In the matter of Mark Anthony Smith

Link copied
Case Copied 45 min read

MENTAL HEALTH COURT

CITATION:

In the matter of Mark Anthony Smith [2018] QMHC 1

PROCEEDING:

Reference

DELIVERED ON:

6 April 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

8 February 2018

JUDGE:

Dalton J

ASSISTING PSYCHIATRISTS:

Dr RE Phillipson and
Dr ASB Davison

DETERMINATION:

1.   The defendant was not of unsound mind at the time of the offending of 17 March 2014.

2.   The defendant was not of unsound mind at the time of the offending of 16 April 2014.

3. Facts which are substantially material to the opinions of the three reporting psychiatrists are so in dispute it is unsafe for this Court to make a decision about diminished responsibility pursuant to s 267(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act 2000.

4.   The defendant is temporarily unfit for trial.

5.   The defendant is detained in the Park, on a forensic order with no limited community treatment.

COUNSEL:

K Prskalo on behalf of the defendant.

J Tate for the Office of the Chief Psychiatrist.
D Balic for the Director of Public Prosecutions.

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the defendant.

Crown Law for the Office of the Chief Psychiatrist.
The Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld).

  1. The defendant is charged with murder on 16 April 2014.  The victim’s name was Bradley Barry Robert Lester.  There are lesser charges of serious assault; assault/obstruct police, and commit public nuisance from 17 March 2014.  There is no defence shown on the evidence in relation to these later charges, so my finding is that the defendant was not of unsound mind at the time of that offending. 

  2. The rest of this judgment is concerned with the murder charge and the defendant’s fitness for trial.  No-one contended that the evidence showed the defendant was of unsound mind at the time of the killing.

  3. Dr Grant, Dr Phillips and Dr Butler all reported to the Court[1] and gave oral evidence. Dr Grant supported a partial defence of diminished responsibility; Drs Phillips and Butler did not. It was not until hearing his oral evidence that it became apparent that the real difference between Dr Grant and the other two psychiatrists was due to the fact that Dr Grant took a different view of the factual material than they did. In submissions, counsel for the defendant properly conceded that the case could not be determined in this Court, but must proceed to trial because of the provisions of s 269 of the Mental Health Act 2000. I think this is correct.

    [1]     Dr Grant reports 1 September 2014, 29 August 2015 and 2 December 2015; Dr Butler report 30 May 2017; Dr Phillips report 14 May 2016.

  4. In these circumstances I will make a finding that the defendant was not of unsound mind at the time of the killing pursuant to s 267(1)(a) of the Mental Health Act 2000. I do not consider that the reasoning in Hansen v DPP[2] prevents this, for the words of s 269(1) of the Act are different from those of s 268(1). I read s 269(1)…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read In the matter of Mark Anthony Smith and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] QMHC 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved Mark Anthony Smith, who was subject to a reference under the Mental Health Act 2000. The central issue was whether Smith was unfit for trial due to mental illness. The court had to determine if the facts were in dispute to the extent that it would be unsafe to decide on the matter of unfitness for trial. This decision was influenced by the provisions of section 269 of the Act, which prevents the court from making a decision if there is a substantial dispute over a material fact that would render it unsafe to proceed.

The primary legal issue was whether the facts relevant to Smith's mental state and the circumstances of the offence were sufficiently in dispute to warrant a refusal to determine his fitness for trial. The court examined the psychiatric evidence and the circumstances surrounding the offence to assess if the factual uncertainties were so significant that they undermined the reliability of the expert opinions. The court had to balance the need for a firm determination of fitness against the principle that it should not substitute for a criminal trial, particularly when the facts of the offence are in dispute.

The court concluded that the evidence presented significant factual uncertainties regarding Smith's mental state at the time of the offence and the specifics of the offence itself. These uncertainties made it unsafe to make a determination on his fitness for trial. The court relied on established legal principles and case law, including the Briginshaw principle, which guides the appropriate standard of proof in civil proceedings. The court found that the facts were so disputed that it was unsafe to determine Smith's fitness for trial without resolving these disputes through a criminal trial.

