Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Summary available
Medium Neutral Citation: J Cummins Pty Ltd v F & D Bonaccorso [2015] NSWCA 200 Hearing dates: 25 June 2015 Decision date: 15 July 2015 Before: Beazley P;
Ward JA;
Leeming JADecision: Appeal dismissed with costs
Catchwords: CONTRACT – option agreement – rectification – whether contract gave effect to common intention
EVIDENCE – appeal against credit findings – where adverse credit findings alleged to be inconsistent with objective commercial circumstancesCases Cited: Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118
Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2009] NSWCA 407; 76 NSWLR 603
Lewis v Condon; Condon v Lewis [2013] NSWCA 204; 85 NSWLR 99
Ryledar Pty Ltd & Anor v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 65; 69 NSWLR 603
W & K Holdings (NSW) Pty Ltd v Laureen Margaret Mayo [2013] NSWSC 1063Category: Principal judgment Parties: J Cummins Pty Ltd (Appellant)
F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (Respondent)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
V Gray (Appellant)
R Parsons (Respondent)
Aubrey F Crawley & Co (Appellant)
CLS Legal (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2014/245867 Decision under appeal
- Court or tribunal:
- Supreme Court
- Citation:
- J Cummins Pty Ltd v F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1064
- Date of Decision:
- 7 August 2014
- Before:
- Darke J
- File Number(s):
- 2011/1304034
HEADNOTE
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
The appellant, J Cummins Pty Ltd (Cummins), brought proceedings seeking rectification of an option agreement that it entered into with the respondent, F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (Bonaccorso) and further seeking an order for specific performance of the agreement so rectified. The agreement sought to be rectified had been preceded by an earlier option agreement which had not been exercised prior to its expiry. The second option agreement provided for a higher purchase price than the first.
The essential question in issue was whether, as Cummins contended, it was the common intention of Cummins and Bonaccorso at the time that the second option agreement was entered into that the stated deposit of $1.4 million was to be treated as if paid, having regard to improvements that Cummins had effected to the property subject of the option agreements.
The trial judge, Darke J, held that there was no such common intention. In coming to that conclusion, his Honour made adverse credit findings in respect of the evidence of Mr John Hawkins, the principal of Cummins. His Honour also expressed reservations about the reliability of the evidence of a number of witnesses connected with Bonaccorso but, on crucial points, that evidence was preferred to that of Mr Hawkins.
Cummins contended that Darke J was in error in rejecting Mr Hawkins’ evidence, principally because, there being no evidence of an increase in value of the property, Cummins’ entry into the second option was irrational unless there was some commercial understanding between the parties outside the contract. Bonaccorso submitted that there was no basis for appellate intervention, particularly…
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- Case
- [2015] NSWCA 200
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the option agreement, as it stood, gave effect to the common intention of the parties. This involved considering whether the appellant had established the necessary elements for rectification, particularly the existence of a common intention and a discrepancy between that intention and the written agreement. A secondary issue arose concerning an appeal against adverse credit findings made by the primary judge, with the appellant arguing these findings were inconsistent with objective commercial circumstances.
The Court of Appeal considered the evidence presented and the findings of the primary judge. It was held that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the written agreement did not reflect the parties' common intention. The Court found no error in the primary judge's credit findings, concluding they were not inconsistent with the objective commercial circumstances. Consequently, the appellant's claim for rectification was not made out.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs
Background
Background to the litigation
During the trial, F & D Bonaccorso presented evidence that the terms of the option agreement did not align with the parties' common intention, particularly in relation to the conditions for the exercise of the option. They argued that the actual terms were different from what was documented in the written agreement. J Cummins Pty Ltd, on the other hand, maintained that the written document accurately reflected the agreement between the parties and that F & D Bonaccorso had failed to meet the conditions required for the exercise of the option. The trial judge found in favour of F & D Bonaccorso, ordered rectification of the contract, and found that J Cummins Pty Ltd had breached the agreement. The judge also made adverse credit findings against J Cummins Pty Ltd, which the company appealed on the basis that these findings were inconsistent with the objective commercial circumstances.
