Industrial Rehabilitation Services Pty Ltd v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation and Others No. SCGRG 93/414 Judgment No. 3903 Number of Pages 23 Workers' Compensation Rehabilitation

[1993] SASC 3903

COURT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA DEBELLE J

CWDS
Workers' Compensation - Rehabilitation - Power of Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation to approve rehabilitation programs - Whether that power includes power to approve providers of rehabilitation services
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Actss.26, 27, 32. Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957) AC 436; Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v FCT (1981) 147 CLR 297; K and S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon and Gotch Ltd (1985) 60 ALR 509; Attorney-General v Great Eastern Railway Co (1880) 5 App Cas 473 and Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653, applied.

HRNG ADELAIDE, 18,19 March 1993 #DATE 16:4:1993
Counsel for the plaintiff:        Mr D Bleby QC with
  Mr Gilchrist
Solicitors for the plaintiff:     Elston Gilchrist
Counsel for the defendants:     Mr B Lander QC with
  Mr Rowell
Solicitors for the defendants:    Stratford and Co

ORDER
Orders made are in the judgment.

JUDGE1 DEBELLE J Determination of preliminary points of law. Since 1981 the plaintiff ("IRS") has carried on business as a provider of rehabilitation services for injured or disabled workers. It has offices in every State of Australia. It contracts with organisations in both the public and private sectors to provide these services. In November 1987, IRS entered into an agreement with the defendant, Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation ("the Corporation"), to provide rehabilitation services for injured and disabled workers. The agreement between IRS and the Corporation was initially for a period of 12 months. IRS continued its arrangements with the Corporation either by fresh agreements or by renewal of existing agreements. In a new agreement made on 19 August 1991, the Corporation and IRS set out the terms and conditions on which IRS would provide rehabilitation services for the next twelve months. On 19 August 1992 the parties agreed to renew the agreement for a period of six months expiring on 18 February 1993. 2. The effect of the agreement between IRS and the Corporation was that IRS would provide rehabilitation services to nominated workers according to programs approved by the Corporation and that the Corporation would pay the cost of treatment by IRS pursuant to s.32(2)(c) of the Workers Rehabilitationand Compensation Act, 1986 ("the Act"). Section 32(1) provides that a worker is entitled to be compensated for costs of a kind described in s.32(2) which are reasonably incurred by workers who have suffered a compensable disability. The costs listed in s.32(2) include the cost of approved rehabilitation: see s.32(2)(c). Section 32(8) defines "approved rehabilitation" in these terms: "A reference in this section to approved rehabilitation is a reference to rehabilitation programs or services of a kind approved by the Corporation for the purposes of this section." 3. The agreement which effected the renewal on 19 August 1992 provided that any further renewal of the agreement was conditional upon IRS satisfying the Corporation as to its level of performance against certain criteria specified by the Corporation. By letter dated 9 December 1992, the Corporation advised IRS that it would not renew the agreement in February 1993 on the grounds that IRS had not demonstrated an improvement in its level of performance and that there was no evidence that IRS would have the capacity to meet the specified criteria by February 1993. The Corporation informed IRS that it could continue to treat patients until 18 February 1993. The letter said the Corporation would communicate with IRS in January 1993 to make appropriate arrangements for the transfer to the Corporation of all case files relating to workers then being treated by IRS for "ongoing management". In January and early February 1993, IRS and the Corporation made arrangements to transfer the files held by IRS to the Corporation. IRS has now handed over all its files to the Corporation including files relating to workers who were still being treated by IRS on 18 February 1993. 4. By clause 24.1 of the agreement between the Corporation and IRS either party could review or extend the agreement for such further period as might be agreed but clause 24.6 provided that neither party was under an obligation to do so and neither party was liable for any failure to do so. The Corporation had the right to terminate the agreement and IRS does not challenge that right. 