Hutchinson and Comcare (Compensation)
[2018] AATA 4600
•20 November 2018
Hutchinson and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 4600 (20 November 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2018/3428
Re:Karen Hutchinson
APPLICANT
AndComcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Brigadier A G Warner, Member
Date:20 November 2018
Date of written 14 December 2018
reasons:
Place:Perth
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
........................[sgd]................................................
Brigadier A G Warner, Member
CATCHWORDS
REHABILITATION SAFETY AND COMPENSATION – whether time should be extended for review of Comcare decision – length of delay – explanation for delay – awareness of appeal rights – conduct of applicant – prejudice – merits of substantive application – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – s 34J, s 34J(c)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – s 14, s 60(1), s 62, s 62(3)
CASES
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Comcare v Willems (1996) 43 ALD 253
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 334
Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 121
Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411
Mason and John Holland Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2018] AATA 415
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Roberts [2003] AATA 269
Zizza v Federal Commission of Taxation (1999) 55 ALD 451REASONS FOR DECISION
Brigadier A G Warner, Member
14 December 2018
INTRODUCTION
Ms Hutchinson is seeking review of a Comcare decision dated 12 June 2018 which determined that “your request for an extension of time to lodge a request for reconsideration of the determination dated 9 February 2016 is not allowed and Comcare will not be undertaking a reconsideration of this matter” (T37/225). The determination dated 9 February 2016 declined liability for agoraphobia and binge eating under s 14 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the SRC Act) (T28/146-150).
A hearing was conducted on 20 November 2018. Ms Hutchinson did not attend the hearing. In the week prior to the hearing, Ms Hutchinson requested that the hearing be vacated and that her application be resolved on the papers.
Section 34J of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) provides for circumstances in which a hearing may be dispensed. However, s 34J(c) of the AAT Act requires the consent of the parties. In this matter, the Respondent opposed Ms Hutchinson’s request for a hearing on the papers. Further, the Tribunal did not want to pursue a course that might limit Ms Hutchinson’s opportunities to progress her case or the Tribunal’s own need to question the parties during a hearing. The Tribunal carefully considered Ms Hutchinson’s request and decided to proceed to the hearing, allowing Ms Hutchinson to attend by telephone conference.
Before the hearing commenced, three attempts were made to contact Ms Hutchinson without success. Two further attempts were made to contact her prior to the Tribunal delivering an oral decision and reasons for decision. Those attempts were also unsuccessful.
In the hearing, the Respondent was represented by Mr Ashley Burgess of Sparke Helmore Lawyers.
After the hearing and delivery of the oral decision and reasons for decision, Ms Hutchinson requested written reasons. The written reasons which follow are distilled from the edited transcript of the hearing.
BACKGROUND
By determination dated 9 February 2016, Ms Hutchinson’s claim for agoraphobia and binge eating was disallowed under s 14 of the SRC Act (T28/146-150). On
15 December 2016, Ms Hutchinson applied to the Federal Court for review of the
9 February 2016 decision and other decisions (T30/153-187).
On 13 April 2018, the Federal Court dismissed the application (Exhibit R1, para 3.14 and T35/220-221) and on 6 June 2018, Ms Hutchinson requested reconsideration of the determination dated 9 February 2016 and an extension of time to request that consideration (T36/223).
By reviewable decision dated 12 June 2018, the request for consideration of the
9 February 2016 determination was refused pursuant to s 62(3) of the SRC Act (T37/224-226). On 22 June 2018, Ms Hutchinson applied to this Tribunal for review of the reviewable decision (T2/3-13). In her application for review of the decision made to this Tribunal, Ms Hutchinson gave her reasons for the application as follows:
… [The] Assistant Director of the Disputed Claims team has decided not to permit an extension of time to enable Comcare to reconsider its decision of 9 February 2016 as made by the primary delegate … I explained the main reasons for why I had made my request out of time, however, … [the Assistant Director of the Disputed Claims] was unconvinced by those reasons and stated she considers I have merely rested on my rights and changed my mind to ask for a reconsideration without further consideration of any of the impediments I had originally cited.
