Wilson v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wilson, in the matter of Wilson v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1999] FCA 1760

BANKRUPTCY – application for annulment of sequestration order – where sequestration order made thirteen years prior to application for annulment – whether judge hearing creditor’s petition wrongly declined to extend time for compliance with bankruptcy notice – whether application to set aside judgment on which bankruptcy notice was based had been instituted prior to time for compliance with bankruptcy notice expired – whether no amount owing to creditor – whether alleged failure of creditor to enforce security would deprive creditor of the right to enforce the debt – whether bankruptcy notice invalid as claiming more than the debt owing

WORDS & PHRASES – “instituted”

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 153B, s 41(6A), s 41(5)

Greenhill, ex parte Myer (NSW) Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 84, not followed
Corney v Brien (1951 ) 84 CLR 343, cited
Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581, followed

IN THE MATTER OF ERNEST ARTHUR WILSON AND PATRICIA LORRAINE WILLIAMS

ERNEST ARTHUR WILSON and PATRICIA LORRAINE WILLIAMS v

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY and DONALD WIGGINS, KEVIN WIGGINS AND THE ESTATE OF AUSTIN AND RENE WIGGINS

N8139 OF 1999

EMMETT J
9 DECEMBER 1999
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N8139 OF 1999

IN THE MATTER OF ERNEST ARTHUR WILSON AND PATRICIA LORRAINE WILLIAMS

BETWEEN:

ERNEST ARTHUR WILSON
First Applicant

PATRICIA LORRAINE WILLIAMS
Second Applicant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
First Respondent

DONALD WIGGINS AND KEVIN ROBINSON
ESTATE OF AUSTIN AND RENE WIGGINS
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 DECEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicants pay the costs of the proceedings of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N8139 OF 1999

IN THE MATTER OF ERNEST ARTHUR WILSON AND PATRICIA LORRAINE WILLIAMS

BETWEEN:

ERNEST ARTHUR WILSON
First Applicant

PATRICIA LORRAINE WILLIAMS
Second Applicant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
First Respondent

DONALD WIGGINS AND KEVIN ROBINSON
ESTATE OF AUSTIN AND RENE WIGGINS
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE:

9 DECEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 17 February 1986, a sequestration order was made against Patricia Lorraine Williams (“Ms Williams”).  The petition was presented on 21 October 1985 by Austin Wiggins, Rene Wiggins, Donald Wiggins and Kevin Robinson (“the Wiggins”).  The petition was based on failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice that had been served on 3 August 1985.  The act of bankruptcy was failure to comply with the bankruptcy notice on or before 24 August 1985.  The petition was heard on 9 December 1985 when, on the application of Ms Williams, the court adjourned the hearing to 17 February 1986.  When the order was made, Ms Williams was legally represented.

  2. On 23 April 1986, a…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1760
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved Wilson, the applicant, who sought to have a bankruptcy notice annulled. The respondent, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, opposed the application. The dispute centred on the validity of the bankruptcy notice, particularly in relation to the amount claimed and the underlying judgment debt. The court was tasked with determining whether the bankruptcy notice was validly issued and if the amount claimed was correctly stated. The case hinged on the interpretation of section 41(5) of the relevant legislation, which deals with claims for amounts greater than what is owed under a judgment. The applicant argued that the judgment itself was excessive and thus the bankruptcy notice was invalid.

The court examined whether the bankruptcy notice exceeded the amount owed according to the judgment. The applicant cited the decision in Re Greenhill ex parte Myer (NSW) Ltd as support for the argument that an overstatement in a bankruptcy notice rendered it invalid. However, the court disagreed with this interpretation, holding that a bankruptcy notice requiring payment of the amount due as per the judgment is valid, even if the judgment itself was for an excessive amount. The court relied on the principle that once a judgment is entered, the amount stated in the judgment is the amount due, regardless of any potential overstatement. The court also noted that setting aside a judgment for an overstatement does not invalidate a subsequent bankruptcy notice based on that judgment.

In summary, the court found that the bankruptcy notice was validly issued and the amount claimed was correctly stated as per the judgment. The court dismissed the application to annul the bankruptcy, holding that the judgment debtor was liable for the amount stated in the judgment and that the bankruptcy notice did not exceed the amount due. The court further ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the proceedings to the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the costs of the proceedings of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

EMMETT J
I do not regard that discrepancy, however, as relevant to the principle to which section 41(5) is directed. Section 41(5), in my view, is concerned with a claim of a bankruptcy notice for an amount greater than is, in fact, owing under a judgment. There is no suggestion that the bankruptcy notice claimed more than was owing under the default judgment in favour of the Wiggins. The complaint is that the default judgment was entered for an amount greater than the amount of the debt that was actually owing. Reliance was placed on a decision of Morling J in Re Greenhill ex parte Myer (NSW) Ltd (1984) 5 FCR 84. Morling J held that an overstatement in the bankruptcy notice of the amount actually due rendered the notice invalid. In that case, the judgment had been entered, apparently erroneously, for some $200 in excess of the amount actually owing. If that decision is correct, then it would add considerable force to Ms William's contention. However, with the greatest respect to his Honour, I am not persuaded that it is a correct recognition of principle. A bankruptcy notice must require the debtor to pay the judgment debt, in accordance with the judgment. The pre-existing obligation, which the judgment is intended to enforce, will have merged in the new obligation created by the judgement - see Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 at 353-354. It may well be that there would be good grounds for setting aside a judgment that was entered for an excessive amount. Further, it may be that this Court, as a Court of Bankruptcy, would go behind a judgment in order to determine whether there was, in fact, anything due. Following the entry of a judgment, however, the amount due by the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor, and the amount for which execution might issue, is the sum stated in the judgment. Where a bankruptcy notice claims that amount, it cannot be said that it claims an amount that exceeds the amount in fact due. By reason of the judgment itself, the amount of the judgment is due. Upon an application to a court exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy to set aside a bankruptcy notice, the court should not go behind a judgment where the grounds upon which the judgment is challenged are such that, if accepted, they would only support a finding that the amount of the debt be reduced, and would not support a finding that there was, in truth, no debt at all - see Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581 at 589. That decision of a Full Court of this Court is binding upon me and, it appears to me, that it would preclude a judge, on hearing a bankruptcy petition, to go behind the judgment if the only purpose for doing so would be to show that the amount of the judgment should be reduced, not to show that no amount was owing. It may be relevant, if the amount of the judgment should be reduced to an amount below the minimum amount that supports a petition. However, that is not the case here. I consider that, on the basis of the principles stated in Emmerson v Wreckair, the final ground relied on in support of the application to annul the bankruptcy also fails. That is to say, I do not consider, on this ground, that the order ought not to have been made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EMMETT J

Full text does not contain this section.