5. On 15 December 1992, IRS wrote to the Corporation disputing both that it had failed to satisfy the Corporation's criteria and that it did not have the capacity to meet them. It also asked whether workers whom it was then treating would be able to continue to use its services after 18 February 1993 and be reimbursed by the Corporation pursuant to s.32(2)(c) of the Act. On 31 December 1992 the Corporation replied by letter stating that workers being treated by IRS after 18 February 1993 would not be entitled to compensation pursuant to s.32(2)(c) for rehabilitation services provided by IRS. Despite further correspondence in February and March 1993 from the solicitors for IRS, the Corporation adheres to that view. 6. On 12 February 1993 the Corporation sent a letter to each worker undergoing rehabilitation with IRS, and to the employers of those workers, informing them that it was not renewing its agreement with IRS. The letter also stated that the Corporation would arrange for the transfer of the rehabilitation program of each worker to another rehabilitation provider. In the meantime, on 25 January 1993, IRS had written to all workers to whom it was then providing rehabilitation services informing them that the Corporation did not intend to renew its agreement with IRS after 18 February 1993. In that letter, IRS invited those workers to continue their rehabilitation program with IRS subject to the Corporation meeting the cost of those services. A little over fifty workers expressed the desire to be able to do so. On 23 February 1993 the solicitors for IRS wrote to the Corporation asking it to reimburse those workers who had expressed the wish to continue to receive the rehabilitation services provided by it. On 26 February 1993 the Corporation wrote refusing to do so on the ground that IRS was no longer a rehabilitation provider with whom the Corporation had a contract. The solicitors for IRS wrote again to the Corporation on 1 March 1993 asserting that the Corporation was not entitled to refuse reimbursement pursuant to s.32(2)(c). The Corporation replied on 4 March 1993 again denying any obligation to reimburse workers receiving rehabilitation treatment from IRS. The letter also stated that the Corporation would continue to inform workers that IRS was not a contracted rehabilitation provider and that the Corporation would not approve payment for rehabilitation services provided by IRS. 7. On 9 February 1993 a rehabilitation counsellor employed by IRS submitted to the Corporation a document called "Return to Work Plan" in respect of a worker then receiving rehabilitation at IRS. On 3 March 1993 the Corporation replied refusing approval to the plan. The ground of refusal was stated to be that IRS was "No longer an approved provider". 8. IRS wishes to continue to provide rehabilitation services to injured workers and claims that workers treated by it after 18 February 1993 are entitled to be reimbursed for these services pursuant to s.32(2)(c) of the Act. IRS also alleges that it is losing business as a result of the action taken by the Corporation. It seeks to prevent the Corporation from informing workers that they are not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of rehabilitation services provided by it. 9. On 11 March 1993 IRS issued these proceedings seeking inter alia orders restraining the Corporation from informing workers that they were not entitled to reimbursement pursuant to s.32(2)(c) for the cost of rehabilitation services provided by IRS. On 12 March 1993 IRS made an ex parte application to a Master seeking certain interlocutory injunctions. The Master was not satisfied that the application should be heard ex parte and adjourned the application for hearing inter partes. Upon the Corporation being served with the application, it asked that the application be heard by a Judge. The application came on before me on 18 March 1993. 10. In the course of argument, the parties asked for an opportunity to formulate questions which might enable a prompt resolution of all of the issues between them. The application was adjourned overnight. On the matter resuming on 19 March, the parties asked for an order that certain points of law be determined forthwith as preliminary questions upon the basis of the facts deposed to in the affidavits then filed. The questions were whether, upon the proper construction of the Workers Rehabilitation and CompensationAct, 1986:
    (1) the Corporation may lawfully reject a claim for compensation
    by a pre-termination client for the cost of rehabilitation
    services provided by the plaintiff to the pre-termination client
    after 18 February, 1993 where such rehabilitation services
    comprise or form part of a program or service actually approved by
    the Corporation;
    (2) the Corporation may lawfully reject a claim for compensation
    by a worker, whether or not the worker is a pre-termination
    client, for the cost of rehabilitation services provided by the
    plaintiff to the worker after 18 February, 1993 where such
    rehabilitation services comprise or form part of a program or
    service of a kind approved by the Corporation -
    (a) solely on the ground that the plaintiff is not or no longer
    party to the agreement or any other agreement with the Corporation
    for the provision of rehabilitation services;
    (b) solely on the ground that the plaintiff is not a provider
    approved by the Corporation; or
    (c) on grounds which include the grounds referred to in
    sub-paragraph (a) or (b); and
    (3) for the purposes of section 32 of the Act, the Corporation may
    lawfully refuse to approve a rehabilitation program or service
    offered or intended to be provided by the plaintiff for a worker -
    (a) solely on the ground that the plaintiff is not or no longer
    party to the agreement or any other agreement with the Corporation
    for the provision of rehabilitation services;
    (b) solely on the ground that the plaintiff is not a provider
    approved by the Corporation; or
    (c) on grounds which include the grounds referred to in
     sub-paragraph (a) or (b). 11. In these questions:
    "pre-termination client" means a worker for whom rehabilitation
    services were being provided by the plaintiff prior to 19