… [The Assistant Director of the Disputed Claims] is quite incorrect when she states that I rested on my rights with regard to this matter. In fact, there has never been a time since 9 February 2016 when I haven’t been actively agitating this matter either before Comcare or the Federal Court of Australia.
I didn’t request a reconsideration of … [the primary delegate]’s decision at the time because I had been provided with unequivocal evidence of her inability to make a decision that wasn’t infected with procedural prejudice and bias, as had been evidenced in her preceding denial decision of 11 December 2015.
It was for that reason that I took the 11 December 2015 decision together with the decision of 9 February 2016 and her refusal to grant a debt waiver (also made by [the primary delegate]) to the Federal Court of Australia under the provisions of the ‘Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977’. (ADJR)
The matter was only recently determined by the Court, hence my late request to Comcare to reconsider the decision of 9 February 2016.
Irrespective of the outcome of the ADJR claim, the issue that has been constantly ignored and dismissed by Comcare to my ongoing detriment has been the fact that … [the primary delegate] based her original decision to deny my ‘agoraphobic avoidance’ or ‘agoraphobia’ condition (however described) on medical information sought by means of a section 71 notice being served on my ex-employer.
It was an impermissible release and breach of the Privacy Act 1988 as was the ‘disclosure’ consequently made to Dr. Kevin O’Daly on which he was to base a (biased and prejudicial) report on which would then allow [the primary delegate] to issue another denial of liability decision. Which she obviously did.
These matters are yet to be prosecuted under the Criminal Code Act 1995 and the Privacy Act 1988 while the results have been used by Comcare in such an impermissible and unlawful way they cannot be relied on for making legitimate administrative decisions, least of all because of a denial of procedural fairness that results.
It is highly concerning that … [The Assistant Director of the Disputed Claims] is once again making a decision on my claim where a clear conflict of interest exists. [The Assistant Director of the Disputed Claims] … routinely makes administrative decisions on my claims that deliberately and recklessly avoid any and all adherence to the APS Values and Code of Conduct for the sole purpose of denying rights I am entitled, by legislative instrument, to receive.
Comcare is notably devolving its decision making responsibilities onto the AAT in relation to as many of my claims as it can because they have found it is proving to be a very effective means for delaying me access to my entitlements, especially as the Tribunal does not make it its business to call Comcare to account for the routine abuses and exploitative matters it takes to the Tribunal and Courts as a means of outstanding liability management (T2/7).
ISSUES
Paragraph 2 of the Respondent’s Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions (Exhibit R1) provides that the parties to this application agree that the following issues fall for consideration by the Tribunal:
(a)Whether the reviewable decision dated 12 June 2018 is correct and therefore should be affirmed or alternatively, whether an extension of time to seek reconsideration should be granted and the request for reconsideration remitted to the respondent for reconsideration of the determination dated 9 February 2016.
(b)The reviewable decision decided that because the request for reconsideration of the determination dated 9 February 2016 was made outside the time prescribed by s 62(3) of the SRC Act the reviewable decision maker could not undertake the requested consideration.
(c)This requires consideration of the following principles set out in Comcare v Willems (1996) 43 ALD 253:
(i) the cause of, and explanation for, the delay;
(ii) the applicant’s conduct leading to the delay;
(iii) the consequences to the compensating authority of the delay; and
(iv) the merits of the substantial application.
EVIDENCE
The Tribunal had before it the following evidence:
·“T Documents” (T1-T39, pp 1-266);
·
Submission of the Applicant in Support of Claim AAT 2018/3428, dated
10 September 2018 (Exhibit A1);
·Respondent’s Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions, including Annexures A-D, dated 8 October 2018 (Exhibit R1); and
·Respondent’s Statement of Issues, dated 2 August 2018 (Exhibit R2).
LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND AUTHORITIES
The Tribunal now turns to the legal principles and authorities relevant to this matter, and particularly those in relation to the principles or factors outlined at paragraph 10 above.
The decision by the determining authority (Comcare), to refuse the extension of time for a request for reconsideration, is reviewable by this Tribunal as it was made under s 62 of the SRC Act and falls within the SRC Act’s interpretation of a reviewable decision at
s 60(1) of the SRC Act.
In paragraphs 3.1 to 3.4 of Exhibit R1, the Respondent sets out a comprehensive record of authorities relevant to an extension of time application (as extracted from Mason and John Holland Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2018] AATA 415 at [16]). The authorities establish factors which must be considered when exercising the discretion to extend time for an application to be made. These factors include:
(a)It is a prima facie rule that the proceedings commenced outside the prescribed period will not be entertained (Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411) (Lucic).
(b)It is not a pre-condition for success in an application for an extension of time that an acceptable explanation for delay must be given. It is, however, to be expected that such an explanation will normally be given as a relevant matter to be considered, even though there is no rule that such an explanation is an essential pre-condition (Comcare v A’Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441 and Dix v Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1993] VicRp 21; [1993] 1 VR 297 at 302).
(c)Action taken by the applicant other than by making an application to the court (Tribunal) is relevant in assessing the adequacy of the explanation for the delay. It is relevant to consider whether the applicant has rested on his rights and whether the respondent was entitled to regard the claim as being finalised. (See Doyle v Chief of Staff [1982] FCA 124; (1982) 42 ALR 283 at 287) (Doyle).
(d)Any prejudice to the respondent, including any prejudice in defending the proceeding occasioned by the delay, is a material factor mitigating against the grant of an extension. (See Doyle at 287 and Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541).
(e)The mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension. (See Lucic at 416).
(f)The merits of the substantial application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. (See Lucic at 417).
(g)Considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons otherwise in a like position are relevant to the manner of exercise of the court’s (tribunal’s) discretion (Wedesweiller v Cole [1983] FCA 94; (1983) 47 ALR 528).
The Tribunal notes that no single factor that has been listed has precedence over any other, or is of itself determinative. The Tribunal should weigh together all of the relevant factors in determining the question of an extension of time (Zizza v Federal Commission of Taxation (1999) 55 ALD 451.
The Tribunal notes that in his reasons for judgment dated 13 April 2018 (Exhibit R1), Barker J considered the following factors relevant in considering an extension of time application:
…explanation for the delay; prejudice to the applicant if an extension of time is not granted; prejudice to the respondent and any third parties if an extension is granted; nature of the decision and, in that context, relevant public interest considerations including the need for finality in litigation; and the merits of the substantive application. In addition, it is also relevant to consider the steps taken by the applicant other than pursuing judicial review proceedings. See Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; [1984] FCA 186; Hamden v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2013] FCA 3; and Malek Fahd Islamic School Limited v Minister for Education and Training [2017] FCA 757 (T35/216).
CONSIDERATION
The Tribunal now turns to the consideration of the factors.
Length of delay
Section 62(3)(b) of the SRC Act provides that a request for reconsideration of a determination shall “be given to the determining authority within 30 days after the day on which the determination first came to the notice of the person making the request, or within such further period (if any) as the determining authority, either before or after the expiration of that period, allows”. In the present matter, Ms Hutchinson was notified of the determination dated 9 February 2016 by email that same date and accordingly, the request for reconsideration should have been made by 10 March 2016. Ms Hutchinson lodged her request for reconsideration on 6 June 2018, and by the Respondent’s calculation that was some 818 days out of time.