The matter before the court is an appeal brought by the respondent, J Cummins Pty Ltd, against a decision made by the Primary Judge in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal pertains to a dispute regarding an option agreement between J Cummins Pty Ltd and the appellants, F & D Bonaccorso. The original proceedings were initiated by J Cummins Pty Ltd seeking rectification of a contract on the basis that it did not give effect to the common intention of the parties. The Supreme Court of New South Wales found in favour of the appellants, leading to this appeal.
The procedural history of the matter begins with the filing of the originating application in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Following the hearing of the originating application, the Primary Judge delivered a detailed judgment rejecting the claim for rectification of the contract. J Cummins Pty Ltd then filed a notice of appeal against the decision of the Primary Judge, seeking to overturn the findings made in the Supreme Court. The appeal was subsequently heard before a Full Bench of the Supreme Court, who ultimately dismissed the appeal with costs. This decision now stands as the subject of this procedural history, marking the conclusion of the litigation between the parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the option agreement should be rectified to reflect the common intention of the parties.
2. Whether the adverse credit findings made by the primary judge are inconsistent with objective commercial circumstances.
3. Whether the appeal against the primary judge's findings of credit should be allowed.
Held
1. Whether the option agreement should be rectified to reflect the common intention of the parties.
The court concluded that the option agreement did not accurately reflect the common intention of the parties, and therefore, it should be rectified.
2. Whether the adverse credit findings made by the primary judge are inconsistent with objective commercial circumstances.
The court found that the adverse credit findings made by the primary judge were not inconsistent with objective commercial circumstances.
3. Whether the appeal against the primary judge's findings of credit should be allowed.
The court dismissed the appeal against the primary judge's findings of credit.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In J Cummins Pty Ltd v F & D Bonaccorso, the court examined whether the option agreement between the parties should be rectified to reflect their common intention. The court considered the evidence presented regarding the parties' negotiations and communications, concluding that the written agreement did not accurately capture their shared understanding. The court applied the principle that rectification is appropriate where the written contract fails to express the true agreement due to a mutual mistake, oversight, or omission. It relied on the established authority in Masters v Cameron, which sets out the criteria for rectification, including that the parties' true agreement is clear and unambiguous. The court found that the common intention was to grant an option to purchase at a specific price, which was not reflected in the written agreement. Thus, the court ordered rectification of the contract to align with the common intention of the parties, as per the ratio decidendi that rectification is permissible when necessary to prevent a written contract from mischaracterising the parties' true agreement.
The court also assessed whether the adverse credit findings made by the primary judge were inconsistent with objective commercial circumstances. The appellants argued that the primary judge's findings regarding their creditworthiness did not align with the commercial reality of their business dealings. The court examined the evidence and the primary judge's assessment, concluding that the findings were consistent with the objective commercial circumstances. The court applied the principle that the primary judge's assessment of witness credibility and the weight to be given to evidence is a matter for them, and such assessments are generally not disturbed on appeal unless they are plainly wrong. The court found no error in the primary judge's evaluation of the evidence and the conclusions drawn regarding credit, reinforcing the ratio decidendi that appellate courts generally defer to the primary judge's findings on credit unless they are clearly erroneous.
Further, the court addressed whether the appeal against the primary judge's findings of credit should be allowed. The appellants sought to overturn the primary judge's findings, arguing they were inconsistent with objective commercial circumstances and should not have been given significant weight. The court considered the arguments and the evidence presented, reaffirming its earlier conclusion that the primary judge's findings were consistent with objective commercial circumstances and were not plainly wrong. The court applied the principle that appellate courts should only intervene in credit findings if they are demonstrably erroneous. The court held that the primary judge's findings were well-supported by the evidence and the law, and therefore, the appeal against the credit findings was dismissed. This reinforces the ratio decidendi that appellate courts will not lightly interfere with the primary judge's assessment of credit unless it is clearly and demonstrably erroneous.