    February, 1993 in accordance with the agreement;
    "cost of rehabilitation services" means the cost of such services
    reasonably incurred by the worker;
    "worker" means a worker as defined in the Act. 12. Both IRS and the Corporation gave an undertaking in identical terms which dealt with a number of issues. The undertaking is on the file in this action and need not be repeated. It is sufficient to note that it includes an undertaking by both to the effect that, if the issues in this action are resolved in favour of the Corporation, the cost of rehabilitation services provided to workers by IRS after 18 February 1993 would be borne by IRS. If, however, the issues are resolved in favour of IRS, the cost of such services would be borne by the Corporation. In this way, disabled workers receiving rehabilitation services from IRS after 18 February 1993 were indemnified from any liability for the cost of these services. Upon the cross-undertakings being given, I ordered that those questions be determined as preliminary points of law. 13. Stripped to essentials, the issue between the parties is whether the Corporation has power not only to approve the nature and content of rehabilitation programs but also to determine who may provide rehabilitation services. Section 26 invests the Corporation with power to establish or approve rehabilitation programs. It is sufficient to refer to s.26(1) and s.26(2) which provide:
    "(1) The Corporation shall establish or approve rehabilitation
    programs with the object of ensuring that workers suffering from
    compensable disabilities -
    (a) achieve the best practicable levels of physical and mental
    recovery; and
    (b) are, where possible, restored to the workforce and the
    community.
    (2) A rehabilitation program may be established by the Corporation
    in relation to -
    (a) a particular worker;
    (b) workers of a particular class;
    (c) workers suffering from disabilities of a particular class." 14. It is convenient at this stage to refer also to s.27 which provides:
    "(1) In the exercise of its powers under this Division, the
    Corporation should seek to utilise rehabilitation facilities and
    services provided by the employer of a disabled worker.
    (2) In the exercise of its powers under this Division, the
    Corporation should give encouragement and assistance to the
    establishment and provision of rehabilitation facilities and
    services in the private sector.
    (3) The Corporation may -
    (a) enter into arrangements with any government agency or other
    body under which medical services or rehabilitation facilities and
    services will be provided for disabled workers;
    (b) with the approval of the Minister, establish clinics and other
    facilities for the assessment, treatment or rehabilitation of
    disabled workers; and
    (c) establish and maintain a register of persons and organisations
    that are, in the opinion of the Corporation, properly qualified
    and equipped to provide rehabilitation services." 15. It will be noticed that the Act does not in express terms invest the Corporation with power to approve those who will provide rehabilitation nor does it expressly invest the Corporation with power to require that rehabilitation services in accordance with rehabilitation programs approved by the Corporation shall be provided by persons approved by the Corporation. 16. General words in a statute cannot be read in isolation; their colour and content are derived from their context: Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957) AC 436 per Viscount Simonds at 461 and per Lord Normand at 465. In order to ascertain the intention of the Act, the Act should be read as a whole and the grant to the Corporation of the power to establish or approve rehabilitation programs should be construed so as not to defeat the objects of the Act and not to produce an absurd or inconvenient result: Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v FCT (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 304-305 and at 319-320; K and S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon and Gotch Ltd (1985) 60 ALR 509, 512 and 514. 17. According to its preamble, the Act is an Act inter alia to provide for the rehabilitation and compensation of workers in respect of disabilities arising from their employment. The Act repealed the Workers Compensation Act, 1971 and provided a new approach to the treatment of incapacitated workers who had suffered disability arising out of their employment: Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation v James (1991) 56 SASR 414, 418. In a way not evident in earlier legislation the Act placed an emphasis on rehabilitation. The objectives of the Act relating to rehabilitation are clearly spelled out in s.26(1). 