person whose interests are affected by the decision may apply, in writing, to the Tribunal to be made a party to the proceeding, and the Tribunal may, in its discretion, by order, make that person a party to the proceeding.

    THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS

  7. The Applicant’s submissions were to the following effect:

    (a)

    In October 2018 due, according to the Applicant, to patent infringements,


    the Applicant issued a “letter of demand” to Slyp. Slyp subsequently sought an extension of time for lodging a patent application.

    (b)The Applicant…

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Details
Case
[2020] AATA 3983
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application to join a party to proceedings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The applicant opposed the joinder of Slyp Pty Ltd, arguing that its opposition was valid. The respondent and Slyp Pty Ltd submitted that Slyp had a direct legal and commercial interest in the decision under review, justifying its joinder.

The central legal issue before Deputy President Boyle was whether Slyp Pty Ltd was a "person whose interests are affected by the decision" for the purposes of section 30(1A) of the AAT Act, and whether it was appropriate to join Slyp as a party to the proceedings. The applicant's opposition was based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the AAT's review function.

Deputy President Boyle reasoned that the applicant's opposition misunderstood the role of the AAT in conducting an administrative merits review. Unlike a court, the AAT is not limited to reviewing the evidence before the original decision-maker for legal error. Instead, the Tribunal undertakes to "do over again" the original decision, making its own determination based on the evidence before it at the time of its decision. This principle, supported by authorities such as *Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority* and *Comptroller-General of Customs v Akai Pty Ltd*, means that the AAT considers the circumstances as they are at the time of the Tribunal's decision, not solely as they were at the time of the original decision. Consequently, Slyp Pty Ltd was found to have a sufficient interest to be joined as a party.

Deputy President Boyle directed that Slyp Pty Ltd be joined as a party to the proceedings pursuant to section 30(1A) of the AAT Act, finding the applicant's opposition to be misconceived.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Johnson and Commissioner of Patents involves an application to join a party to the proceedings, Slyp Pty Ltd, which the Applicant, Johnson, opposed. Johnson had filed a patent application which was subsequently deemed late by the Commissioner of Patents. Johnson applied for an extension of time to lodge the patent application, which was denied by the Commissioner. Johnson then sought review of the Commissioner's decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Slyp, which had an interest in the patent application due to a prior related patent, was not initially a party to the proceedings but sought to be joined as a party whose interests were affected by the decision under review.

The Applicant argued against Slyp being joined as a party, contending that Slyp's interests were not sufficiently affected to warrant its inclusion in the proceedings. Slyp, however, argued that its interests were directly affected by the decision as it pertained to a related patent, and thus it should be joined as a party. The Tribunal needed to determine whether Slyp was a person whose interests were affected by the decision under review, as required by section 30(1A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act. This section allows for a person whose interests are affected by the decision to be joined as a party to the proceedings. The Tribunal's role in such a review was to re-evaluate the decision based on the evidence before it, rather than merely identifying errors in the original decision-making process.

In its consideration, the Tribunal noted that Slyp had a direct legal and commercial interest in the outcome of the patent application review, given its connection to a related patent. The Tribunal found that Slyp's opposition to being joined misunderstood the nature of the review process and the Tribunal's role in conducting a merits review. The Applicant's arguments focused on what the original decision-maker did rather than the evidence and the current circumstances, which was misaligned with the Tribunal's function. Consequently, the Tribunal directed that Slyp be made a party to the proceedings, finding that the Applicant's opposition was misconceived and based on a misunderstanding of the review process.

