MENTAL HEALTH COURT
CITATION:
In the matter of DBY [2018] QMHC 6
PROCEEDING:
Reference
DELIVERED ON:
23 April 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATES:
17 November 2017 and 6 March 2018
JUDGE:
Flanagan J
ASSISTING PSYCHIATRISTS:
Dr C Gray and
Dr JJ SundinDETERMINATION:
(a) Pursuant to section 269 of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) the Court must not make a decision as to whether the defendant was of unsound mind when the first alleged offence of attempted murder was committed.
(b) Pursuant to section 268 of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) the Court must not make a decision as to whether the defendant was of unsound mind when the second alleged offence of attempted murder was committed.
(c) The defendant is fit for trial.
(d) The proceedings against the defendant for the two alleged offences of attempted murder be continued according to law.
Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld), s 268, s 269.
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Austin [2014] QCA 97, cited.
In the matter of Mark Anthony Smith [2018] QMHC 1, applied.R v Schafferius [1987] 1 Qd R 381, applied.
COUNSEL:
MB Lehane for the Director of Public Prosecutions
SJ Hamlyn-Harris for the Office of the Chief Psychiatrist
C Morgan for the defendantSOLICITORS:
Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld)
Crown Law for the Office of the Chief Psychiatrist
Legal Aid Queensland for the defendant
This is a reference under the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) (the MHA 2000) in relation to DBY. The reference is in respect of two charges of attempted murder allegedly committed between 3 August 2016 and 17 August 2016. Both charges were referred to the Mental Health Court by the Director of Mental Health on 2 March 2017.
The charges concern an allegation that the defendant twice attempted to murder her nine‑year-old daughter at the family home at Bribie Island. Both offences are alleged to have occurred during the period of the Royal Queensland Show (Friday 5 August to Sunday 14 August 2016). As to the first charge the defendant told her daughter that they would sleep together in the bathroom. The defendant then laid down a swag on the bathroom floor and they went to sleep. The daughter awoke the next day to find two gas bottles in the bathroom which were opened and continuing to release gas. The daughter felt dizzy and fell over, hitting her head on the laundry basket. She then woke her mother and asked what was happening. The defendant replied, “I’m trying to kill us.” The daughter turned off the gas bottles and left the bathroom. She later was told by her mother not to tell anyone about what had happened or she would be taken away. When questioned by police about the details of the first incident, the defendant stated, “I did it”, “I did what you said”. She admitted that she had placed two nine kilogram LPG gas bottles in the bathroom before taking her daughter into the…
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- Case
- [2018] QMHC 6
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's analysis, informed by previous case law, confirms that the Mental Health Court should not substitute its judgment for that of a criminal court in determining the facts of the alleged offence. Instead, it should focus on the mental state of the defendant at the time of the alleged offence, applying a standard of proof that is clear and convincing. The court referenced earlier decisions, particularly R v Schafferius, which outlined that mental health tribunals should adopt a cautious approach, balancing the Briginshaw principle with the gravity of the proceedings. This means the court must be firmly satisfied, based on the evidence, that Mr. Ayad was of unsound mind at the time of the alleged offence, even if there is contrary evidence. The court must refrain from making a determination if the facts are so in dispute that it would be unsafe to do so.
The court concluded that, given the disputed facts surrounding the alleged offence, it was not in a position to determine whether Mr. Ayad was of unsound mind at the time of the offence. The evidence presented was not sufficient to firmly establish the defendant's mental state at the relevant time, thus making it unsafe to proceed with the determination. The court's role was limited to assessing the mental health aspects of the case, without delving into the factual disputes of the alleged offence. The final orders of the court were to refrain from making a determination regarding Mr. Ayad's mental state at the time of the offence, and to direct that a criminal trial should proceed to ascertain the facts of the alleged offence.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The hearing of the reference resumed on 6 March 2018 after each reporting psychiatrist had provided an addendum report addressing these issues. Before considering the reports and evidence of the reporting psychiatrists it is necessary to first consider the operation of section 269 of the MHA 2000.The Operation of Section 269 Section 269 of the MHA 2000 was recently considered by Dalton J In the matter of Mark Anthony Smith.[5]I respectfully adopt her Honour’s analysis of the relevant case law:[5] [2018] QMHC 1 at [79]-[83].“[79] There is case law as to the level of satisfaction which the Mental Health Court must feel before it can determine a reference where either the facts of the offending are in dispute or the facts material to the psychiatric opinion are in dispute. I will now summarise that law but I think the gist of it is neatly captured in a statement made by Philippides J in Re Keeys:[6][6] [2010] QMHC 44 at [32].‘Clearly, it is not appropriate for the Mental Health Court to embark upon or transgress into the area of fact finding that is ordinarily performed in a criminal trial by a jury, where the facts relating to either the physical or mental elements of the offence are in issue.’[80] The Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with this point in R v Schafferius.[7]After explaining his reasons, Thomas J (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) concluded as follows:‘Proceeding before the Mental Health Tribunal afford a clear example of proceedings that call for the application of a principle that is sometimes called the Briginshaw principle, namely that the degree of satisfaction to a civil proceeding may vary according to the gravity of the fact to be proved.…The above considerations lead to the view that there is no warrant for the application of a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but that findings should be made only in reliance on clear and convincing evidence, and upon a firm satisfaction consistent with the gravity of the proceeding. In short, [a proceeding in the Mental Health Tribunal] is a proceeding at the “grave” end of the Briginshaw principle. Indeed, in cases where it seems that the facts are so in dispute that it would be unsafe to make a determination the Tribunal is required to stay its hand (s. 33(2)). This is consistent with the view the Tribunal should proceed to a finding only in clear cases, and that it is not intended to be a substitute for a criminal trial, although in appropriate cases it will render a criminal trial unnecessary. Quite often the precise details of the alleged crime will be critical to the assessment of the alleged offender’s mental condition at the relevant time, and if those details are in any way in dispute the only way to resolve them is by the adversarial scrutiny of a criminal trial before the jury.’ – p 383.[81] Section 33(2) of the Act being spoken of there provided:‘If in a reference made to it the Mental Health Tribunal is of the opinion that the facts are so in dispute that it would be unsafe to make a determination such as is referred to in provision (a) or (b) of subsection (1), it shall refrain from making the determination but shall inquire and determine whether the person in question is fit for trial.’[82] The Court of Appeal considered this dicta in Attorney-General (Qld) v Kamali.[8] It was said:‘The standard of proof in these matters is on the balance of probabilities with the Briginshaw qualification, as confirmed by Schafferius. Schafferius should not be read as excluding a finding in all but the clearest of cases. Certainly the gravity of such proceedings warrants the Tribunal’s exercising caution. But if the judge constituting the Tribunal is sufficiently satisfied that there is evidence which, if accepted, would warrant the finding, and believes that the evidence should be accepted, then the finding should be made, notwithstanding that there may be other contrary evidence in the case which the judge is disinclined to accept.’[83] Then in DAR v DPP (Qld) & Anor,[9] the Court of Appeal said:‘The first point to be made here is that this Court in A-G (Qld) v Kamali did not deny that the cautious approach suggested in R v Schafferius was the correct approach. The MHC did not err in approaching its fact finding function by searching for clear and convincing evidence of the direction in which the balance of probabilities tilted.’”[7] [1987] 1 Qd R 381.[8] (1999) 106 A Crim R 269 at [9].[9] [2008] QCA 309 at [83]ff.