ISJ v The Queen

Case [2012] VSCA 321


SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2011 0093
S APCR 2011 0094
I S J Appellant

v

THE QUEEN Respondent

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JUDGES NETTLE, REDLICH and OSBORN JJA
WHERE HELD MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING 29 August 2012
DATE OF JUDGMENT 18 December 2012
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION [2012] VSCA 321
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM R v [I S J] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge McInerney, 8 April 2011)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal against conviction – Rape – Incest – Whether the verdict on the charge of rape was unsafe and unsatisfactory – No direction required as to whether the accused believed that the complainant was consenting – Whether the complainant gave free agreement – Temporal gap between the complainant’s objection to penetration and the time of penetration left unexplored – Prosecutor failed to ask complainant whether penetration was without consent – Trial judge’s directions on the evidence as to the question of consent inadequate – Sections 37 and 37AAA of the Crimes Act 1958 – Appeal allowed on the charge of rape – Appellant convicted of alternative charge of incest – Appeal otherwise dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW – Evidence – Rule against hearsay – Complaint evidence – Prior representations of complaint evidence led as an exception to the hearsay rule – Substantial time delay between the asserted facts and the dates on which the representations were made – Trial judge limited the use of the evidence under s 136 to buttressing credibility only – Need to comply with statutory pre-conditions under exception to credibility rule – Whether the asserted facts were ‘fresh in the memory’ of the complainant – Sections 66, 108, 136, 137 and 192 of the Evidence Act 2008 – XY v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 181 referred to – Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 29 considered – Appeal dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal against sentence – Manifest excess – Appellant re-sentenced because of the successful appeal against sentence – Sentence not manifestly excessive.

CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal against sentence – Child pornography – Manifest excess – Parity – Sentencing discretion re-opened – Appellant re-sentenced.

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Appearances: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Mr T Kassimatis Galbally & O’Bryan
For the Crown Mr T Gyorffy SC Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

NETTLE JA

REDLICH JA
OSBORN JA:

  1. Following a trial in the County Court at Melbourne, the appellant was convicted on two charges of indecent act with a child under 16 (Charges 1 and 2), five charges of incest (Charges 4, 7, 9, 11 and 13) and one charge of rape (Charge 5).[1]  All of the charges involved the complainant, who is the daughter of the appellant’s former de facto partner.  On 8 April 2011, the appellant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of nine years and six months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of six years and four months.  He also pleaded guilty to one charge on a second indictment[2] of making child pornography, and was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment, to…

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ISJ v The Queen [2012] VSCA 321
Case
[2012] VSCA 321
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ISJ v The Queen involved the appellant, who was convicted of several sexual offences against his teenage stepdaughter, the complainant, and appealed against his conviction and sentence. The appellant was found guilty of incest, while the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of rape. The legal issues before the court were whether the verdict of rape was unsafe and unsatisfactory, whether the complainant had given free agreement, and if the trial judge's directions on consent were adequate. Additionally, the court examined the admissibility of prior representations of the complainant's evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule and whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

The court found that the trial judge's directions on consent were inadequate, as there was no direction as to whether the appellant believed that the complainant was consenting, and the temporal gap between the complainant's objection to penetration and the time of penetration was left unexplored. Furthermore, the court found that the prosecutor failed to ask the complainant whether penetration was without consent. The court held that the trial judge's directions on the evidence as to the question of consent were inadequate and that the verdict on the charge of rape was therefore unsafe and unsatisfactory. The court also found that the complainant's prior representations of her evidence were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive.

The appeal against the conviction for rape was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of that charge. The conviction for incest was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed in all other respects. The appellant was re-sentenced due to the successful appeal against the sentence related to the charge of incest, but the new sentence was not found to be manifestly excessive. The appeal against the sentence for child pornography was also dismissed, as the court found that the sentencing discretion had been properly exercised.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

At the oral hearing the appellant abandoned Grounds 1, 2 and 4 and sought leave to raise an additional ground of appeal. 6. That a miscarriage of justice resulted from the trial judge’s failure to relate the evidence to his direction to the jury on the law of consent.Background The offences occurred over a period of approximately one year while the appellant was living with the complainant and her mother at a unit in Sunbury. The complainant was aged between 15 and 16 years at the time of the offences. The appellant was 26 years older than the complainant. On 1 June 2003, the appellant was home alone with the complainant. The complainant had drunk three or four ‘vodka cruisers’, purchased for her by the appellant. She was falling asleep on the couch. The appellant told her to go to bed and started massaging her legs, back and buttocks. He took her to bed and she pretended that she was asleep. The appellant left the room and returned 20–30 minutes later. He pulled down the complainant’s doona, lifted up her shirt and started to rub and suck her breasts. These acts constituted Charge 1. The applicant then took the complainant’s left hand and moved it up and down on his penis. This act constituted Charge 2. In September 2003, the complainant was lying in bed. The appellant got under the covers of the bed and began hugging, rubbing her body and putting his fingers in her vagina (Charge 4). On the same occasion, the appellant began to rub his penis against the complainant’s vagina. She was lying on her back and the appellant was on top of her. She said ‘Don’t put it in, don’t put it in’ and the appellant replied ‘No, I won’t’. At some stage after this discussion, the appellant put his penis in her vagina (Charge 5). The complainant gave evidence that she had sexual intercourse with the appellant on many occasions. She stated that it occurred two or three times per week and usually in her bedroom at night when her mother was asleep. Other specified instances of sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complainant comprised Charges 7, 9, 11 and 13. The complainant’s friend, BM, gave evidence that in 2004 or 2005, the complainant had told her that on one occasion she was asleep on the couch at home and that she woke up to find the appellant standing next to her with his genitals out. They went to her bedroom and had sex. The complainant told her that he would enter her bedroom when her mother was sleeping and have sex with her and that they had also had sex in his car. The complainant’s evidence at trial was that BM was the first person she had told about her sexual relationship with the appellant. Another friend of the complainant, SY, gave evidence that she received a text message from the complainant in which the complainant stated that she had been in a sexual relationship with the appellant when she was younger. SY and the complainant had a telephone discussion that evening and on another occasion two days later, in which they discussed what had occurred between the appellant and the complainant.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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