The matter of Johnson and Commissioner of Patents commenced as an application for review by the Applicant against a decision of the Commissioner of Patents. This application was filed under section 30 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Applicant's primary contention was the refusal of their patent application. The Commissioner of Patents opposed the review, arguing the correctness of the decision based on the merits of the patent application. The Applicant sought to join Slyp Pty Ltd as a party to the proceedings, asserting that Slyp had a significant interest in the outcome of the decision. Slyp, however, was not initially a party to the proceedings and did not file an application to intervene. The Applicant's opposition to Slyp's inclusion was predicated on a misunderstanding of the Tribunal's role in administrative merits review, which entails conducting a de novo review of the decision rather than a legal error review. The Tribunal, upon considering the submissions from both parties, found that Slyp had a direct legal and commercial interest in the decision under review, warranting their inclusion as a party pursuant to section 30(1A) of the AAT Act. This decision was based on the understanding that the Tribunal, unlike a court, is not restricted to the evidence before the original decision-maker and exercises its discretion afresh on the evidence before it at the time of review.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Carter and Australian Securities and Investments Commission[3] at [51], having referred to a number of the authorities set out in the above paragraphs, I observed:The above authorities make it clear that the role of the Tribunal is to do over again that which the original decision maker did and, on the evidence before the Tribunal at the time that it makes its decision, exercising the same discretions that the original decision maker had, make what it considers to be the correct or preferable decision. That is not, as asserted by the Applicant, an exercise in considering what errors the delegate made. It will be an exercise in considering the evidence that was presented to the delegate, and any further evidence put to the Tribunal by the parties, and forming its own view as to what the correct or preferable decision is.[3] [2020] AATA 809.DECISION For the reasons set out above I am satisfied that Slyp is a person whose interests are affected by the decision under review and that it is appropriate for it to be made a party to these proceedings. The Applicant’s opposition to Slyp being made a party is misconceived and is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of a review to be undertaken by the Tribunal. I direct that, pursuant to s 30(1A) of the AAT Act, Slyp Pty Ltd be made a party to these proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Respondent’s submissions were to the effect that:(a)It is appropriate that Slyp be joined as a party to the proceeding and the Applicant’s opposition to that course is without merit.(b)For substantially the reasons set out in Slyp’s submissions, Slyp has a direct legal and commercial interest in the decision under review, which is clearly of a nature that justifies its joinder to the proceeding.(c)The Applicant’s submission misunderstand both the nature of the proceeding and the matters relevant to an application for joinder. The matters raised by the Applicant are irrelevant to the exercise of the Tribunals’ discretion.CONSIDERATION Slyp’s submissions correctly set out the relevant law. The Respondent’s submissions succinctly and accurately reflect the legal position. It is clear that, for the reasons set out in Slyp’s submissions, Slyp is “a person whose interests are affected by the decision” for the purposes of s 30(1A) of the AAT Act. Further, the Respondent’s statement that the Applicant misunderstands the nature of the proceedings before the Tribunal, and the nature of an application to be made a party, is correct. The basis of the Applicant’s opposition to Slyp being made a party to these proceedings misunderstands the role of the Tribunal in reviewing an administrative decision. The Tribunal in undertaking a review of a decision is not limited to the evidence which was before the original decision maker. The Tribunal undertakes an administrative merits review. Its role, unlike a court, is not to review a decision to find legal error in the decision, but to do over again that which the original decision maker did and to make its own decision. There are any number of cases which describe the role to be undertaken by the Tribunal. An often-cited judgment in this regard is that of the Full Court in Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority[1]. Justice Downes made the following observations:[1] [2007] FCAFC 59.35.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is not a court. It does not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth. It is an administrative decision-maker. It exercises the executive power of the Commonwealth. Administrative decision-making is almost always improved if it is based on the facts and circumstances as they are at the time of the decision and not as they were in the past. Administrative decisions should always be made on this basis unless there are compelling reasons for doing otherwise. Sometimes, however, legislation conferring the decision-making power will, expressly or by implication, require the decision-maker to address a time prior to the decision and the facts and circumstances as they were at that time.36.The position is different with litigation before courts. Judicial power is concerned with resolving disputes between parties. The dispute must exist at the time proceedings are commenced and generally be defined by pleadings or other documents addressing that point of time. Courts, accordingly, focus much more on the circumstances as they were at the time the proceedings were commenced. In this respect the work of courts can be contrasted with that of tribunals engaged in merits review of administrative decisions....38.Hill J expanded upon this in Comptroller-General of Customs v Akai Pty Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 511 at 521:"The Tribunal is an administrative Tribunal and, as has often been said, its function is merely to do over again what the original decision-maker did, working out, as a further step in administration, what it considers the decision ought to be: cf Mobil Oil Australia Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1963] HCA 41; (1963) 113 CLR 475 at 502 per Kitto J; Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 at 413-415 per Bowen CJ and Deane J, and more recently see Liedig v Commissioner of Taxation [1994] FCA 1058; (1994) 50 FCR 461. In exercising its role, in what Davies J in Jebb v Repatriation Commission [1988] FCA 105; (1988) 8 AAR 285 at 288-289 referred to as a "part of" an administrative "continuum", the Tribunal, within the ambit of the jurisdiction conferred upon it as a review authority, decides the matter by reference to the evidence before it and not the evidence before the decision-maker, taking into account events that may have occurred to the date of decision: cf Jebb (at 289-290); Lucas v Repatriation Commission (1986) 69 ALR 415 at 421; Ward v Nicholls (1988) 20 FCR 18 at 22, per Wilcox J.”