FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (a firm) (No 5) [2021] FCA 248
File number(s): TAD 39 of 2016 Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J Date of judgment: 18 March 2021 Date of publication of reasons: 19 March 2021 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applications for freezing orders in the nature of orders for the payment of proceeds of sale of properties into court in aid of enforcing costs orders – where relevant costs are yet to be taxed or assessed – where costs orders are against the trustee of a trust of which the properties are the principal trust assets – where mortgages in favour of non-parties have been registered over the properties – whether danger of dissipation of trust assets – whether payment of proceeds of sale into court is necessary to do justice between the parties, and if so, in what amount – orders made for payment into court of specified amounts upon sale. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 53
Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) ss 3(1), 40, 134
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 7.32(1), 7.34, 41.10
Cases cited: Agusta Pty Ltd v Provident Capital Ltd [2012] NSWCA 26; 16 BPR 30,397
Basi v Namitha Nakul Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 743
Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63
Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; 162 CLR 612
Laundry Coin-Wash Nominees Pty Ltd v Dunlop Olympic Ltd (1985) ATPR 40-584
Levasseur v Mason & Barry Ltd [1891] 2 QB 73
Octavio Investments Pty Ltd v Knight [1979] HCA 61; 144 CLR 360
Trailer Trash Franchise Systems Pty Ltd v GM Fascia & Gutter Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 293
Division: General Division Registry: Tasmania National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Number of paragraphs: 30 Date of hearing: 17 March 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Deller Solicitor for the Applicant: Keypoint Law Counsel for the First, Second, Third and Fifth Respondents: Mr S B McElwaine SC Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Tremayne Fay and Rheinberger Counsel for non-party respondents to the applications: Ms A Bindoff Solicitor for the non-party respondents to the applications: Cann Legal ORDERS
TAD 39 of 2016 BETWEEN: JADWAN PTY LTD (ACN 006203 112)
Applicant
AND: RAE & PARTNERS (A FIRM)
First Respondent
WILSON DOWD (A FIRM)
Second Respondent
TOOMEY MANING & CO (A FIRM) (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WHEELAHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 MARCH 2021
PENAL NOTICE IN RESPECT OF ORDER 1 OF THESE ORDERS
TO:JADWAN PTY LTD
IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):
(A)REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR
(B)DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,
YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.
ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that Jadwan, as the trustee of the trust, was liable at law in respect of all liabilities that it had properly incurred. The only beneficial asset apparent on the evidence was Jadwan's interest in the trust assets that corresponded to its right of indemnity. That asset could be realised only with the cooperation of Jadwan, or by a court order involving the appointment of a receiver. The court took into account Jadwan's resistance to any type of order and its failure to advance any undertakings to the court. The court also considered the absence of evidence upon which to evaluate the likely course of events once Jadwan realised the principal trust assets. The court found that Jadwan did not offer any undertakings to the court, or give any enforceable assurances concerning the potential dissipation of funds once the properties were sold. In all the circumstances, the court considered that there was a danger of dissipation of assets, albeit not one that it could quantify with certainty.
Upon QBE Insurance Australia Ltd giving the usual undertaking as to damages, and upon the first, second, third, and fifth respondents undertaking to prosecute the taxation and assessment of costs of this proceeding and of the appeal TAD28 of 2018 with all due diligence, the court ordered that Jadwan Pty Ltd, as the registered proprietor of the properties, must pay or cause to be paid into Court from any net proceeds payable to, or otherwise receivable by it, in consequence of the sale, transfer, mortgaging, or charging of either of the properties to any other person the following amounts: (a) an amount of $375,000 (or such lesser amount as is payable to or receivable by it) in respect of the costs of the first, second and third respondents; and (b) after the payment in paragraph 1(a) above, an amount of $119,200 (or such lesser amount as is payable to or receivable by it) in respect of the costs of the fifth respondent. The interlocutory applications of the first to third respondents filed on 10 February 2021, and of the fifth respondent filed on 8 February 2021 were otherwise dismissed. The first, second, third and fifth respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the non-parties to these interlocutory applications, Julie Ann Alexander, Joan Isobel Alexander, Wayne Noel Alexander, Stephanotis Pty Ltd and Centaurea Pty Ltd, on an indemnity basis as agreed or assessed. Jadwan Pty Ltd was ordered to pay 60% of the first, second, third and fifth respondents’ costs of the interlocutory applications against it on a party and party basis as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Upon QBE Insurance Australia Ltd giving the usual undertaking as to damages, and upon the first, second, third, and fifth respondents undertaking to prosecute the taxation and assessment of costs of this proceeding and of the appeal TAD28 of 2018 with all due diligence –
1. Subject to further order, the applicant (Jadwan Pty Ltd) as the registered proprietor of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Vol. 23609/4 known as 1 Star Street South Hobart, and as the registered proprietor of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Vol. 23609/1 known as 20 Fitzroy Place South Hobart (hereafter referred to as “the properties”) must pay or cause to be paid into Court from any net proceeds payable to, or otherwise receivable by it, in consequence of the sale, transfer, mortgaging, or charging of either of the properties to any other person the following amounts –
(a) an amount of $375,000 (or such lesser amount as is payable to or receivable by it) in respect of the costs of the first, second and third respondents; and
(b) after the payment in paragraph 1(a) above, an amount of $119,200 (or such lesser amount as is payable to or receivable by it) in respect of the costs of the fifth respondent –
to be held pending finalisation of the taxation and assessment of costs payable by the applicant to the first, second, third and fifth respondents pursuant to the following orders for costs –
(i) the orders made by Kerr J on 29 June 2018; and
(ii) the orders made by the Full Court on 29 May 2020.