18. The Corporation's power to establish or approve rehabilitation programs is unqualified and unrestricted. There is, therefore, no reason why, when establishing or approving a rehabilitation program, the Corporation should not be able to include a term to the effect that the rehabilitation services shall be provided by rehabilitation providers approved by the Corporation. Such a term would enhance the capacity of the Corporation to achieve the statutory objectives. Indeed, if the Corporation did not have such a power, some absurd results might follow and the objects of the Act, and in particular of s.26, might be defeated. For example, the Corporation might establish a series of rehabilitation programs. If it did not have the power to approve those who were able to provide the rehabilitation services outlined in those programs, the Corporation might be obliged to pay compensation pursuant to s.32(2)(c) in respect of rehabilitation services provided in accordance with a program approved by the Corporation but provided by a person or organisation which the Corporation believed was not competent to provide those services. If that occurred, not only would the Corporation be inhibited in its capacity to discharge the statutory objectives in s.26(1) but there might also be adverse consequences for the worker. Similarly, should a person or organisation providing rehabilitation services submit a rehabilitation program to the Corporation for approval, the Corporation should be able to approve the provider as well as the program. Although the Corporation might approve the program, it might believe that the provider is not qualified or equipped to provide rehabilitation in accordance with that program or it might believe that the provider does not otherwise have the capacity to provide a proper standard of rehabilitation services. It would be quite absurd if the Corporation were obliged to pay compensation pursuant to s.32(2)(c) in circumstances where it did not believe the provider could provide an adequate standard of service. 19. Furthermore, rehabilitation services can be provided by any person. No training or qualification is required. While organisations which provide such services might include in their staff physiotherapists, occupational therapists, psychologists or other persons who might be medical experts as defined by the Act, there is no requirement that they do so. Thus, rehabilitation services can be provided by any person be they qualified or unqualified. It would be quite incongruous if the Corporation was required to pay compensation pursuant to s.32(2)(c) for rehabilitation services provided by persons quite unqualified or unskilled to do so merely because that unqualified or unskilled person had provided rehabilitation services pursuant to an approved program. 20. The conclusion that the power of approval in s.26(1) includes a power to approve rehabilitation providers is re-inforced by a consideration of the terms of s.27. Sub-sections (1) and (2) are no more than statements of desired objectives of the Parliament. However, sub-section (3) provides a means by which the Corporation can determine who will provide rehabilitation services. Rehabilitation services can be provided either by employers, government agencies, or persons or organisations in the private sector pursuant to arrangements made under s.27(3)(a), or, with the approval of the Minister, in clinics or the like established by the Corporation pursuant to s.27(3)(b); or by registered providers who are on a register kept by the Corporation pursuant to s.27(3)(c). It is implicit in the power of the Corporation to enter into arrangements with persons under s.27(3)(a) that the Corporation is at liberty to enter into such arrangements only with those persons who it believes have the competence or skills necessary to provide rehabilitation services to a standard approved by the Corporation. Similarly, it is implicit in the power of the Corporation to establish and maintain a list of registered providers under s.27(3)(c) that it will place a person on the register only if it believes that that person is a fit and proper person to be entered on the register and has the necessary skills or competence to provide rehabilitation services. 21. This implied power of the Corporation to approve rehabilitation providers is demonstrated by the following example. Consider the position if, say, the Corporation had established a register of rehabilitation providers and decided to remove a person from that list on the ground that that person was no longer a fit and proper person to provide such services. It would be quite absurd if the Corporation was obliged to pay compensation pursuant to s.32(2)(c) to a worker who was treated by that de-registered person. There would be no point in establishing a register of providers if those who were de-registered could continue to provide rehabilitation services and the workers treated by de-registered providers could continue to be compensated pursuant to s.32(3)(c) for the cost of their services. It could defeat the purposes of the Act and in particular prevent the Corporation from achieving the statutory objectives spelled out in s.26(1) if the Corporation were under a liability to reimburse workers pursuant to s.32(2)(c) for rehabilitation services provided by a de-registered provider. Similar considerations would obtain in the case of a person with whom the Corporation had made an arrangement pursuant to s.27(3)(a) where that arrangement had been terminated or not renewed because the Corporation believed that that person was not providing a proper standard of service. There might, of course, be other reasons quite unrelated to quality of service which might cause the Corporation to terminate an arrangement or not renew it. It is then open to the Corporation to inform that person that he may continue to provide rehabilitation services for which compensation will be paid under s.32(2)(c). But the fact that the Corporation may terminate or not renew an arrangement for reasons other than quality of service cannot, in my view, circumscribe the power of the Corporation to determine who is an approved provider. There is the potential for anomaly in that fees for medical services might be recoverable under s.32 even after an arrangement made under s.27(3)(a) in respect of the provision of medical services has determined and where the Corporation is not satisfied with the standard or quality of services provided. However, the possibility for this anomaly does not, I think, affect the conclusion that the Corporation has the power in relation to rehabilitation services to determine who is an approved provider. 