INGLIS v Police

Case [2025] SASC 167

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeal)

INGLIS v POLICE

[2025] SASC 167

Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gray 

2 October 2025

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - CONCURRENT, CUMULATIVE AND ADDITIONAL SENTENCES

This is an appeal against a sentence imposed by a magistrate on 12 February 2025 for offences of disorderly behaviour, contrary to s 7(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) and assaulting a prescribed emergency worker, contrary to s 20AA(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).

The learned sentencing Magistrate imposed a sentence of imprisonment of 25 days for the disorderly behaviour offence, and a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months for the assault offence. The resultant head sentence was 12 months and 20 days, allowing for partial concurrency, which was then reduced on account of the appellant’s guilty plea to seven months and 21 days imprisonment.

The appellant was directed to serve five months of that sentence in custody, whereby the balance would be suspended upon entrance into a bond to be of good behaviour in the amount of $200 for 18 months.

The appellant complains that the sentence is manifestly excessive, and that the learned sentencing Magistrate erred in principle by considering the concept of concurrency in the context of totality.

The respondent submits that the sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the learned sentencing Magistrate afforded due weight to considerations of concurrency.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

1.It was open to the learned sentencing Magistrate to impose the penalty complained of. Having regard to the appellant’s poor antecedent history, which may warrant less scope for leniency, the principles of individualised justice, and the gravity of the offending itself, the sentence, albeit heavy, was within the range of permissible sentences: at [30]-[32];

2.The learned sentencing Magistrate did not err in imposing partial concurrency. It was within discretion to consider the issue of concurrency in the manner in which his Honour did in the context of imposing a single sentence: at [41]-[42].

Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 7; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20AA; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 26; Criminal Law (Assaults on Prescribed Emergency Workers) Amendment Act 2019 s 7, referred to.

Attorney-General (SA) v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84; R v Copeland (No 2) [2010] SASCFC 61; (2010) 108 SASR 398; Cruise v The King [2025] SASCA 59; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Arvanitidis [2008] VSCA 189; (2008) 202 A Crim R 300; Ettridge v Police (SA) [2022] SASC 96; Hackett v The Queen [2021] SASCA 32; House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499; Hubbard v Police (SA) [2023] SASC 182; Jones v Police (SA) [2020] SASC 188

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INGLIS v Police [2025] SASC 167
Case
[2025] SASC 167
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Inglis v Police involves an appeal by the appellant against a sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The appellant, who had a history of similar offences, was convicted of disorderly behaviour and assaulting a police officer. The respondent, the police, argued that the sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the Magistrate had correctly applied the principle of concurrency. The appeal was heard by the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had to determine whether the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust.

The legal issues before the court were whether the sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court was manifestly excessive or inadequate, and whether the Magistrate had erred in applying the principle of concurrency. The court considered whether the sentence fell within the permissible range of sentences for the appellant and the offence, taking into account the appellant's criminal history, the nature of the offences, and the need for personal deterrence. The court also considered whether the Magistrate had erred in applying the principle of concurrency, given that the two offences were not committed as one course of conduct and had different victims.

In its decision, the Supreme Court held that the appeal should be dismissed. The court found that the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was not manifestly excessive and that the Magistrate had correctly applied the principle of concurrency. The court noted that the type of offending committed by the appellant was very similar to previous offending and that there was a need for personal deterrence. The court held that the sentence was reasonable and just, and that there was no demonstrated error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld.

