Hurst v State of Queensland (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hurst v State of Queensland (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 151

DISCRIMINATION LAW – application for injunctive relief and general damages on basis of disability discrimination – appellant sought quia timet injunction – likelihood of a future contravention of appellant’s rights – whether injunction sought within scope of s 46PO(4) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – finding that the appellant had suffered no loss or damage not challenged on appeal.

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46PO, 46PO(4)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 24(1)(a)

Catholic Education Office v Clarke (2004) 138 FCR 121 discussed
Clarke v Catholic Education Office (2003) 202 ALR 340 discussed
Hurst v Queensland (2006) 151 FCR 562 referred to
Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland [2005] FCA 405 referred to
R v Macfarlane; Ex parte O’Flanagan and Ex parte O’Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 518 cited

TIAHNA HURST (BY HER NEXT FRIEND GAIL SMITH) v STATE OF QUEENSLAND (ACTING THROUGH EDUCATION QUEENSLAND)
QUD 187 OF 2005

RYAN, FINN AND WEINBERG JJ
27 OCTOBER 2006
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 187 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

TIAHNA HURST (BY HER NEXT FRIEND GAIL SMITH)
Appellant

AND:

STATE OF QUEENSLAND (ACTING THROUGH EDUCATION QUEENSLAND)
Respondent

JUDGES:

RYAN, FINN AND WEINBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 OCTOBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s application for injunctive relief and/or compensation be refused.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 187 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

TIAHNA HURST (BY HER NEXT FRIEND GAIL SMITH)
Appellant

AND:

STATE OF QUEENSLAND (ACTING THROUGH EDUCATION QUEENSLAND)
Respondent

JUDGES:

RYAN, FINN AND WEINBERG JJ

DATE:

27 OCTOBER 2006

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

  1. Judgment in this matter was delivered on 28 July 2006: Hurst v Queensland (2006) 151 FCR 562. The appellant, Tiahna Hurst, succeeded in her appeal to this Court in proceedings against the respondent under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (“the Disability Discrimination Act”). The Court found that the respondent had discriminated against her, but left open the question whether, having regard to the unchallenged findings of the primary judge, she was entitled to any substantive relief. The Court stated (at [138]):

    “In addition, although Tiahna originally sought injunctive relief before Lander J, that claim seems to have been but faintly pressed both before his Honour and on appeal.  There seems little likelihood that any such claim could now succeed, given the time that has now passed, and the state of the evidence led below.  Nonetheless, we should give the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding the formal disposition of the claim for injunctive relief.  That…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hurst v State of Queensland (No 2) involved the appellant seeking injunctive relief and/or compensation for alleged discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act. The court was tasked with determining whether the appellant was entitled to such relief given the circumstances of her case and the passage of time since the alleged discriminatory acts. The primary issue before the court was whether the appellant had established a sufficiently high likelihood of future injury to warrant the immediate grant of a quia timet injunction. The court also considered whether the passage of time and changes in circumstances rendered injunctive relief inappropriate.

The court held that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the likelihood of a future contravention of the appellant's rights, which alone was a basis for refusing the injunction sought. Furthermore, the court noted that over four years had passed since the alleged discriminatory acts, and the circumstances had changed significantly. The appellant was at a different stage of her development, and the education services available to her and offered by the respondent were different from what was available at the time of the alleged contraventions. The court found that these changes further supported the denial of injunctive relief.

Given the reasons outlined, the court refused the appellant's application for injunctive relief and/or compensation. The court concluded that neither the evidence before the primary judge nor the evidence subsequently adduced established the likelihood of a future contravention of the appellant's rights to a sufficient degree to justify the immediate grant of an injunction. Additionally, the court considered the changes in circumstances and the passage of time as sound reasons for denying injunctive relief.

ORDERS:
1. The appellant’s application for injunctive relief and/or compensation be refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s application for injunctive relief and/or compensation be refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

RYAN, FINN AND WEINBERG JJ
Finally, the respondent submitted that there could be no proper comparison between the appellant and the complainant in Clarke. In that case, the compensation was driven by the intellectual isolation and social alienation established by the evidence. None of those factors was present here. CONCLUSION The starting point in considering the appellant’s application for injunctive relief is to note that what is sought is a quia timet injunction. That is, what the appellant seeks is an injunction to prevent or restrain an apprehended or threatened wrong which would result in substantial damage if committed. In quia timet proceedings, the court will have regard to the degree of probability of apprehended injury, the degree of the seriousness of the injury, and the requirements of justice between the parties. In R v Macfarlane; Ex parte O’Flanagan and Ex parte O’Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 518 Isaacs J observed (at 539):“The Court is not entitled to apply the obstacle of injunction to the contemplated action of a co-ordinate branch of the Government unless not only a case of clear illegality, proved to be calculated to result in a clear injury, is established, but also it is shown that by no other means can injury be averted or sufficiently compensated for.” Dr I C F Spry, in The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, Rectification and Equitable Damages (2001, 6th ed), comments (at 378) that quia timet injunctions are not granted unless the imminence of the act to be prohibited is sufficiently clearly established to justify the court’s intervention. The fact that there is no breach presently occurring may make it more difficult, as a matter of evidence, to establish that there is a sufficient risk of a future injury to justify the immediate grant of an injunction. If, in all the circumstances, the likelihood that an injury will take place is not sufficiently high, quia timet relief will be refused. The applicant will be left either to avail himself or herself of such other remedies as may be open, or else to renew his or her application should the likelihood of an injury subsequently increase sufficiently to render equitable intervention appropriate. Neither the evidence before the primary judge, nor the evidence subsequently adduced before this Court, sufficiently establishes the likelihood of a future contravention of the appellant’s rights. That of itself is an adequate basis for the refusal of the injunction sought. However, there are other sound reasons for denying injunctive relief. More than four years have now passed since the relevant acts of discrimination occurred. The circumstances that existed in May 2002 have altered considerably. The appellant is now at a different stage of her development. The education services that she might require, and those that the respondent is presently prepared to offer, differ considerably from those that were available at the time of the contraventions of the Disability Discrimination Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RYAN, FINN AND WEINBERG JJ

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