In the Estate of JOHN HENRY MARSHALL

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Application)

In the Estate of JOHN HENRY MARSHALL

[2015] SASC 61

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

17 April 2015

SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS  - WHEN LOST, MISLAID, DESTROYED OR NOT AVAILABLE - EVIDENCE

Application for an order that probate of the will of John Henry Marshall late of Pinnaroo Soldiers Memorial Hospital, Bundey Terrace, Pinnaroo, retired glazier, deceased, who died on 24 February 2012, as contained in a reconstructed copy will undated, be granted to David Marshall, the executor therein, until the original will or a more authentic copy of it is brought into and left in the probate registry of the Court. 

The applicant is the deceased's son David Marshall. The application is made ex parte pursuant to rule 68 of the Probate Rules (2004) (SA). The application is made ex parte as there is no person disadvantaged by the application.  If a grant of probate is made in respect of the reconstructed will the applicant is effectively the sole beneficiary as specific gifts in the reconstructed will were destroyed and, accordingly, those gifts lapse.  If the order is not made in respect of the reconstructed will the presumption of revocation has the consequence the deceased died intestate and the applicant would be the sole beneficiary.

Held:

1. The Court pronounces against the alleged will of John Henry Marshall late of Pinnaroo Soldiers Memorial Hospital, Bundey Terrace, Pinnaroo, retired glazier, the deceased, who died on 24 February 2012 as contained in a reconstructed copy will undated (at [17]).

2. The Court pronounces against the alleged will of John Henry Marshall late of Pinnaroo Soldiers Memorial Hospital, Bundey Terrace, Pinnaroo, retired glazier, the deceased, who died on 24 February 2012 as contained in a document described as a will dated 29 July 1984 (at [18]).

3. There be a grant of letters of administration to David Marshall in respect of the estate of John Henry Marshall late of Pinnaroo Soldiers Memorial Hospital, Bundey Terrace, Pinnaroo, retired glazier, the deceased limited until an original will or a copy be brought into and left in the probate registry of the Court (at [19]).

Probate Rules 2004 (SA) r 68; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 12, referred to.
In the Estate of Hall (deceased) (2011) 120 SASR 1; Elton v Public Trustee [2014] SASC 149; Re Grey Smith [1978] VR 596; Spoehr v Health Services Charitable Gifts Board (2014) SASR 174; Docking v Schwarzkopf [2015] SASC 18, considered.

In the Estate of JOHN HENRY MARSHALL
[2015] SASC 61

Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Application

STANLEY J

Introduction

  1. This is an application for an order that probate of the will of John Henry Marshall late of Pinnaroo Soldiers Memorial Hospital, Bundey Terrace, Pinnaroo, retired glazier, deceased, who died on 24 February 2012, as contained in a reconstructed copy will undated, be granted to David Marshall, the executor therein, until the original will or a more authentic copy of…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASC 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of In the Estate of John Henry Marshall involved a dispute over the validity and probate of a will. The primary parties were the deceased, John Henry Marshall, and the applicant, David Marshall, who sought to have a will admitted to probate. The court was tasked with determining whether a 2002 will, which was alleged to have been lost, should be admitted to probate and whether an earlier will dated 29 July 1984 should be revoked in light of this claim. The case hinged on the legal principles concerning the admission of lost wills to probate, including the necessity for clear and convincing evidence to establish the existence and terms of the will.

The central legal issues the court had to address were whether the 2002 will existed and could be admitted to probate, and if the 1984 will should be revoked. The court had to consider the burden of proof required for admitting a lost will to probate, which must be balanced against the potential for error and fraud. Furthermore, the court needed to evaluate whether the presumption of revocation, which arises when a will is not produced at the deceased’s death, could be rebutted by evidence suggesting the existence of a subsequent will.

