Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Limited (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Limited (No 2)
[2013] FCAFC 7

Citation: Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Limited (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 7
Appeal from: Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Limited (2011) 192 FCR 210; [2011] FCA 183
Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Limited (No 2) (2011) 282 ALR 405; [2011] FCA 934
Parties: INFORMAX INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD and ISABEL MENANO-PIRES v CLARIUS GROUP LIMITED and CLARIUS GROUP LIMITED v INFORMAX INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD and ISABEL MENANO-PIRES
File number: NSD 1484 of 2011
Judges: BESANKO, JAGOT AND BROMBERG JJ
Date of judgment: 6 February 2013
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application by appellants for leave to amend notice of motion seeking leave to amend claims for relief – interlocutory application made after Court published reasons in appeal and cross-appeal (Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Limited [2012] FCAFC 165) – where orders sought by the appellants under s 16 of the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) – whether Court on appeal has power to grant leave to amend – whether Court would have power to make the orders sought by the appellants – consideration of relevant discretionary matters including interests of justice, prejudice to appellants and to respondent.

Held: The appellants’ application for leave to amend the notice of motion be allowed. Appeal allowed and notice of motion remitted to primary judge for hearing and determination in accordance with Court’s reasons and otherwise in accordance with law. The respondent’s cross appeal be dismissed.

Legislation: Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) ss 12, 16, Pt 3
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N, 28
Cases cited:

AON Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175, cited
Classic Gourmet Sausages Pty Ltd v Lida Commercial Properties Pty Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 313, cited
Commissioner of Taxation v Brambles Holding Ltd (1991) 28 FCR 451, cited
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1, cited
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, cited

Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658, cited

Keldote Pty Ltd v Riteway Transport Pty Ltd (2009) 185 IR 155, cited
Keldote Pty Ltd v Riteway Transport Pty Ltd (2010) 195 IR 423, cited
Leotta v Public Transport Commission (NSW) (1976) 50 ALJR 666, cited
Teoh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 49 FCR 409, cited

Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of submissions: 26 November 2012 (Appellants/Cross-Respondents)
28 November 2012 (Appellants/Cross-Respondents)
4 December 2012 (Respondent/Cross-Appellant)
7 December 2012 (Appellants/Cross-Respondents)
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellants / Cross-Respondents: Mr M J Kimber SC and Mr N E Furlan
Solicitor for the Appellants/ Cross-Respondents: Harmers Workplace Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent/Cross-Appellant: Mr A Moses SC and Mr Y Shariff
Solicitor for the Respondent/ Cross-Appellant: Lander & Rogers Lawyers

IN THE…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Limited (No 2) involved an appeal by the appellants, Informax International Pty Ltd and others, against the decision of the primary judge. The appellants sought leave to amend their notice of motion to include additional relief under the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth). The respondent, Clarius Group Limited, opposed the application. The legal issues before the court included whether the court on appeal had the power to grant leave to amend and whether it would have the power to make the orders sought by the appellants. The court also considered relevant discretionary matters such as the interests of justice and potential prejudice to both parties.

The court held that the appellants' application for leave to amend the notice of motion should be allowed. The appeal was allowed, and the notice of motion was remitted to the primary judge for hearing and determination in accordance with the court's reasons and otherwise in accordance with law. The respondent's cross-appeal was dismissed. The court found that orders under section 16(4) of the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) may only be prospective in operation but could be made with future effect in respect of past matters or events or which varied a contract which had a remedial scope dating back to the contract's formation but an operative effect from the date of the court's order.

The final orders of the court included granting the appellants leave to further amend their notice of motion by adding an additional prayer for relief in the Second Further Amended Application that accompanied the notice of motion. The appeal was allowed, and the first order made by the primary judge on 29 March 2011 and the second and third orders made by the primary judge on 18 October 2011 were set aside. The appellants' notice of motion dated 21 April 2011, as amended, was remitted to the primary judge for hearing and determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court and otherwise in accordance with law. There was no order as to the costs of the appeal or the cross-appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Appellants have leave to further amend their Notice of Motion dated 21 April 2011 by adding an additional prayer for relief in the Second Further Amended Application that accompanied the Notice of Motion as follows:

3B Order that, with effect on and from … 2013, the Candle Contract (as extended on 1 June 2008) is varied to include the following further terms:

14 If Candle has taken any step to enforce a provision in a contract between Candle and the Client, the purpose or likely effect of which was (in whole or in part) to fetter, restrain or otherwise impede the Contractor or the Principal Person from being directly or indirectly engaged by the Client at a time when this agreement no longer restrained the Contractor from being so engaged after 1 August 2008, then Candle shall be liable to compensate the Contractor for any loss or damage occasioned thereby.

15 If Candle has procured or encouraged the taking of any step by the Client to enforce a provision of the kind referred to in clause 14, then Candle shall be liable to compensate the Contractor for any loss or damage occasioned thereby.

16 If Candle has engaged in the conduct contemplated by clauses 14 and/or 15, such that the Contractor or the Principal Person was denied work and/or the opportunity to work for the Client in the period from October 2008 to November 2010, then the compensation to be paid by Candle to the Contractor on or before … 2013 will be $450,000.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The first order made by the primary judge on 29 March 2011 and the second and third orders made by the primary judge on 18 October 2011 be set aside.

4. The appellants’ Notice of Motion dated 21 April 2011 as amended be remitted to the primary judge for hearing and determination in accordance with the reasons of this Court and otherwise in accordance with law.