The final order was that the court refrained from making a determination on Smith's fitness for trial and instead directed an inquiry into his fitness for trial. This decision underscores the court's role in ensuring that the determination of fitness for trial is based on clear and convincing evidence, particularly when the facts are in dispute.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing all the evidence was explored thoroughly. In giving reasons for my view that s 269 prevents me making a finding on the issue of diminished responsibility, I need only canvass the parts of the evidence and the parts of the psychiatric opinion which illustrate the factual uncertainty which is material to the opinions of the witnesses. I am conscious that these reasons therefore deal with only part of the evidence which was before me.Facts from Police Investigation At the time of the killing the defendant resided at Ozcare in Townsville. The victim also resided there; they were sharing the same room. Police were contacted at 7.50 pm on 16 April 2014 by someone who had seen a deceased body at the Cutting, a well-known cleared area of dirt at Sturt Street, Townsville, often used as a carpark. Mr Lester’s body was found in long grass at the rear of the parking area. The informant told police that at 4.30 that afternoon he had been shown the deceased man by the defendant who said something like, “You see what happens when you cross me.” When police made enquiries they found that Mr Lester had asked staff at Ozcare to remove him from the shared room due to a recent falling out with the defendant. The police interviewed the defendant early in the morning on 17 April 2014. The interview lasted about 1 hour and 20 minutes. For most of that time the defendant told police a version in which he, the deceased and the informant had gone to the Cutting to smoke cannabis. During this time the defendant said that he had insulted the deceased man; he had said he was “full of shit”. By this he meant that the deceased man said that he had a gun and a gun licence, and a lot of money, and was a drug dealer. The defendant had been “taken in” by this and felt resentful. The defendant said that his insult had incited Mr Lester to hit the defendant on the jaw. The defendant had a tooth abscess on his jaw. He had just recently consulted a doctor about it. Thus, the hit to the jaw had really hurt him. He “snapped” and “lost it”. He “lost the plot”. He put Mr Lester into a “sleeper hold”. He demonstrated this for police; essentially he choked Mr Lester. He said he was in a rage. Then he corrected himself and said rage was not the correct word, he was in a panic and he could not think properly, his mind was all foggy. He said he did not hold Mr Lester for long. He held him until he dropped to the ground. During this time the informant was egging him on, telling him to kill Mr Lester. Once Mr Lester was on the ground the informant then kicked him twice to the head and dragged his body into the grass. The defendant gave a detailed description of this. He added that he thought Mr Lester was alive at the time he dropped to the ground and he thinks the kicks might have killed him. He said the informant went through Mr Lester’s bag; he disdained to do such a thing. He then gave a second version which was to the same effect, save that Mr Lester tried to punch him and he ducked so that he was not hit. Then he put Mr Lester in a sleeper hold. He fought and wriggled and made a gargling noise. The defendant says he was in a rage, and this time does not qualify the statement. Then he says again that he was hit on an abscess on the jaw and that made him angry.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Dr Butler thought the defendant was unfit for trial at the time of his report. He could not say that unfitness was permanent.Conclusions as to s 269 Section 269(1) of the Mental Health Act 2000 provides as follows:“Dispute relating to substantially material fact(1)The Mental Health Court must not make a decision under section 267(1)(a) or (b) if the court is satisfied a fact that is substantially material to the opinion of an expert witness is so in dispute it would be unsafe to make the decision.” There is case law as to the level of satisfaction which the Mental Health Court must feel before it can determine a reference where either the facts of the offending are in dispute or the facts material to the psychiatric opinion are in dispute. I will now summarise that law but I think the gist of it is neatly captured in a statement made by Philippides J in Re Keeys:[6]“Clearly, it is not appropriate for the Mental Health Court to embark upon or transgress into the area of fact finding that is ordinarily performed in a criminal trial by a jury, where the facts relating to either the physical or mental elements of the offence are in issue.”[6] [2010] QMHC 44, [32]. The Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with this point in R v Schafferius.[7] After explaining his reasons, Thomas J (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) concluded as follows:“Proceedings before the Mental Health Tribunal afford a clear example of proceedings that call for the application of a principle that is sometimes called the Briginshaw principle, namely that the degree of satisfaction to a civil proceeding may vary according to the gravity of the fact to be proved.…The above considerations lead to the view that there is no warrant for the application of a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but that findings should be made only in reliance on clear and convincing evidence, and upon a firm satisfaction consistent with the gravity of the proceeding. In short, [a proceeding in the Mental Health Tribunal] is a proceeding at the ‘grave’ end of the Briginshaw principle. Indeed, in cases where it seems that the facts are so in dispute that it would be unsafe to make a determination the Tribunal is required to stay its hand (s. 33(2)). This is consistent with the view the Tribunal should proceed to a finding only in clear cases, and that it is not intended to be a substitute for a criminal trial, although in appropriate cases it will render a criminal trial unnecessary. Quite often the precise details of the alleged crime will be critical to the assessment of the alleged offender’s mental condition at the relevant time, and if those details are in any way in dispute the only way to resolve them is by the adversarial scrutiny of a criminal trial before the jury.” – p 383.[7] [1987] 1 Qd R 381. Section 33(2) of the Act being spoken of there provided:“If in a reference made to it the Mental Health Tribunal is of the opinion that the facts are so in dispute that it would be unsafe to make a determination such as is referred to in provision (a) or (b) of subsection (1), it shall refrain from making the determination but shall inquire and determine whether the person in question is fit for trial.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.