The court's reasoning focused on the sufficiency of the evidence presented. The applicant argued that the contents of a draft affidavit prepared by Ms. Harris, based on a conversation with Mr. Lawson, should be sufficient for the court to grant probate to the alleged 2002 will. However, the court found that the lack of a sworn affidavit from Mr. Lawson left significant doubt about the existence and contents of the 2002 will. The court was also cautious about acting on purely hearsay evidence, emphasizing the need for clear and convincing proof, especially where the evidence is oral. Additionally, the court considered the implications of the 1984 will and whether it should be revoked based on the alleged existence of the 2002 will.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied with the evidence presented regarding the 2002 will and thus declined to admit it to probate. The court also did not find sufficient grounds to pronounce in favour of the 1984 will. Consequently, the court ordered that letters of administration be granted to David Marshall, pending the production of an original will or a copy in the probate registry. The decision underscores the stringent evidentiary standards required for admitting lost wills to probate and the court’s vigilance in preventing error or fraud.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In Elton v Public Trustee,[3] I discussed the legal principles relevant to the Court granting probate in respect of a lost will. I said:[4] [3] [2014] SASC 149.[4] [2014] SASC 149 at [37]-[45].It is clear that in certain circumstances a Court will recognise a lost will and admit it to probate. It is common ground between the parties that if the Court is satisfied that the Irrevocable Order is admitted to probate the Court should revoke the grant made in favour of the 1991 will. The relevant principles concerning granting probate of a lost will, modified to reflect the changes to the law effected by the equivalent of s 12 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA), were enunciated in Cahill v Rhodes by Campbell J as follows:First, it must be established that there actually was a Will, or a document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person; second, it must be shown that that document revoked all previous Wills, third, the presumption that when a Will is not produced it has been destroyed must be overcome, fourth, there must be evidence of its terms, and fifth, there must be either evidence of due execution or that the deceased person intended the document to constitute his or her Will.While the burden of proof remains the usual civil standard of balance of probabilities, the authorities emphasise the need for clear and convincing evidence of the existence of a lost will. In The Estate of Ralston Hodgson J said:... there should be clear and convincing proof similar to that appropriate to other classes of case where the Court is asked to give effect to parol arrangements in circumstances where the law requires, or the parties have chosen, that a particular matter be recorded in some formal way, or where the Court is asked to make a finding concerning a legal transaction by a deceased person.However, this does not mean that what is required is other than proof on a balance of probabilities. In a case such as this, I believe that what is required is that the party bearing the onus of proof must be sufficiently diligent in calling available evidence, because the Court will not be prepared to act on material which it considers inadequate... Hodgson J cited as authority for this proposition the High Court’s judgment in Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd which is an application of the Briginshaw test. In applying the balance of probabilities standard in considering applications to admit a lost will to probate the Court must be vigilant, being fully cognisant of the dangers of error and fraud and the gravity of the consequences flowing from any finding made. In my view, these considerations apply with particular force where the evidence the Court is asked to act upon is purely oral. I do not regard anything said subsequently in Gruzdeff v Lough by Hodgson J as detracting from this proposition. While parol evidence may be adduced to prove the contents of a lost will the Court must take particular care in considering whether such evidence leaves it reasonably satisfied “not just as to the existence of the will but as to its contents”. If the Court is satisfied that the document sought to be propounded as the lost will of the deceased existed, the next issue the Court must consider is whether the document itself, or so much of the document as may be proved, was intended by the deceased to constitute his will. The Court must be satisfied that the document sought to be admitted to probate, or at least so much of the contents of the document as the Court is satisfied has been proved, purports to embody the deceased’s testamentary intentions. That means the deceased intended the document, without more on his part, to take effect as a testamentary disposition of his property upon his death. This is to be decided by reference to the document itself, the circumstances regarding its contents (including such marks or handwriting as may appear on it) and any other relevant circumstances. While each case must depend upon its own facts, the greater the departure from compliance with the formal requirements for the making of a will, the more difficult will it be for the Court to be satisfied that the deceased intended the reconstructed document to be his will. Next the Court must be satisfied of two related matters: the terms of the testamentary instrument and whether the terms included a provision revoking all previous wills. If the Court is satisfied of these matters it must then turn to consider the presumption of revocation. This involves two issues: does the presumption arise and, if so, is it rebutted. The presumption was described in Welch v Phillips in the following terms: ... If a will, traced to the possession of the deceased, and last seen there, is not forthcoming on his death, it is presumed to have been destroyed by himself; and that presumption must have effect, unless there is sufficient evidence to repel it. ...In The Estate of Gibbs Gray J made the following observations regarding the rebuttal of the presumption.The presumption of revocation is a presumption of fact which may be rebutted by appropriate evidence. It is the applicant who carries the onus of rebutting the presumption. Further, when determining if the presumption has been rebutted, the court is “to consider the whole of the facts together, and draw what inference should be drawn from the totality of the evidence”.(Citations omitted)Facts

