Independent Commission Against Corruption v Kinghorn

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Independent Commission Against Corruption v Kinghorn [2015] NSWCA 342
Hearing dates:28 October 2015
Date of orders: 28 October 2015
Decision date: 06 November 2015
Before: Bathurst CJ; Basten JA; Meagher JA
Decision:

Notice of motion filed by the applicant on 7 May 2015 dismissed with costs.

Catchwords: PROCEDURE – application to set aside consent orders – orders entered but to be treated as not entered – no mistake or misapprehension in agreeing to orders – retrospective change in law revived availability of appeal – change of law in prospect when orders agreed to – agreement unqualified – no challenge to agreement – reliance on possible anomalies – reliance on interest in resolving dispute as to operation of statute – Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, r 36.16
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 56
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 184
Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW), s 8; Sch 4, Pt 13, cl 34
Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment (Validation) Act 2015 (NSW), s 2
Supreme Court Rules 1970, Pt 2, r 3
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 36.11, 36.15, 36.16; Pt 36, Div 2, Div 4
Cases Cited: Autodesk Inc v Dyason [No 2] (1993) 176 CLR 300
AVS Australian Venue Security Services Pty Ltd v Criminale [2006] NSWCA 368
Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529
Chandless-Chandless v Nicholson [1942] 2 KB 321
Cliffs Robe River Iron Associates v Dravo Pty Ltd [1988] WAR 322
De L v Director-General, New south Wales Department of Community Services [No 2] (1997) 190 CLR 207
Deputy Commission of Taxation v Meredith (No 2) (2008) 75 NSWLR 462; [2008] NSWCA 133
Duncan v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2015] HCA 32; 89 ALJR 835
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268
Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235
Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14; 89 ALJR 475
In Re Harrison’s Share Under A Settlement; Harrison v Harrison [1955] 1 Ch 260
Kentwell v The Queen [2014] 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37
Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 573
Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
Piening v Wanless (1968) 117 CLR 498
Reg v Unger [1977] 2 NSWLR 990
Romeo v Papilia [2012] NSWCA 221
Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Pneupac Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 185
Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 319
Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73
Vital Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Taylor (1996) 40 NSWLR 25
Texts Cited:

J Tarrant, “Consent Orders Based on Binding Contracts” (2011) 28 JCL 237

  J Tarrant, Amending Final Judgments and Orders (Federation Press, 2010)
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Independent Commission Against Corruption (Applicant)
John Alan Kinghorn (Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
Mr G M Watson SC/Mr…

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Details
Case
[2015] NSWCA 342
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) sought to set aside consent orders made in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute concerned the ICAC's application to have these consent orders, which had been entered but were to be treated as not entered, rescinded. The primary issue was whether the court had the power to set aside consent orders where there was no mistake or misapprehension in the agreement to those orders.

The Court of Appeal of New South Wales was required to determine whether it possessed the power to set aside consent orders in circumstances where the parties had unqualifiedly agreed to them, and there was no allegation of mistake, misrepresentation, or duress. A further question arose as to whether a retrospective change in the law, which revived the availability of an appeal, could justify setting aside orders that were agreed to when such a change was only in prospect. The court also considered whether reliance on potential anomalies in statutory operation or an interest in resolving a dispute about the interpretation of a statute could form a basis for setting aside consent orders.

The court held that it did not have the power to set aside consent orders simply because a party later wished to appeal or because of a change in the law, particularly when the agreement to the orders was unqualified and made with knowledge of the law's potential alteration. The court emphasised that consent orders represent a contract between the parties, and their inherent jurisdiction to set aside such orders is limited to cases involving vitiating factors such as fraud, collusion, or a mutual mistake. The court found no basis to depart from the general principle that consent orders, once made, are binding and cannot be set aside at the whim of a party, even if they later perceive strategic advantages or disadvantages.

The notice of motion filed by the applicant on 7 May 2015 was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Notice of motion filed by the applicant on 7 May 2015 dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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