FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; in the matter of Whiteman v Whiteman [2021] FedCFamC2G 131
File number(s): MLG 1639 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE A KELLY Date of judgment: 12 October 2021 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application for review of exercise of power by a registrar to make sequestration order – interim application by debtor for a stay of all proceedings under the sequestration order – where applicant forms opinion that debtor has evaded tax – where orders made against debtor in Federal Court for freezing of assets – where Federal Court dismisses application seeking a stay of the proceeding and grants summary judgment – where debtor then applies to Administrative Appeals Tribunal seeking to challenge amended assessments issued by Australian Taxation Office – where Tribunal dismisses application – where debtor again applies to Tribunal seeking a merits review of decisions not to allow his objections against amended assessments – where application before Tribunal has not been determined – where no submission made by debtor of solvency – de novo hearing – where applicant has prima facie entitlement to sequestration order – whether court should dismiss the petition pursuant to par 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) for other sufficient cause – applicable principles – application dismissed – whether proceedings under sequestration order should be stayed – where stay sought on basis of application made in 2021 for an extension of time in which to appeal final order made in 2017 – where no evidence of merit of proposed appeal – stay refused. Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 32, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 52, 109
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 256
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 104
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 25, 31A
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 14ZYA, 14ZZK, 14ZZM, 14ZZR, 255-5
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 21.04, 25.04
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 29.04Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 36.08, 38.08
Cases cited: Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137
Bayne v Baillieu (1907) 5 CLR 64
Bechara v Bates (2021) 388 ALR 414
Boensch v Somerville Legal [2021] FCAFC 79
Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639
Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1982) 45 ALR 323
Commissioner of Taxation v Bayeh (1999) 100 FCR 144
Commissioner of Taxation v Rigoli (2013) ATC ¶20–407
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Doggett [2017] FCA 1176
Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 343 ALR 632
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v A & S Services Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 663
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v A & S Services Australia Pty Ltd (2017) 12 BFRA 668
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Machinery and Investment Co. Pty. Ltd (1945) 20 ALJR 326
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd (2008) 237 CLR…
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- Case
- [2021] FedCFamC2G 131
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the debtor's argument for the court to dismiss the petition for other sufficient cause was unavailing. The court held that it should not look behind a judgment obtained against the debtor on 18 August 2017 for a sum of $8,453,699.99 (judgment) upon which the petition was based. The court further held that the debtor had not demonstrated solvency. The court found that the applicant had adduced proof of the matters required by s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The court held that the onus was on the debtor to demonstrate sufficient cause to dismiss the petition. The court found that the debtor had not discharged that onus. The court held that the registrar's order should be affirmed, and the application dismissed. The court was not persuaded that it should exercise its discretion to stay proceedings under the sequestration order. The court held that the debtor had not shown that there was a genuine dispute as to the liability to pay the debt. The court found that the debtor had not demonstrated that the amount owed would be reduced to an amount below the minimum amount that supports a petition. The court held that the stay application was unmeritorious.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Although the proposed amended application contemplated the debtor would abandon his application for a review of the exercise of power by the registrar in making the sequestration order pursuant to s 104(3) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), I decided it was preferable, in the interests of the administration of justice, to refuse that amendment.Sequestration of a debtor’s estate Part IV of the Act, which concerns the subject, Proceedings in connexion with bankruptcy, is arranged in six divisions and comprises 40 – 76B. Within Div 1, Acts of bankruptcy, relevantly ss 40-41 concern the topics, Acts of bankruptcy and Bankruptcy notices. Within Div 2, s 43 confers jurisdiction to make sequestration orders while s 44 identifies the conditions on which a creditor may petition. Section 52 addresses proceedings and orders on a creditor’s petition. The Act does not rest upon any policy whereby a creditor should be entitled to a sequestration order against the estate of a recalcitrant, but solvent, debtor. The centrality of solvency in the law of bankruptcy bears several aspects. In light of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceeding, it recognises