MA v The Queen

Case [2013] VSCA 20


SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2011 0252

MA Appellant
v
THE QUEEN Respondent

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JUDGES REDLICH, OSBORN and WHELAN JJA
WHERE HELD MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING 26 October 2012
DATE OF JUDGMENT 14 February 2013
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION [2013] VSCA 20

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Appeal against conviction – Convictions arising out of sexual abuse of appellant’s daughter – Admissibility of expert evidence as to the general behaviour of child victims of sexual abuse – Incidental evidence concerning common parental reactions – Relevance of evidence concerning counter-intuitive behaviour –Whether witness had ‘specialised knowledge’ for the purposes of ss 79 or 108C of the Evidence Act 2008 – Whether basis of opinion properly established – Whether probative value outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice – Evidence Act 2008 ss 55, 79, 135, 137, 108C – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 388 – Appeal dismissed.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Mr J McLoughlin Mr A Shears, Victoria Legal Aid
For the Crown Mr B Kissane Ms D Ziukelis, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

REDLICH JA:

  1. I invite Osborn JA to deliver the first judgment. 

OSBORN JA:

  1. On 30 August 2011, the appellant was convicted of seven charges arising out of sexual abuse of his daughter.  In the course of his trial, a psychiatrist, Dr Daniel Sullivan, gave expert evidence on behalf of the Crown with respect to the behavioural framework within which the evidence of the complainant’s reactions to the alleged abuse should be assessed and understood. 

  1. More particularly, Dr Sullivan gave evidence that:

(a)       the failure of the complainant to cry out during the sexual assaults when other members of the family were in the vicinity was not an unusual behavioural reaction;

(b)      the failure of the complainant’s mother to accept the truth of a complaint made to her by her teenage daughter concerning sexual abuse by her father was not an unusual behavioural reaction and could be regarded as relevant to the complainant’s behaviour thereafter; and

(c)       the fact that the complainant maintained an ongoing relationship with her father for many years after the alleged abuse, despite both its occurrence and the failure of her mother to accept her complaint, was not demonstrative of an unusual behavioural reaction. 

  1. On 8 March 2012, Harper JA gave leave to appeal on the ground that it was reasonably arguable that Dr Sullivan did not possess the relevant expertise to give the evidence complained of. 

  1. On the hearing of the appeal, leave was granted to the appellant to further challenge the admissibility of Dr Sullivan’s evidence on the grounds that it was: 

(a) irrelevant in that it was incapable of rationally affecting any matter in issue in the trial (in accordance with s 55 of the Evidence Act 2008 (‘the Evidence Act’));

(b) so unfairly prejudicial as to require exclusion pursuant to s 135 or 137 of the Evidence Act; and

(c)       likely to have unfairly prejudiced consideration of the case by the jury. 

  1. For…

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MA v The Queen [2013] VSCA 20
Case
[2013] VSCA 20
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in MA v The Queen concerns convictions arising from the sexual abuse of the appellant’s daughter. The primary legal issues revolve around the admissibility of expert evidence regarding the general behaviour of child victims of sexual abuse, the relevance of incidental evidence concerning common parental reactions, and the probative value of evidence concerning counter-intuitive behaviour. The appeal also examines whether the expert witness had the necessary 'specialised knowledge' under sections 79 or 108C of the Evidence Act 2008, and whether the basis of the expert's opinion was properly established. Additionally, the court considered whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused.

The court found that the trial judge had correctly admitted the expert evidence. The judge had considered the relevant sections of the Evidence Act, including sections 135 and 137, which deal with the discretion to exclude evidence and the exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceedings. The court held that the probative value of the expert evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the appellant. The opinion evidence was based on a credible evidentiary basis and was not inherently unreliable. The court found that the trial judge's approach to assessing the probative value and potential prejudice was correct, and that the jury was capable of rationally evaluating the weight to be given to the evidence. The court dismissed the appeal, confirming the convictions.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal against the convictions, affirming the decision of the trial court.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In giving leave to admit Dr Sullivan’s evidence, the trial judge expressly considered the application of ss 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act.[21] He expressly considered the reliability of the evidence despite doubt as to the relevance of that factor upon the authorities as they then stood.[22] [21]Sections 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act 2008 provide:135General discretion to exclude evidenceThe court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might—(a)be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or(b)be misleading or confusing; or(c)cause or result in undue waste of time.…137Exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceedingsIn a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused.[22]Cf Dupas v The Queen [2012] VSCA 328, [63]-[241]. I am not persuaded that the probative value[23] of Dr Sullivan’s evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the appellant. [23]‘Probative value’ of evidence is defined by the Dictionary to the Evidence Act as meaning ‘the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of a fact in issue’. For the reasons I have already explained, I am not persuaded that it has been demonstrated that the evidence was inherently unreliable. It was credible opinion evidence based upon an evidentiary basis that was not ultimately challenged before the jury. The weight to be given to the evidence was capable of rational evaluation by the jury. Further I do not accept that the evidence carried with it a material danger of unfair prejudice. The trial judge did not err in the approach he took to this consideration. His ruling stated in part: The relevant concept was encapsulated by McHugh J in Pfennig:[24] Dr Sullivan’s evidence did not preclude the making of a submission on behalf of the appellant that the complainant’s failure to cry out in the particular circumstances of her case at the time of the alleged assaults and the manner in which she remained in a family relationship with the appellant thereafter raised doubts as to her credibility. Dr Sullivan’s evidence simply provided a context which explained the range of common behavioural responses to sexual abuse, within which the jury could assess the evidence relating to the complainant. In turn, the jury were well able to evaluate the way in which Dr Sullivan’s generalised evidence might be said to bear on the facts of the case, including such matters as the fact that the complainant continued in a family relationship with the appellant when she was an adult and not simply for the initial period after the alleged offending when she was a child. Counsel for the appellant draws particular attention to the fact that, at one point, Dr Sullivan identified a potential link between the failure of mothers to act on allegations of sexual abuse by their children and the possibility that such mothers were victims of domestic abuse by the same person. Dr Sullivan did not say, and there was no suggestion, that this was the situation in the present case. Dr Sullivan simply referred to this possibility in the range of behavioural explanations for the outcomes he described. Similarly, the fact that at one point Dr Sullivan said that one reason a victim might not protest during an act of abuse was that the victim had been subjected to other abuse such as violence, again, did no more than identify an aspect of the complexity of responses to sexual abuse. Although it will be recalled that, in the present case, the complainant’s evidence is that she was physically abused by the appellant as well as sexually abused, Dr Sullivan did not express a view as to the applicability of this potential link in the present case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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