2. The interlocutory applications of the first to third respondents filed on 10 February 2021, and of the fifth respondent filed on 8 February 2021 are otherwise dismissed.
3. The first, second, third and fifth respondents pay the costs of the non-parties to these interlocutory applications, Julie Ann Alexander, Joan Isobel Alexander, Wayne Noel Alexander, Stephanotis Pty Ltd and Centaurea Pty Ltd, on an indemnity basis as agreed or assessed.
4. The applicant (Jadwan Pty Ltd) pay 60% of the first, second, third and fifth respondents’ costs of the interlocutory applications against it on a party and party basis as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court on applications for freezing orders filed by the respondents. These applications sought orders for the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the properties into court to enforce the costs orders. The applications were heard by the court, which considered the evidence and submissions from all parties involved, including Jadwan, the respondents, and the non-party mortgagees. The court also reviewed relevant prior decisions and orders, including those made by Kerr J on 29 June 2018 and by the Full Court on 29 May 2020.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether there is a danger of dissipation of trust assets that necessitates the payment of proceeds of sale into court.
2. If such payment is necessary, in what amount should it be made?
Held
1. The court concluded that there is a danger of dissipation of trust assets, which necessitates the payment of proceeds of sale into court.
2. The court determined that the amount to be paid into court upon the sale of the properties should be $375,000 for the costs of the first, second, and third respondents, and $119,200 for the costs of the fifth respondent, to be held pending finalisation of the taxation and assessment of costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to prejudice, the only prejudice that I discerned that was claimed in the submissions on behalf of Jadwan and the non-parties was the prospect that Jadwan might have to pay into court more than would ultimately be found due on a taxation or assessment of costs.Consideration The guidance given by the authorities is that where a freezing order is sought on the basis of a danger of the dissipation of assets, it is not necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the risk of dissipation is more probable than not, and nor is it necessary for the applicant to adduce evidence of an intention on the part of the respondent to dissipate assets: Basi v Namitha Nakul Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 743 at [9] (Wigney J). I reject the respondents’ applications to the extent that they seek orders that the mortgagees pay any monies into court. There is no allegation by the respondents that the debts that are the subject of the mortgages do not exist, or that there has been any fraud such as would affect the title of the mortgagees. Prima facie, the mortgagees’ interests are indefeasible by reason of the registration of the mortgages: Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas), s 40, when read with the definition of “registered proprietor” in s 3(1). Senior counsel for the respondents did not advance any cogent basis on which the mortgages might be impugned, and specifically confirmed that the respondents did not seek to impugn the mortgages. Although there was a faint suggestion by senior counsel in reply submissions that the mortgages might be voidable in the event of a liquidation of Jadwan, this submission had not been developed, and did not form part of the case to which the solicitor for the mortgagees had responded. I give it no weight. I am unable to accept the submission of Jadwan that there will be a surplus of assets once the properties are realised and debts discharged. Jadwan has not adduced any evidence of its current state of affairs, when it was in the best position to do so: cf, Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63. I am not able to form any conclusions about what other liabilities Jadwan has, and apart from the evidence of Ms Julie Alexander who is the sole director of Jadwan, and her preparedness to have Jadwan pay some money into court, there is no evidence upon which to evaluate the likely course of events once Jadwan realises the principal trust assets. Jadwan itself did not offer any undertakings to the Court, or give any enforceable assurances concerning the potential dissipation of funds once the properties were sold. In all the circumstances, I consider that there is a danger of dissipation of assets, albeit not one that I can quantify with certainty. I take account of the absence of reliable evidence concerning Jadwan’s state of affairs, bearing in mind that it is liable at law in respect of all liabilities that it has properly incurred as trustee. Its only beneficial asset apparent on the evidence is its interest in the trust assets that corresponds to its right of indemnity. That asset can be realised only with the cooperation of Jadwan, or by a court order involving the appointment of a receiver. As I have mentioned, Jadwan by its counsel has not advanced any undertakings to the Court, and resists any type of order: see in an allied context, Laundry Coin-Wash Nominees Pty Ltd v Dunlop Olympic Ltd (1985) ATPR 40-584 (Smithers J).