The Respondent contends that 818 days is a significant delay in light of the allowed
30-day time limit. In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 334, Wilcox J stated at [348] that:
prescribed period… is not to be ignored… Indeed, it is the prima facie rule that proceedings commenced outside of the period will not be entertained…
The Tribunal notes that in general terms it is in the public interest in the efficient conduct of the merits review process that timely decisions are made and are acted on with finality. Even in circumstances where a delay is not considered to be lengthy, the brevity of the extension sought does not, however, lead automatically to an order extending the time. The Tribunal refers to Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services
v Roberts [2003] AATA 269 at [16]. Taking this length of delay factor alone, the Tribunal considers that the delay in this matter is very significant and weighs against the granting of an extension of time.Explanation for delay, awareness of appeal rights and the conduct of the Applicant
The Respondent’s submissions regarding these factors are laid out in Exhibit R1, at paragraphs 3.9 to 3.17. Having carefully considered the relevant evidence, the Tribunal considers that these submissions are consistent with the material before it and so accepts them.
The Tribunal notes that the Federal Court judgment of 13 April 2018, previously mentioned, in refusing Ms Hutchinson’s application for an order extending the time to seek judicial review of the 9 February 2016 decision, stated as follows:
This decision was made under an enactment.
As in the case of the 11 December 2015 decision Comcare opposes the application for an extension of time, first raising the question of delay in bringing the proceeding.
As Comcare points out the decision made 9 February 2016 was transmitted to the applicant by email on the same date. For the application for a review to have been made within time with respect to this decision, it should have been made by 8 March 2016. Instead the application was filed in this Court on 5 December 2016. It follows that the application in respect of this decision was some 271 days out of time.
I have recited above the principles and authorities governing the exercise of the Court’s discretion to extend time for seeking judicial review under the ADJR Act and the range of factors relevant to the exercise of a discretion, including the availability of merits review of a decision such as that made 9 February 2016.
In my view, the explanation provided by the applicant for what is a long delay in applying for judicial review is inadequate. Persons in the position of the applicant cannot simply choose when they will commence proceedings. I do not accept that ignorance of a right to seek judicial review, which is advanced by the applicant should result in an extension now being granted – at least in the circumstances of this case.
Additionally, it was open to the applicant to seek merits review of the decision in the Tribunal, but she chose, for her own reasons, not to do so. The Parliament of Australia has set up merits review as a substantive means of ensuring the preferable administrative decision is made in relation to a wide range of Commonwealth government decisions. It behoves an applicant, such as the applicant here, to take advantage of such merits review processes, especially when the substance of the case they wish to put on a judicial review application goes to the merits of the decision already made. It would have been appropriate for the applicant to seek merits review and then, if she considered there were questions of law that affected the making of that decision, to appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act.
So far as the merits of the judicial review application are concerned, Comcare has reasonably construed the applicant’s contention to be that the delegate made a ‘fraudulent’ and ‘false and misleading statement’ in the 9 February 2016 decision, being: ‘Dr O’Daly attributed your weight gain to your obsessive personality style not to your compensable condition and you do not meet the DSM 5 for agoraphobia’.
I consider the submission made by Comcare in respect of this grievance is correct. The contention essentially amounts to a request for the Court to engage in merits review of the decision made. No question of law is apparent. As I have intimated, merits review is available in the Tribunal, not this Court. The jurisdiction of this Court is to deal with questions of law, either under a judicial review application under the ADJR Act, or on an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act following merits review in the Tribunal.
As to the decision actually made, in my view plainly there was information before the delegate that enabled the decision to be made. It cannot be said that for the purposes of s 6(1)(h) of the ADJR Act there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the proposed decision.
For these various reasons, both individually and collectively, the application for an order extending the time to seek judicial review of the 9 February 2016 decision should be refused (T35/220-221).
In the present consideration, the Tribunal pays particular attention to Ms Hutchinson’s claim that she did not request reconsideration of the primary decision at the time because she “had been provided with unequivocal evidence of her [the Comcare delegate’s] inability to make a decision that wasn’t infected with procedural prejudice and bias” (Exhibit A1, para 1.4, and T2/7). On the evidence before it, and with the Tribunal not having the opportunity to hear more regarding this explanation because of Ms Hutchinson’s non-participation in this hearing, the Tribunal finds this claim to be an unsubstantiated claim by Ms Hutchinson.