22. When the Act is viewed as a whole, it can be seen that the power of the Corporation in s.26(1) to establish and approve rehabilitation programs includes a power to approve a person as a provider of rehabilitation services for which compensation is payable under s.32(2)(c). 23. The extent to which IRS can after 18 February 1993 continue to provide rehabilitation services to workers is also provided for in the agreement between IRS and the Corporation made on 19 August 1991 and renewed on 19 August 1992. The agreement is an arrangement made pursuant to s.27(3)(a). The power to enter into such arrangements includes whatever might be fairly regarded as incidental to or consequential upon the exercise of that power: Attorney-General v Great Eastern Railway Co (1880) 5 App Cas 473, 478; Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653. In my view, it is incidental to the exercise of the power to enter into arrangements pursuant to s.27(3)(a) for the Corporation to include provisions in such arrangements by which it maintains control of the rehabilitation of workers and examines that rehabilitation services of an approved standard are supplied. The Corporation may also include provisions requiring the other party to transfer workers for treatment by another rehabilitation provider. 24. The agreement made between IRS and the Corporation is quite lengthy and provides for many aspects of the provision of rehabilitation services. It is sufficient for present purposes to note the following clauses. In the agreement, IRS is referred to as "the Contracted Rehabilitation Provider". Clauses 2.2 and 2.4 are important. They provide:

    "2.2 No Liability of Workers
    The provision of vocational rehabilitation services by the
    Contracted Rehabilitation Provider to a nominated worker pursuant
    to this agreement shall not render that worker liable to the
    Contracted Rehabilitation Provider for any fees or remuneration
    for the services and the Contracted Rehabilitation Provider shall
    not enter into any contract with any nominated worker for the
    provision of vocational rehabilitation services to that worker.
    (Emphasis added).
    2.4 Obligation to Provide Services The Contracted Rehabilitation
    Provider shall provide vocational rehabilitation services and
    other approved services to nominated workers in accordance with
the terms and conditions of this agreement." 25. The expression "nominated workers" used in the agreement is defined in the agreement to mean workers whom the Corporation refers to IRS or who the Corporation agrees should be treated by IRS: see also clauses 2.5 and 2.6. Thus, at the outset, the agreement clearly states that IRS will treat workers only in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. There is, of course, nothing to prevent IRS from entering into other arrangements to provide rehabilitation services to other workers and clause 2.5 of the agreement expressly provides that IRS may contract with an exempt employer to provide rehabilitation services. But workers treated pursuant to such other arrangements are not entitled to compensation under s.32(2)(c). 26. Clause 4 provides for approval by the Corporation of rehabilitation programs and for the approval by the Corporation of amended programs. Clause 7.1 of the agreement provides that the management of the rehabilitation of all workers is subject always to the control of the Corporation: "7.1 Control of Cases The Contracted Rehabilitation Provider shall manage the cases of nominated workers and provide vocational rehabilitation services for the nominated workers in accordance with this agreement but subject always to the direction and control of the Corporation in each case." 27. By clause 7.2 the Corporation can appoint case managers to monitor the rehabilitation of workers being treated by IRS. In addition, pursuant to clause 20 the Corporation has power to appoint rehabilitation advisers who may direct IRS as to the treatment of workers. A case manager and rehabilitation adviser or any other authorised officer of the Corporation may at any time direct IRS to cease to have or manage the case of any worker being treated by IRS and may nominate another rehabilitation provider in its place: see clause 28.4. 28. The Corporation retains control over the level of fees charged by IRS: see clause 12. Clause 13 provides a procedure for payment of the fees of IRS. Invoices are not delivered to workers being treated pursuant to an approved program. At monthly intervals IRS submits its invoices to the Corporation for payment direct by the Corporation, a procedure authorised by s.32(3) of the Act. 29. Clause 26 of the agreement provides for the consequences of termination of the agreement. The provisions which are presently relevant are clause 26.1, 26.3, 26.5 and 26.6. They provide:
    "26.1 Existing Rights and Liabilities
    The termination of this agreement for any reason shall not limit
    or affect any right or liability of a party that has accrued to
    the date of termination.
