Ireland v Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   IRELAND -v- NORILYA MINERALS PTY LTD [2010] WASCA 203

CORAM:   McLURE P

NEWNES JA
MURPHY JA

HEARD:   12 OCTOBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   20 OCTOBER 2010

FILE NO/S:   CACV 104 of 2010

BETWEEN:   ADAM JONATHON IRELAND as Executor of the Estate of DEAN EDWARD IRELAND

CLARK ERVIN EASTERDAY
LEONARD LANCELOT IRELAND
First Appellants

KAYLENE HOLDINGS PTY LTD
Second Appellant

BRENDA ANNE EASTERDAY
Third Appellant

WEBGO PTY LTD
Fourth Appellant

FIM PTY LTD
Fifth Appellant

PAUL CHRISTOPHER IRELAND
Sixth Appellant

AND

NORILYA MINERALS PTY LTD
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :LE MIERE J

Citation  :NORILYA MINERALS PTY LTD -v- ADAM JONATHON IRELAND as Named Executor of the Estate of DEAN EDWARD IRELAND [2010] WASC 260

File No  :CIV 2232 of 1990, CIV 2364 of 2007

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application for leave to appeal on interlocutory decision

Practice and procedure - Abuse of process - Inability to recover monies subject to order of the Court of Criminal Appeal - Effect of impecuniousity of party

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1935 (WA), s 60(1)(f)

Result:

Application for leave to appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Appellants             :     Mr J A Thomson

Second Appellant          :     Mr J A Thomson

Third Appellant             :     Mr J A Thomson

Fourth Appellant            :     Mr J A Thomson

Fifth Appellant               :     Mr J A Thomson

Sixth Appellant              :     Mr J A Thomson

Respondent:     Mr S M Davies SC & Ms K F Banks­Smith

Solicitors:

First Appellants             :     Bostock & Ryan

Second Appellant          :     Bostock & Ryan

Third Appellant             :     Bostock & Ryan

Fourth Appellant            :     Bostock & Ryan

Fifth Appellant               :     Bostock & Ryan

Sixth Appellant              :     Bostock & Ryan

Respondent:     Norton Rose Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Allmark v Mossensons (a firm) [2006] WASCA 127

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256

Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 18; (1999) 198 CLR 380

Easterday v The Queen [2003] WASCA 69; (2003) 143 A Crim R 154

Easterday v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 105; (2005) 30 WAR 122

Easterday v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 202

Graham v Sutton, Carden & Co [1897] 2 Ch 367

Hammond Suddard Solicitors v Agrichem International Holdings Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2065

Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Easterday [2009] WASC 191

Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland [2008] WASC 53

Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland [2010] WASC 260

Phillip Morris Ltd v Attorney‑General for the State of Victoria (2006) 14 VR 538

R v Carroll [2002] HCA 55; (2002) 213 CLR 635

Re Payne, Randle v Payne (1883) 23 Ch D 288

Re Wickham, Maroney v Taylor (1887) 35 Ch D 272

Vodafone Ltd v GNT Holdings (UK) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1242

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:   

Introduction

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Details
Case
[2010] WASCA 203
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Ireland v Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd involved the appellants, Ireland, seeking leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The respondent, Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd, sought a costs order following the dismissal of the appellants' application for leave to appeal. The appellants sought a stay of the costs order under section 15 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) until the determination of civil claims in other proceedings. The court needed to decide whether the appellants' impecuniousity and the potential for an equitable set-off constituted 'special circumstances' justifying a stay of the costs order.

The court examined the appellants' conduct in exposing themselves to the costs order and concluded that it was relevant in determining whether 'special circumstances' existed. The court noted that the appellants had not opposed the making of a costs order but sought a stay of payment. The appellants argued that without a stay, they would be denied the opportunity to set off the amount due under the costs order against the amounts due to them under Court of Criminal Appeal orders. The court acknowledged that the appellants' inability to recover monies from the Court of Criminal Appeal orders due to the respondent's impecuniousity could constitute special circumstances. However, the court was not persuaded that the appellants' conduct justified a stay of the costs order.

The court ordered that the appellants pay the respondent's costs of the application for leave to appeal, to be taxed or agreed, and refused the appellants' application for a stay of that order. The court found that the appellants' conduct in the application was relevant to the consideration of whether 'special circumstances' existed, and in light of their conduct, the court was not persuaded that such circumstances justified a stay. The court's decision upheld the costs order against the appellants without a stay of payment.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: After the dismissal of the appellants' application for leave to appeal on 12 October 2010, the respondent applied for a costs order in its favour. The appellants did not oppose the making of a costs order, but sought an order that payment of the costs be stayed pursuant to s 15 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) (the Act), until the determination of the civil claims in CIV 2232 of 1990 and CIV 2364 of 2007. Section 15(3) of the Act provides that the court may only make such an order if there are 'special circumstances' that justify the making of the order. In support of their application for a stay, the appellants in effect said that if there were no stay, they would be denied the opportunity of setting off the amount due by them under the costs order, against the amounts due to them under the Court of Criminal Appeal's orders, the liability for which the respondent could not avoid if the respondent fails at trial. They say that this result works a particular injustice, in circumstances where the respondent will have no assets in any event to satisfy the Court of Criminal Appeal's orders if its claim to an equitable set‑off is rejected, with which orders the respondent continues not to comply in the meantime. But for the respondent's claim to an equitable set‑off, the amounts due under the two orders could be set off: O 66 r 7 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Pringle v Gloag (1879) 10 Ch D 676, 679 (inherent jurisdiction). The respondent's right to an equitable set‑off against the Court of Criminal Appeal's orders has not yet been determined. The very unusual circumstances pertaining in this litigation might well, all other things being equal, constitute 'special circumstances' which would justify the grant of a stay of the costs order. However, the features of the appellants' application to which we referred in [27] of the court's principal reasons herein, to which these reasons are supplementary, put a different complexion on matters. In our view the appellants' conduct in exposing themselves to the costs order they now face is relevant to a consideration of whether 'special circumstances' exist. Having regard to the appellant's conduct in this application, we are not persuaded that 'special circumstances' exist which would justify a stay of the costs order. For these reasons, we would order that the appellants pay the respondent's costs of the application for leave to appeal to be taxed or agreed, and we would refuse the appellants' application for a stay of that order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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