5. There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.

6. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

7. There be no order as to the costs of the cross-appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent opposed the application. The Court considered it appropriate to decide the matter by reference to written submissions and the following written submissions were made:1.Appellants’ Submission in support of Application to Amend their Notice of Motion of 21 April 2011; 2.Respondent’s Outline of Submissions in Reply to Appellants’ Submissions;3.Appellants’ Submissions in Reply; and 4.Appellants’ Submissions as to the Orders it seeks in the Appeal.BACKGROUND TO THE APPELLANTS’ APPLICATIONThe Primary Judge’s First Judgment (Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Limited [2011] FCA 183) As our reasons state, in his first judgment the primary judge found that the Candle contract was unfair within the meaning of s 12(1) of the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cth) (“IC Act”) and, on 29 March 2011, he granted relief under s 16(1) of the IC Act. That subsection gives the Court the power to make, among other things, an order varying the contract in question. The order which his Honour made on 29 March 2011 was as follows:1.The contracts between the Applicants and the Respondent of 31 May 2008 and 4 June 2008 be varied by the addition of the following terms:“14.Candle will not take any step to enforce any provision in any contract between Candle and the Client, the purpose or likely effect of which would be (in whole or in part) to fetter, restrain or otherwise impede the Contractor or the Principal Person from being directly or indirectly engaged by the Client during the period of 17 September 2008 to 1 October 2008 (being a period after the expiry of this agreement) including any restraint provision that exists before the formation of this agreement.15.Candle will not procure or encourage the taking of any step by the Client to enforce a provision of the kind referred to in clause 14. This order reflected one of the orders claimed by the appellants in their Further Amended Application (paragraph 2(a)) which was lodged on the first day of the trial before the primary judge. In other words, the primary judge made orders in terms of one of the orders sought by the appellants. The Further Amended Application was the third iteration of the Originating Application, the first was dated 19 June 2009 (Application) and the second was dated 16 October 2009 (Amended Application). Neither party challenged the conclusion that the contract between the appellants and Candle (“Candle Contract”) had come to an end on 30 June 2008. Furthermore, the primary judge found that the contract between Informax and Woolworths Ltd expired by effluxion of time at midnight on 30 September 2008 and neither party challenged that finding. In those circumstances, the relief sought by the appellants was damages flowing from the unfairness in the Candle contract. In theory, they could do that in either one of two ways. They could claim damages for breach of the Candle contract as varied or they could claim damages under a term of the contract which expressly provided for the payment of damages in the event of breach. The appellants decided to pursue both of those avenues of relief.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour then noted and dealt with the four arguments the respondent raised in opposition to the application to add prayer 3A. Those arguments and his Honour’s treatment of each argument may be summarised as follows:(1)The respondent submitted that the unfairness with which the IC Act was concerned was with matters subsisting at its inception (s 12(3)). The events said by the appellants to give rise to the right to compensation arose after both contracts’ formation and may not, therefore, be examined by the Court. The primary judge concluded by reference to ss 12, 15 and 16 of the IC Act and, in particular s 16(2), that the opinion was as to unfairness which existed at the time of the contract’s inception and that a remediating order under s 16(2) was similarly limited. His Honour said (at [51]):This suggests, and I conclude, that this Act is concerned with the prospective remediation of unfair or harsh contracts (e.g. s 16(4)) and that unfairness or harshness is to be judged by reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract’s formation (e.g. s 12(3)). There is no room in its provisions for attempts to obtain compensation for the fact of a contract having been unfair in its operation in the past. Any attempt to formulate the compensation for that past operation takes one directly into the forbidden area lying between the moment of the contract’s inception and the making of the Court’s orders. The effect of ss 12(3) and 16(4) is to operate as a bar on the consideration of events falling in the range delimited by them.A little later his Honour said (at [53]):The combined operation of ss 12(3), 16(2) and 16(4) is to prevent an examination of the matters which would need to be examined in order to undertake an assessment of the appropriate compensation. (2)The proposed variation to the Candle contract set out in prayer 3A would, as a matter of contract law, be an unenforceable penalty and the Court would not insert into a contract a term which was invalid. The primary judge did not need to decide whether this submission was correct, although he said that the compensation awarded was likely to be a reasonable estimate of the liability arising from the breach and hence not a penalty (at [55]).(3)The application to amend the Originating Application had been delayed and no explanation had been proffered for that delay. The primary judge said that there was no real prejudice to the respondent and that he would otherwise have permitted the amendment “(but for the legal difficulties identified)” (at [57]).(4) The orders of 29 March 2011 had been entered. The primary judge said that he would not have accepted this argument because the orders had not, in fact, been entered (at [57]).This Court’s Decision On the appeal and the cross-appeal we upheld the primary judge’s conclusion that by reason of s 16(4) of the IC Act the Court cannot make an order which operates retrospectively. We said that orders under s 16(4) “may only be prospective in operation” (at [179]). However, we held, contrary to the primary judge’s view, that an order could be made with future effect but in respect of past matters or events (at [180]) or which varied a contract “which had a remedial scope dating back to the contract’s formation but an operative effect from the date of the Court’s order” (at [182]). In other words, we rejected the argument which was the first of the respondent’s four arguments before the primary judge. Nevertheless, the difficulty for the appellants with prayer 3A in light of clauses 14 and 15 was that identified by the primary judge (see [12] above). THE MERITS OF THE APPELLANTS’ APPLICATION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established