    26.3 Case Management on Termination The Contracted Rehabilitation
    Provider shall use its best endeavours to ensure that there is no
    unnecessary detriment or disruption to the management of cases of
    nominated workers and the provision of vocational rehabilitation
    services and other services to nominated workers on the
    termination of this agreement and shall endeavour to negotiate and
    agree with Case Managers and Rehabilitation Advisers and any other
    officers of the Corporation a means and process for the transfer
    of and continued management of cases of nominated workers by the
    Corporation or another Contracted Rehabilitation Provider or other
    party nominated by the Corporation.
    26.5 Case Files on Termination
    Without limiting any other term or condition of this Agreement the
    Contracted Rehabilitation Provider shall hold or deliver
    possession of or deal with all case files in such manner as may be
    required by the Corporation either generally or in relation to the
    cases of any nominated worker or workers.
    26.6 Adjustment of Fees on Termination
    In the event of the termination of this agreement there shall be
    an adjustment of fees and costs to be paid by the Corporation to
    the Contracted Rehabilitation Provider pursuant to this agreement
    to the date of termination and the Contracted Rehabilitation
    Provider shall give to the Corporation invoices and a statement
    and particulars of services actually provided by the Contracted
    Rehabilitation Provider and the charges for those services and the
    Corporation shall pay to the Contracted Rehabilitation Provider in
    accordance with this agreement the appropriate amount for the
    services actually provided and may set off and deduct from any
    payments due to the Contracted Rehabilitation Provider the amount
    of any moneys due by the Contracted Rehabilitation Provider to the
Corporation for or arising from this Agreement." 30. To summarise, the effect of the agreement is that the Corporation will pay IRS for rehabilitation provided to disabled workers where those workers have been referred by the Corporation to IRS or where the Corporation has authorised IRS to provide rehabilitation to such workers. IRS will treat those workers in accordance with a program approved by the Corporation. The Corporation retains control over the rehabilitation of each worker and may require IRS to transfer a worker for treatment by another rehabilitation provider. Upon termination of the agreement, IRS will be entitled to be paid for costs and fees for rehabilitation services provided to the date of termination of the contract, IRS will hand over to the Corporation files relating to workers then being treated by IRS, and IRS will assist the transfer to other nominated rehabilitation providers of workers then being treated by it. By clause 2.2 IRS has agreed that it will not enter into a contract with a nominated worker to provide rehabilitation services to that worker. It is implicit in these provisions that, upon termination of the agreement, IRS will not continue to treat nominated workers or, if it does, that workers treated by it will not be entitled to compensation under s.32(2)(c). Indeed, any other construction would be quite at odds with the tenor of the agreement. 31. Mr Bleby contended that the ambit of the Corporation's power to approve rehabilitation programs was determined by the definition of "approved rehabilitation" in s.32(8). It is convenient to repeat the terms of s.32(8):- "A reference in this section to approved rehabilitation is a reference to rehabilitation programs or services of a kind approved by the Corporation for the purposes of this section." 32. He contended that s.32(8) limits the power of approval in s.26 to the nature and content of rehabilitation programs. I do not think that the definition of "approved rehabilitation" in s.32(8) limits or qualifies the grant of power of s.26. First, the definition in s.32(8) is by its terms limited to the expression "approved rehabilitation" when used in s.32. It does not purport to govern the operation of s.26. Secondly, even if that definition were not limited in its operation to s.32, the expression "rehabilitation programs or services of a kind approved by the Corporation" does not in my view limit the capacity of the Corporation to determine who will provide rehabilitation services. The expression "of a kind" is capable of referring to the quality of rehabilitation services as well as to the nature and content of such services. The Corporation is able to control the quality of rehabilitation services by determining who will provide such services. I turn to deal with the points of law stated by the parties. 