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am satisfied I should adopt this course. I am reinforced in this view by the fact that the only evidence as to the deceased's testamentary intentions before the Court would have the whole of the deceased's estate left to the applicant. The same outcome would result if the estate is administered on the basis of intestacy.Conclusion The Court pronounces against the alleged will of John Henry Marshall late of Pinnaroo Soldiers Memorial Hospital, Bundey Terrace, Pinnaroo, retired glazier, the deceased, who died on 24 February 2012 as contained in a reconstructed copy will undated. The Court pronounces against the alleged will of John Henry Marshall late of Pinnaroo Soldiers Memorial Hospital, Bundey Terrace, Pinnaroo, retired glazier, the deceased, who died on 24 February 2012 as contained in a document described as a will dated 29 July 1984. There be a grant of letters of administration to David Marshall in respect of the estate of John Henry Marshall late of Pinnaroo Soldiers Memorial Hospital, Bundey Terrace, Pinnaroo, retired glazier, the deceased, limited until an original will or a copy be brought into and left in the probate registry of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ms McEwin, counsel for the applicant, submits that the Court should act on the contents of the draft affidavit of Mr Lawson prepared by Ms Harris. She submits that this is an adequate evidentiary basis for the Court to allow the application and grant probate to the reconstructed will. She submits the contents of the draft affidavit of Mr Lawson tells a reasonable story as to why the deceased wished to change his will and the basis of the two specific gifts. She submits that the recollection of Mr Lawson as described to Ms Harris concerning the form of the will is consistent with the form of the previous will of 29 July 1984.Consideration The authorities emphasise the need for clear and convincing evidence of the existence of a lost will. The Court must be vigilant in considering whether to admit a lost will of probate. It must be fully cognisant of the dangers of error and fraud and the gravity of the consequences flowing from any finding made. In Elton I emphasised that these considerations apply with particular force where the evidence the Court is asked to act upon is purely oral. That caution must apply a fortiori where there is a lack of viva voce evidence. In this case I am not satisfied as to the existence of the 2002 will and necessarily therefore as to its contents. The failure of Mr Lawson to swear or affirm the affidavit prepared by Ms Harris in accordance with his instructions leaves me with sufficient doubt about the matters concerning the making of the 2002 will he described in the telephone conversation with her and set out in her affidavit. In the absence of any supporting evidence from any other source I am not prepared to find that the will existed. That leaves the issue of whether I should make an order admitting to probate the 29 July 1984 will. No application has been made to the Court to pronounce in favour of the 29 July 1984 will. An interesting question of revocation arises. The evidence suggests the 29 July 1984 will was duly executed. While evidence of due execution gives rise to a presumption that the will should be admitted to probate, the presumption is rebuttable. Evidence giving rise to a well founded suspicion the document is not valid for whatever reasons will rebut the presumption.[6] Notwithstanding that I am not satisfied on the evidence of Ms Harris as to the existence of the 2002 will, the evidence, such as it is, raises the question as to whether the deceased died intestate. The 29 July 1984 will leaves the whole of the deceased's estate to the applicant. Yet Mr Lawson told Ms Harris that the deceased was making a will in 2002 because it was his intention to replace a previous will that made some provision for his brother in England whom he now wished to exclude as a beneficiary of his estate. That suggestion is inconsistent with the terms of the 29 July 1984 will. While I am not prepared to act on the hearsay evidence of Ms Harris for the purposes of being satisfied as to the existence of the 2002 will, her evidence is relevant to the question of revocation in relation to the 29 July 1984 will. [6] Re Grey Smith [1978] VR 596 at 604; Spoehr v Health Services Charitable Gifts Board [2014] SASC 171 at [37] - [38], (2014) 121 SASR 174 at 184 - 185; Docking v Schwarzkopf [2015] SASC 18 at [8].