The Tribunal finds Ms Hutchinson’s explanation for the delay inadequate and that the careful consideration of this factor weighs significantly against granting an extension of time.
Prejudice
The Tribunal now turns to the factor of prejudice.
In her written submission, Ms Hutchinson submits that there has been no prejudice or bias caused to Comcare and that there has been an ongoing benefit to Comcare in keeping this matter away from the glare of public scrutiny (Exhibit A1, para 6.1). The Respondent submits reasonably, in the Tribunal’s review, having regard to the length of delay that prejudice is likely to come in the form of deterioration in the quality of evidence that can now be obtained given the delay of 818 days (Exhibit R1, para 3.9). The Respondent relevantly cites the High Court’s decision in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, at 551, in which McHugh J said:
The discretion to extend time must be exercised in the context of the rationales for the existence of limitation periods. For nearly 400 years, the policy of the law has been to fix definite time limits (usually six but often three years) for prosecuting civil claims. The enactment of time limitations has been driven by the general perception that ‘where there is delay the whole quality of justice deteriorates’. Sometimes the deterioration in quality is palpable as in the case where a crucial witness is dead or an important document has been destroyed. But sometimes, perhaps more often than we realise, the deterioration in quality is not recognisable even by the parties. Prejudice may exist without the parties or anybody else realising that it exists. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Barker v Wingo, ‘what has been forgotten can rarely be shown’. So, it must often happen that important, perhaps decisive, evidence has disappeared without anybody now ‘knowing’ that it ever existed. Similarly, it must often happen that time will diminish the significance of a known fact or circumstance because its relationship to the cause of action is no longer as apparent as it was when the cause of action arose. A verdict may appear well based on the evidence given in the proceedings, but, if the tribunal of fact had all the evidence concerning the matter, an opposite result may have ensued. The longer the delay in commencing proceedings, the more likely it is that the case will be decided on less evidence than was available to the parties at the time the cause of action arose (Exhibit R1, para 3.20).
The Tribunal notes that even if it were to find that Comcare would not suffer any significant prejudice as Ms Hutchinson asserts, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension: Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411 at 416.
The Respondent submits that a second type of prejudice is relevant to the present matter, and that is the public interest prejudice of the kind recently discussed by Deputy President Boyle in Mason and John Holland Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2018] AATA 415, at para [31]. This is the prejudice that is caused:
…in the administration of justice by parties such as the Applicant simply ignoring legislative timeframes. In this regard the Tribunal notes the obvious and accepted public interest in the finality of decision-making, and the need to prevent disruption to established practices (see Re Veronica Lesley Johnson and Commonwealth of Australia; Commission of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Employees [1990] AATA 1) (Exhibit R1, para 3.22).
The Tribunal agrees.
The Tribunal also has careful regard to the consequences that Ms Hutchinson says have resulted from the delay. In her written submission Ms Hutchinson states:
The delays that have been unfairly continued against me perpetuated an ongoing agenda of detriment, harm and unlawful behaviours to prevent me access to the rights and entitlements that I have available to me under the SRC Act 1988.
If the AAT continues its recalcitrant ignorance and refusal to address these matters as put to them then the injustice that has been identified will continue to impact on every aspect of fair and legal decision making in according to Commonwealth law (Exhibit A1, paras 7.1 and 7.2).
Before the Tribunal, the Respondent submitted that there were no delays caused by the Respondent, rather, delays resulted from Ms Hutchinson not exercising her rights in a timely manner. Having considered the material before it, the Tribunal agrees, noting that Ms Hutchinson has made a conscious decision to bypass merits review and has sought alternative relief through the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (see also comments of Barker J at paragraph 22 above).
The Tribunal is of the view that it is in the public interest that there is an end to the appeal process. Time limits are imposed to ensure that there is a predictable and orderly conclusion to the process, and that the public interest and the interests of those applicants who comply with the prescribed time limits are unsettled by perceptions of unfairness and uncertainty if an extension of time is granted where the justice of the case does not permit that this should occur.