The court did not make any further orders and invited the parties to advise on any other orders that might be appropriate. The ratio of the decision was that where an offender has a poor prior criminal record or has previously committed offences of a similar nature, the offence will be rendered more serious than may otherwise be the case, and a severe but proportionate penalty can be expected. The severity of the penalty reflects that there is less scope for leniency.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent submits that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The respondent further submits that given the two offences were not committed as one course of conduct, and as they had different victims, and as the offence of assaulting a prescribed emergency worker was committed after the appellant’s arrest, the learned sentencing Magistrate did not err in the application of the principle of concurrency. Background The factual basis upon which the appellant was sentenced was largely uncontentious. The circumstances of the offending were that at about 5:45pm on 22 December 2024, police were called to Whitmore Square because of a disturbance. Upon arrival, police located the appellant. The appellant was intoxicated and was yelling and swearing. Police spoke with the appellant and warned the appellant to calm down. Police observed that the appellant had a cut above his right eye. Police were again called to attend at Whitmore Square at about 7:15pm that day and the same uniformed patrol attended, including the victim of the assault charge, Constable Simister. The appellant approached the police on that occasion and was yelling and swearing. Police called for an ambulance to treat the cut above the appellant’s right eye. Upon the paramedic’s arrival, the appellant became aggressive towards them. The appellant continued to yell and swear. Members of the public were nearby, including children. The appellant’s behaviour on the second occasion that police attended is the subject of the disorderly behaviour charge. Because of the disorderly behaviour, police placed the appellant under arrest. The appellant was handcuffed, and police placed the appellant in a seated position on the ground. At that point, without provocation or warning, the appellant used both of his feet to kick Constable Simister in his shins in what has been described as a ‘push kick’ motion. The kick is said to have caused Constable Simister immediate pain however, no injury was suffered, and the pain subsided after about 15 minutes. The appellant was then conveyed to hospital where he was examined and cleared as being fit for custody. He was refused bail and remanded in custody.Principles on appeal This appeal is governed by s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) and is in the nature of a rehearing pursuant to r 191.1 of the Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA). To interfere with the exercise of a sentencing discretion there must be a demonstrated error of the kind described in House v The King.[2]The approach to be adopted was explained by White J in Wittwer v Police in which it was held:[3]The imposition of a sentence involves an exercise of judicial discretion. This Court interferes with the exercise of that discretion only when it is satisfied that the sentencing Magistrate has acted upon some wrong principle, or [if it] has allowed irrelevant considerations to influence it, or it has failed to have regard to a relevant consideration or alternatively, even though no precise error can be identified, the sentence is so obviously unreasonable or unjust that it can be said that there must have been a failure to exercise the discretion properly.[2] House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-5 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ).[3] Wittwer v Police [2004] SASC 226 at [16] (White J).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I dismiss ground 2 of the appeal.Conclusion and orders The appeal is dismissed. I will hear from the parties as to any other orders.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent referred to the five-year maximum penalty prescribed by law, the standards of sentencing reserved for those offences and the place of the criminal conduct occupied in the scale of objective seriousness of the crimes of that type, and the personal circumstances of the appellant. Having regard to those matters, the respondent submitted that the sentence imposed by the learned sentencing Magistrate was not outside the permissible range of sentences for the appellant and the offence.Consideration As this Court has previously observed, where an offender has a poor prior criminal record or has previously committed offences of a similar nature, the offence will be rendered more serious than may otherwise be the case. A penalty that is severe but still proportionate can be expected. This does not mean that a severe penalty is being imposed because the previous offending has been revisited, but rather the severity of the penalty reflects that there is less scope for leniency.[20][20] Jones v Police (SA) [2020] SASC 188 at [31]-[33] (Nicholson J); Mahon v Commissioner of Police (SA) [2024] SASC 147 at 17 (Stanley J). It can also be expected that, generally, the imposition of an immediate term of imprisonment for repeat offending of this kind by the appellant would be expected. It can be expected that there is a need for personal deterrence. The difficulty the learned sentencing Magistrate was faced with is that the type of offending committed in the circumstances of this case, by this appellant, was very similar to the form of offending that the appellant had previously engaged in. Further, the appellant had, on the day of this offending, just been released from custody for similar offending. I find that this context required a sentence which provided personal deterrence. In considering whether or not the sentence imposed involved an outcome error, I have had regard to the observations of this Court in Hackett v The Queen (‘Hackett’).[21] In that case, the Court of Appeal held:[22]The administration of the criminal law involves individualised justice. The imposition of a just sentence on an offender in a particular case is an exercise of judicial discretion concerned with doing justice in that case. The exercise of the discretion that the law reposes in a sentencing judge does not yield a single correct sentence. Absent a specific error it is only if the sentence is found to be “unreasonable or plainly unjust” that a challenge of manifest excess will succeed. A sentence which is unreasonable or plainly unjust for no reason other than that it is manifestly too long or too short is a sentence which has not been imposed according to rules of reason and justice. It is not sufficient for this court to conclude that it would have come to a different decision to the one reached by the sentencing judge. The judgment is a discretionary one and what is required is that the sentencing judge must take into account all relevant (and only relevant) considerations in forming the conclusions reached. Judges at first instance are to be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and as accords with the statutory regime that applies. To observe that a sentence is “very heavy” when compared with other sentences is not, without more, to conclude that it exceeded the bounds of the sentencing judge’s discretion.(citations omitted)[21] Hackett v The Queen [2021] SASCA 32 (Kelly P, Lovell and Livesey JJA).[22] Hackett v The Queen [2021] SASCA 32 at [8] (Kelly P, Lovell and Livesey JJA).