the public interest directed to sequestration orders not being made against the estate of persons who are solvent. One aspect of the public interest arises from the critical importance of recognising that the interests of creditors (other than the petitioner), of being paid in full should not be prejudiced by the making of a sequestration order that should not be made. A corollary of that public interest is the due administration of an insolvent estate for the general body of existing and potential creditors. Delay is inimical to proper administration. Importantly, an order for the sequestration of a person’s estate effects a change in the debtor’s status and has the significant personal consequences that this entails: Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212, 223-225; Kleinwort Benson Australia Pty Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71, 82; Sarina v Council of the Shire of Wollondilly (1980) 43 FLR 163, 165-166; Sarina v Council of the Shire of Wollondilly (1980) 48 FLR 372, 376-377; Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137, 148; Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 343 ALR 632, [40]-[46], [55]; Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132, [55]; Bechara v Bates [2021] FCAFC 34; Boensch v Somerville Legal [2021] FCAFC 79, [85]-[88]. In Boensch, the Full Court considered the obligations owed towards self-represented litigants in bankruptcy proceedings. The de novo hearing in this proceeding was conducted with those principles very much in mind. I adopt the submissions of counsel for the applicant who relied upon the reasoning of Gilmour J in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Cumins (2008) 6 ABC(NS) 12, [14]-[18] and [64]:On proof of the matters mentioned in s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) a petitioning creditor has a prima facie right to the making of a sequestration order and the Court will proceed to make a sequestration order unless the Court is satisfied that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order should not be made: s 52(2)(b) of the Act; Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639 at 646. The onus is on the respondent debtor to demonstrate “sufficient cause”: Commissioner of Taxation v Bayeh (1999) 100 FCR 144 at [12]Section 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) is wide enough to entitle the Court, in a proper case, to adjourn or dismiss a petition in the exercise of its discretion, where the debtor demonstrates a genuine dispute as to the liability to pay the debt: Re Verma; Ex Parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 4 FCR 181 at 185 and 187. This power is discretionary: Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1982) 45 ALR 323 at 328.The Court is entitled to inquire whether a judgment is founded on a real debt. In general, a court exercising jurisdiction should not proceed to sequestrate the estate of a debtor where an appeal is pending against the judgment relied on as the foundation of the bankruptcy proceedings, provided that the appeal is based on genuine and arguable grounds: Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137 at 148; Bayne v Baillieu (1907) 5 CLR 64.The mere fact that an appeal has been lodged does not without more, give rise to a duty to postpone the hearing of the petition: in Re Flatau: Ex Parte Scotch Whisky Distillers (1882) 22 QBD 83 (CA) at 84-85; nor will the court as a matter of course inquire into the validity of a judgment debt: Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 222-223.The test to be applied has been described variously. The judgment debtor must point to grounds having “a real chance of success on appeal”: Re Lewin: Ex Parte Milner (1986) 11 FCR 312 at 318; or ensure “that substantial reasons are given for questioning” whether there was in truth a debt: Wren 126 CLR 212 at 225. It is not enough to rely upon mere assertion. The onus is on the applicant for a stay to show the existence of a genuine dispute by adducing evidence establishing the substantial nature of the grounds of challenge: Verma, Virendra Kumar v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1983] FCA 388 referred to with approval in Re Verma 4 FCR 181 at 187.. . . .Furthermore the Court should not go behind a judgment debt where to do so would, if the debtor’s objections be successful, only support a finding that the debt be reduced but would still leave an amount in excess of the amount on which a creditor may petition. The reduction will only be relevant if the amount contained in the bankruptcy notice would be reduced to an amount below the minimum amount that supports a petition. In the present case, even if the AAT proceedings were successful, there would remain an amount owing on which the applicant may petition: Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581 at 589; Wilson v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1999] FCA 1760; Spencer v Lane Rowin Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1519 at [21]-[24].See also Stratton v Bowles (No 2) (2015) 12 ABC(NS) 404, [27]-[37]; Endresz v Australian Security and Investments Commission (2015) 228 FCR 334, [36]-[37] (Edmonds, Gordon and Beach JJ). I note that in Endresz, the Full Court held at [38], that the question whether a petition should be dismissed arises under s 52(2), while the exercise of power for it to be adjourned separately arises under s 33(1). While the considerations which may relevant to the exercise of power to dismiss or adjourn a petition will overlap, it may be appropriate to consider a broader range of matters in the exercise of power under s 33(1): Williams v Mortgage Ezy Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1567, [27] (Jackson J).