The consideration of the above facets of prejudice – that is potential prejudice to the Respondent, Ms Hutchinson’s claim of the consequences of the delays to her, and the wider prejudice to the general public in terms of disruption to established practices weighs against granting an extension of time.
Merits of the substantive application
The Tribunal now turns to a consideration of the merits of the substantive application. It is not necessary for the Tribunal to conduct a merits review of Ms Hutchinson’s substantive application (that is related to the Comcare decision dated 9 February 2016 (T28/146-150)) in these proceedings. However, it is appropriate for the Tribunal to consider the merits of that application as part of the process of determining whether an extension of time should be granted. Relevantly, the Tribunal notes the statement of Von Doussa J in the matter of Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 121 at 122 to the effect:
One of the principal considerations to be addressed in deciding whether it is fair and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time is whether the merits of the proposed appeal are such that if an extension of time is granted there is some prospect of success in the appeal. If a consideration of the merits indicates that there is no question to be agitated on the appeal, and there is no prospect of success, it would be futile to grant an extension of time and most unjust to the respondent to subject the respondent to the costs of defending a pointless appeal.
It may be that the stronger the apparent merits of the substantive application, the more likely that an extension of time would be appropriate.
In the substantive matter, the Respondent contends that Ms Hutchinson has limited prospects of success and that this factor weighs heavily against the granting of an extension of time (Exhibit R1, para 3.25). The Respondent contends that for Ms Hutchinson to be successful in the substantive proceedings, it would need to be shown that her agoraphobia condition was an ailment that was “contributed to, to a significant degree by the applicant’s employment with Comcare” (Exhibit R1, para 3.26).
The Respondent cites a medical report by Dr Jonathon Spear, consultant psychiatrist, dated 21 February 2018 (Exhibit R1, Annex C). This report states in part:
Therefore, on balance, I consider that most likely her employment has made a material contribution to her claimed condition of agoraphobia.
…
The applicant’s employment most likely makes a material contribution to her diagnosis of Agoraphobia but not a significant contribution (Exhibit R1, para 3.27).
The Respondent also cites a supplementary report provided by Dr Spear dated 17 August 2018 (Exhibit R1, Annex D). That report states in part in relation to Ms Hutchinson:
She appears to have a paranoid personality style but most likely she does not meet the DSM criteria for personality disorder. If atrial flutter was excluded as a contributor to Ms Hutchinson’s agoraphobia condition, I would consider that her degree of employment contribution remained material, but not significant. This is because there are many at least material causes of her mental health condition including personal stressors and her vulnerability to develop mental health disorder was evident with cognitive distortions (Exhibit R1, para 3.28).
Having regard to Dr Spear’s opinions, the Tribunal concludes that Ms Hutchinson would have limited prospects of success if the Tribunal were to grant the extension of time and remit the substantive matter to Comcare to determine liability. It follows then that this factor weighs against the granting of an extension of time.
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal regrets that Ms Hutchinson was unable to attend the hearing.
The Tribunal, having regard to all the evidence and the circumstances of this application and weighing the relevant factors discussed above, concludes that it is not reasonable in all the circumstances for an extension of time to be granted. It follows that the decision under review, dated 12 June 2018, is affirmed.
DECISION
For the reasons given, the Tribunal refuses Ms Hutchinson’s application for an extension of time to seek review of the Comcare decision dated 9 February 2016 and affirms the decision under review in these proceedings, being the Comcare decision dated
12 June 2018.
I certify that the preceding 42 (forty-two) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Brigadier A G Warner, Member
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Associate
Dated: 14 December 2018
Date of Receipt of Request
for Written Reasons:21 November 2018 Date of Hearing 20 November 2018 Applicant: No appearance Representative for the
Respondent:Mr A Burgess Solicitors for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
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