33. The answer to the first question turns on the meaning and effect of the agreement made between IRS and the Corporation. The effect of the agreement has already been noted. The agreement provides that IRS will only treat workers in accordance with that agreement: clause 2.4. Clause 2.2 prevents IRS from entering into any agreement with any nominated worker for the provision of rehabilitation services to the worker. The agreement also enables the Corporation to retain control of the rehabilitation of each worker. Clause 28.4 enables the Corporation to direct IRS to cease to have the management of the rehabilitation of any worker and to nominate another rehabilitation provider to provide rehabilitation services in place of IRS. As already mentioned, prior to the determination of the agreement by letter dated 9 December 1992, the Corporation had requested IRS to hand over all files to the Corporation so that the Corporation could arrange for the continued management of rehabilitation of workers then being treated by IRS. IRS was, therefore, obliged by the agreement to comply with those requests and in particular to arrange for the transfer of workers to another rehabilitation provider for continuation of the treatment according to the program approved for those workers. As from 19 February 1993, the conduct of the rehabilitation program was in the hands of another provider of rehabilitation services: it was no longer in the hands of IRS. Another provider was then the approved provider. It was not therefore open to IRS to negotiate with workers then being treated by it for the continued treatment of them by IRS according to an approved rehabilitation program. Indeed, in negotiating with workers to continue treatment with it, IRS might well have been acting in breach of clause 2.2. IRS could provide rehabilitation services to workers for which the workers would be re-imbursed under s.32(2)(c), only if the Corporation re-appointed IRS as a rehabilitation provider for the workers. The answer to the first question is, therefore, yes. 34. Mr Bleby contended that workers being treated by IRS on 18 February 1993 were being treated pursuant to rehabilitation programs already approved by the Corporation and IRS was, therefore, at liberty to continue to provide those services and the workers were entitled to compensation. This argument must be rejected. It ignores the contractual obligations of IRS to arrange for the transfer of workers to other rehabilitation providers for treatment. 35. For the purpose of answering the second question, it is necessary to distinguish between those workers who are pre-termination clients and those who are not. In the case of workers who are pre-termination clients, the reasoning in relation to the answer to the first question applies with equal force. The Corporation had requested the transfer of all nominated workers being treated by IRS and IRS was obliged by the agreement to transfer them to another rehabilitation provider. The Corporation may lawfully reject a claim for compensation by a pre-termination client on the ground that rehabilitation is being provided by a person other than IRS. 36. Different considerations obtain in respect of claims by those workers who were not pre-termination clients. In respect of those workers it would be necessary for the Corporation to approve a program pursuant to s.26 and for the reasons already given the Corporation could refuse to approve a program submitted by IRS on the ground that it was not a provider approved by the Corporation. The fact that the Corporation might have already established a rehabilitation program for workers of a particular class or for workers suffering from a disability of a particular class does not mean that it was not necessary for the Corporation to approve a program for a individual worker. It is plainly necessary to determine what kind of program is most suitable for each worker. 37. Like considerations to those just mentioned apply in the case of the third question. The question assumes that the worker is not already being treated pursuant to an approved rehabilitation program and that IRS has submitted a rehabilitation program for that worker to the Corporation for its approval. For the reasons already given, the Corporation is entitled to refuse to approve the program on the ground that IRS is not an approved provider. 38. I therefore answer the questions as follows:-
    1. Yes.
    2. (a) In the case of pre-termination clients, the Corporation
    may lawfully reject a claim for compensation for the cost of
    rehabilitation services provided by IRS on the ground that the
    worker is being treated by a rehabilitation provider other than
    IRS.
    (b) In the case of a worker who is not a pre-termination client,
    the Corporation may lawfully reject a claim for compensation for
    the cost of rehabilitation services provided by IRS on the ground
    that IRS is not a rehabilitation provider approved by the
    Corporation.
    3. The Corporation may lawfully refuse to approve a
    rehabilitation program or service offered or intended to be
    provided by the plaintiff for a worker on the ground that IRS is
    not a rehabilitation provider approved by the Corporation.