SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeal: Criminal)
JAUNAY v POLICE
[2023] SASC 38
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stein
24 March 2023
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
MAGISTRATES - HEARING - PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND NATURAL JUSTICE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE
Following a trial in the Magistrates Court, the appellant was found guilty and convicted of the offence of assault contrary to s 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). The appellant was alleged to have assaulted the complainant on 25 October 2013 while on duty as a police officer. The complainant took an audio recording on his mobile phone shortly after the alleged offending. Although the Magistrate found the complainant to be a poor witness, the Magistrate found beyond reasonable doubt that in part of the audio recording the appellant was admitting to the charged offence and convicted the appellant.
The appellant appealed against the conviction on the following grounds:
1.It was not open on the evidence for the Magistrate to return a verdict of guilty.
2.The Magistrate erred in finding the audio recording recorded an admission and failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness.
Held, allowing the appeal, quashing the conviction and remitting the matter for retrial before a different Magistrate:
1.The Magistrate erred in finding beyond reasonable doubt that the words “ya fairy mates” were spoken in the recording and rejecting the possibility any other words were spoken.
2.The Magistrate erred in reasoning that the phrase “belted you one” was only attributable to a blow with the hand and in reaching that conclusion by his personal understanding and observed use of the phrase.
3.The prosecution case was run on the basis the words “belted you up” were spoken in the audio recording and the Magistrate made a factual finding that the words “belted you one” were spoken. That factual finding, together with the Magistrate’s personal understanding of the meaning of the words found to have been uttered, were significant in the Magistrate’s reasoning to guilt. Consequently, in the particular circumstances of the case there was an obligation to afford procedural fairness by giving the parties the opportunity to make further submissions.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20(3); 20(4); Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42(1); Supreme Court Criminal Rules 2014 (SA) ch 12A, referred to.
Boyle v The Queen [2022] SASCA 50; Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R (HL) 67; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; Macks v Viscariello (2017) 130 SASR 1; Martin v Department of Transport, Energy & Infrastructure [2010] SASC 141; MDM v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 80; Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 403 ALR 398; R v Hazim (1993) 69 A Crim R 371; R v Singh [2019] SASCFC 51; S, N v Police [2021] SASC 49
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- Case
- [2023] SASC 38
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Magistrate’s interpretation of the audio recording was open on the evidence and there was no error. The court found that the audio recording was capable of bearing either interpretation and there was no clear and convincing evidence to support one interpretation over the other. The court also held that there was no breach of procedural fairness. The court found that the Magistrate did not need to disclose what he or she was minded to decide to enable the parties to criticise the mental processes of the judge before reaching a decision or to give a running commentary about the view the judge was taking of the evidence. The court found that procedural fairness was accorded as the appellant was given the opportunity to ascertain the relevant issues and to be informed of the content and nature of adverse material.
The court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. The court found that the interpretation of the audio recording did not alter the effect of the evidence in any material way and that affording the appellant the opportunity to comment on the finding would not have led to an alternative verdict being imposed. The court found that the entitlement to a fair hearing is qualified by an important practical question being whether further information could have possibly made any difference and an appellate court will not order a new trial if it would inevitably result in the making of the same order as made in the first trial. The court found that a denial of procedural fairness will only be found to result in a miscarriage of justice where there is a realistic possibility the breach was of such a nature or degree that it could have impacted the verdict of guilty. The court found that the breach of procedural fairness did not impact the verdict of guilty in this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: STEIN J
In the event the Court were to find that there was a failure to accord procedural fairness, counsel for the respondent submitted that the alternative interpretation did not amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice warranting intervention by the Court. He submitted a breach of procedural fairness must be material to an outcome in the sense that compliance could realistically have resulted in a different outcome in order to warrant relief. Counsel submitted the entitlement to a fair hearing is qualified by an important practical question being whether further information could have possibly made any difference and an appellate court will not order a new trial if it would inevitably result in the making of the same order as made in the first trial. Counsel contended that a denial of procedural fairness will only be found to result in a miscarriage of justice where there is a realistic possibility the breach was of such a nature or degree that it could have impacted the verdict of guilty. Counsel submitted that the fact the Magistrate interpreted the word that followed “belted you” as “one” instead of “up” did not alter the effect of the evidence in any material way. Either interpretation rendered the statement capable of amounting to an admission the appellant had struck the complainant. Consequently, counsel contended affording the appellant the opportunity to comment on the finding that the appellant uttered the words “belted you one” would not have led to an alternative verdict being imposed. Consideration There is no contest about the obligation to accord procedural fairness. The rules of procedural fairness require a party liable to be directly impacted by a decision to be given the opportunity to be heard. The rules of procedural fairness do not require the judge to disclose what he or she is minded to decide to enable the parties to criticise the mental processes of the judge before reaching a decision or to give a running commentary about the view the judge is taking of the evidence.[36] However, procedural fairness ordinarily will require the party affected to be given the opportunity of ascertaining the relevant issues and to be informed of the content and nature of adverse material.[37] [36] SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [48] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.[37] SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [32] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. In Macks v Viscariello[38] (“Macks”), the Court comprising Lovell J, Corboy and Slattery AJJ considered a complaint of a failure to comply with the rule in Browne v Dunn[39] and allegations of a failure by the trial judge to accord procedural fairness based on assertions that the trial judge based his findings on matters not pleaded, not put in cross-examination and which the party had not been given an opportunity to address. In addressing the complaints, the Court considered instructive the decision of Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd[40] (“Kuhl”) in which Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ addressed a view formed by the trial judge that the plaintiff was reluctant to say precisely what happened in an accident. The trial judge relied on four questions and answers by the plaintiff in circumstances in which the plaintiff was not asked further questions about how the accident occurred. The majority in Kuhl concluded that in the absence of any challenge from the cross-examiner to the frankness or completeness of the plaintiff’s evidence, it was incumbent on the trial judge to make the challenge himself if his conclusion that the plaintiff had not been frank and complete was to play a role in his decision adverse to the plaintiff. The majority continued:[41]Perhaps the criticism in the judgment did not occur to the trial judge until after the plaintiff had left the box, or until after the hearing had concluded and before the Judge’s reserved judgment was given. It remained necessary either to recall the plaintiff or to have no regard to that aspect of the plaintiff's evidence. [38] Macks v Viscariello (2017) 130 SASR 1. [39] (1893) 6 R (HL) 67.[40] (2011) 243 CLR 361.[41] Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [75] per Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ.