Huntley Management Limited v Australian Olives Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Huntley Management Limited v Australian Olives Limited [2010] FCAFC 98

Citation: Huntley Management Limited v Australian Olives Limited [2010] FCAFC 98
Appeal from: Huntley Management Ltd v Australian Olives Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 1549
Parties: HUNTLEY MANAGEMENT LIMITED (ACN 089 240 513) v AUSTRALIAN OLIVES LIMITED (ACN 078 885 042); AUSTRALIAN OLIVES LIMITED (ACN 078 885 042) v HUNTLEY MANAGEMENT LIMITED (ACN 089 240 513)
File number: NSD 16 of 2010
Judges: JACOBSON, GILMOUR and FOSTER JJ
Date of judgment: 12 August 2010
Catchwords:

CONTRACTS – whether, upon the true construction of the constituent documents of three managed investment schemes, management fees payable in advance were paid in satisfaction of a present debt and were therefore not apportionable – whether the provisions of s 232 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) apply to payments made in advance – s 232 held not to apply to payments made in advance – in the circumstances of the present case, management fees held not to be apportionable

CORPORATIONS – consideration of the meaning of ss 601FJ, 601FS and 601FT of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – a change in the responsible entity of a managed investment scheme held not to be effective unless and until ASIC’s record is relevantly altered – the relevant part of ASIC’s record is that part in which the responsible entity is named – the passing of a resolution by the members of a managed investment scheme to remove one responsible entity and replace it with another is only a step along the way in the process of effecting a change in that responsible entity – neither s 601FS nor s 601FT of the Corporations Act permits a rewriting of contracts to which the former responsible entity was a party – those sections place a new responsible entity in the shoes of the former responsible entity in relation to rights, obligations and liabilities that would have been those of the former responsible entity in respect of the post changeover period but for the changeover – in the present case, at the point of changeover, there were relevantly no rights, obligations and liabilities which survived the changeover – the provisions of s 601FS and s 601FT of the Corporations Act were not engaged in the circumstances of the present case

RESTITUTION – claim for money had and received by the new responsible entity of three managed investment schemes against the former responsible entity first raised on appeal – claim not available because not pleaded, not run at trial and made too late – claim for money had and received, in any event, not available to the new responsible entity because that entity was not the payer of the amounts the subject of the claim for money had and received – claim for money had and received rejected  

Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601FJ, 601FS and 601FT
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 232  
Cases cited: Huntley Management Ltd v Australian Olives Ltd (No…
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Details
Case
[2010] FCAFC 98
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Huntley Management Limited v Australian Olives Limited involved a dispute between the two parties over the management fees for three managed investment schemes. The dispute was brought before the court to determine several legal issues. Firstly, the court had to decide whether the management fees paid in advance were considered as a present debt and thus not apportionable. Secondly, the court needed to consider the effect of sections 601FJ, 601FS, and 601FT of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) on the change of the responsible entity of the managed investment schemes. Lastly, the court needed to address the claim for money had and received by the new responsible entity against the former responsible entity.

The court found that the management fees payable in respect of Projects 1, 2, and 6 were not apportionable as they were paid in satisfaction of a present debt. The court arrived at this conclusion by interpreting the relevant Grove Agreements, which indicated that a debt in favor of the responsible entity for the whole of the management fee payable by the investors in each year came into existence at the beginning of each year. Once the annual amount was paid, the investors' debts to the responsible entity were discharged, leaving nothing for the new responsible entity to accede upon its appointment. The court also held that sections 601FS and 601FT of the Corporations Act did not affect the former responsible entity's right to retain management fees paid in satisfaction of a present debt. There were no "shoes" into which the new responsible entity could step.

The claim for money had and received by the new responsible entity against the former responsible entity was rejected. The court found that the claim was not available because it was not pleaded, not run at trial, and made too late. Additionally, the new responsible entity was not the payer of the amounts the subject of the claim for money had and received.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal. The cross-appeal was also dismissed, and the cross-appellant was ordered to pay the cross-respondent's costs of and incidental to the cross-appeal up to and including 28 April 2010.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

3. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

4. The cross-appellant pay the cross-respondent’s costs of and incidental to the cross-appeal up to and including 28 April 2010.

Background

Background to the litigation

At [7]–[13] of his Reasons, the primary judge set out the relevant facts as follows:FACTSChanges in RE7.On 18 March 2008 the members of Projects 5 and 6 resolved to remove AOL as RE for those Projects and to appoint Huntley as RE in its place. Apparently on the same day, Huntley lodged an ASIC Form 5107 (Notification of Change of Responsible Entity) in respect of each of Projects 5 and 6. On 28 March 2008, ASIC processed the Forms 5107 in the sense noted above of recording Huntley as RE in respect of Projects 5 and 6 in place of AOL.8 On 29 April 2008 the members of Project 4 resolved to remove AOL as RE for Project 4 and to appoint Huntley as RE in its place. On the following day, 30 April 2008, Huntley lodged ASIC Form 5107 for Project 4 with ASIC. On that same day, ASIC processed the Form 5107 in the sense noted above of recording Huntley as RE for Project 4 in place of AOL .9.On 6 November 2008 the members of Project 1 resolved to remove AOL as RE for that Project and to appoint Huntley as RE in its place. On the same day Huntley lodged ASIC Form 5107 with ASIC. On 12 November 2008 ASIC processed the Form 5107 by recording Huntley as RE for Project 1 in place of AOL.10On 17 November 2008 the members of Project 2 resolved to remove AOL as RE for that Project and to appoint Huntley as RE in its place. On the same day Huntley lodged ASIC Form 5107 with ASIC. On 19 November 2008 ASIC processed the Form 5107 by recording Huntley as RE for Project 2 in place of AOL.Receipt of Management Fees11AOL received management fees for Projects 1, 2 and 6 in respect of annual periods that included a period during which Huntley was the RE for those Projects.12.Huntley received management fees for Projects 4 and 5 in respect of annual periods that included a period during which AOL was the RE for those Projects.Two Agreed Facts13 The parties have agreed that:(1)Costs (excluding harvesting costs - see [21] below) of the RE in performing its duties under the Grove Agreements referred to below are incurred unevenly throughout the year, and vary in relation to time of the year and conditions; and(2)Management fees for Project 4 were in fact charged in arrears by AOL. Contrary to the primary judge’s findings set out at [7] of his Reasons, the ASIC record suggests that the relevant notification was lodged with ASIC on 19 March 2008, not 18 March 2008. Nothing turns on this. At [14]–[20] of his Reasons, the primary judge set out particular findings concerning the establishment of Projects 1, 2 and 6 and the relevant terms of the Grove Agreements. His Honour said: THE DOCUMENTS14Alone of the Projects, Project 1 was established prior to the amendment of the Corporations Law as from 1 July 1998 by the Managed Investments Act 1998 (Cth) (MI Act). Project 1 was established by a Project Deed dated 4 August 1997. After 1 July 1998 Project 1 was required to be registered with ASIC as an MIS. Under the MI Act, AOL was authorised to amend the Project Deed in certain respects and did so by a Supplemental Deed dated 5 June 2000. By reason of the Supplemental Deed references to “Trustee” and “Manager” in the Project Deed are to be read as references to the RE. The Constitution for Project 1 is therefore to be found in the Project Deed as amended by the Supplemental Deed. This consolidated document has a heading of “Trust Deed”. I will refer to the “Trust Deed” and the “Constitution” for Project 1 indiscriminately. 15Projects 2 to 6 were established directly by “Constitutions” to which AOL and all persons holding interests in the Project are parties.Grove Agreements16The RE’s entitlement to management fees arises under a Grove Agreement between the RE and each member of the particular Project (Member).17Save for the due date for fees in Projects 4 and 5, the material terms of the Grove Agreements for all Projects are mutuatis mutandis identical. (In Project 5 fees are payable six-monthly in arrears and in Project 4 they are payable on the rendering of an invoice (clause 6.3(c)) – as noted earlier, the parties agree that the fees have in fact been invoiced in arrears.)18Clause 4.3 of the Project 1 Grove Agreement lists the ongoing management and harvesting duties that the RE must perform.19Clause 6.3 of the Project 1 Grove Agreement entitles the RE (Manager) to management fees. It provides:(a) In consideration of the Manager carrying out its duties under clause 4.3 for the third Year and onwards of this Agreement (except for clause 4.3((l)) [sic] in the relevant Year) the Manager is entitled to be paid a fee calculated in accordance with the following formula:-

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham City Council [1997] QB 380, the English Court of Appeal considered a claim by a bank for the restoration of a sum of money paid to a local council pursuant to an agreement which was ultra vires the council and void. At 392–393, Evans LJ said:ConclusionI can accept Mr Underhill’s submission that the phrase “at the expense of” forms part of the definition of a restitutionary claim and that the central issue is whether that has to be interpreted by reference to the payer/payee relationship alone, as distinct from other parts of what he calls the overall transaction. But I have no doubt that the former interpretation is correct. This is because the payee’s obligation, which is correlative to the payer’s right to restitution, is to refund or repay the amount which he has received and which it is unjust that he should keep. “At his expense”, in my judgment, serves to identify the person by or on whose behalf the payment was made and to whom repayment is due (compare Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105,125E per Goulding J and see Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution, p 132). That person, having made the payment, is necessarily out of pocket to that extent, and the defendant’s obligation is to replenish his pocket when the circumstances are such that the money should be returned. If the payment was made for valuable consideration, then the payer did not suffer “loss” even though the payment was made by him. But if it appears, as it did in the present case, that in law there was no consideration for it, then in that sense the payer has suffered loss. His pocket is emptier than it would have been if the money, or its value, was still there. But I would not give “loss” any wider meaning than that. In particular, it seems to me that it would be inconsistent with the principle of repayment that “loss” should be given some wider meaning equivalent to “overall losses on the transaction”, even if “the transaction” could be sufficiently identified, or that the right to recover restitution should be limited to the amount of “loss” in that sense, though never increased above the amount of the payment. Saville LJ agreed with Evans LJ and with Morritt LJ. At 395, his Lordship said: The expression “at the payer’s expense” is a convenient way of describing the need for the payer to show that his money was used to pay the payee. Thus there may well be cases where this cannot be shown, where in truth, for example, the payer was only the conduit through which the funds of others passed to the payee. Morritt LJ focused on the phrase “at the expense of the plaintiff” in order to explain both the origins and basis of the cause of action for money had and received. His Lordship quoted from the judgment of Mason CJ in Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 51. At 73–74, Mason CJ said: Historically, as I have already noted, the basis of restitutionary relief in English law was not compensation for loss or damage but restoration of what had been taken or received. The requirement that the defendant be unjustly enriched “at the expense of” the plaintiff can mean that the enrichment is “by doing wrong to” or “by subtraction from” the plaintiff [Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985), pp. 23–24]. Hence, a plaintiff can succeed by showing that he or she was the victim of a wrong which enriched the defendant—this is not such a case—or that the defendant was enriched by receiving the plaintiff’s money or property.When the plaintiff succeeds in a restitutionary claim, the court awards the plaintiff the monetary equivalent of what the defendant has taken or received, except in those cases in which the plaintiff is entitled to specific proprietary relief. Because the object of restitutionary relief is to divest the defendant of what the defendant is not entitled to retain, the court does not assess the amount of its award by reference to the actual loss which the plaintiff has sustained. That is what Windeyer J. was saying in Mason v New South Wales [(1959) 102 CLR at p. 146] when he rejected the notion that impoverishment of the plaintiff is a correlative of the defendant’s unjust enrichment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

We adhere to these observations. We will apply them in the present appeal. Consideration His Honour held that the management fees payable in respect of Projects 1, 2 and 6 were not apportionable. His Honour arrived at that conclusion by construing the relevant Grove Agreements. There was no error in his Honour’s construction of those Agreements. His Honour also held that s 601FS and s 601FT of the Act did not affect AOL’s right to retain management fees which had been paid to it in satisfaction of a present debt. There were no “shoes” into which Huntley could step. These conclusions were also correct. Pursuant to cl 6.3(c) of the Grove Agreements used for Project 1 and pursuant to cl 5.3(c) of the Grove Agreements used for Project 2, a debt in favour of AOL for the whole of the management fee payable by the investors in those projects in respect of each year comes into existence at the beginning of each year. This was the conclusion reached by his Honour at [39] of his Reasons. We agree with his Honour’s conclusion. Once the annual amount was paid, the investors’ debts to AOL as the responsible entity of Projects 1 and 2 were discharged. There was nothing to which Huntley could accede upon its appointment as the new responsible entity for those projects. AOL was removed as the responsible entity of Projects 1 and 2 in November 2008. Management fees for the 2008–2009 financial year were paid by the investors in those projects to AOL prior to the date when AOL was removed as the responsible entity of Projects 1 and 2. Those management fees were paid in advance of the services being provided by AOL for which the fees were paid. For Project 6, the same conclusions follow. In respect of that project, the debt becomes due and payable either on 1 October in each year or on 31 October in each year. For present purposes, the precise date does not matter since, for the financial year ended 30 June 2008, both dates antedate the date of AOL’s removal as the responsible entity of Project 6 (18 March 2008 or perhaps 28 March 2008). Section 232 of the Property Law Act does not alter the position as explained at [23]–[26] above because the management fees for Projects 1, 2 and 6 which were the subject of Huntley’s claim were all payments made in advance. Section 232(1) and s 232(2) of the Property Law Act provides as follows: (1)All rents, annuities, dividends, and other periodical payments in the nature of income whether reserved or made payable under an instrument in writing or otherwise shall, like interest on money lent be considered as accruing from day to day, and shall be apportionable in respect of time accordingly.(2)The apportioned part of any such rent, annuity, or other payment shall be payable or recoverable in the case of a continuing rent, annuity, or other such payment, when the entire portion of which such apportioned part, forms part becomes due and payable, and not before, and in the case of a rent annuity or other such payment determined by re-entry, death, or otherwise, when the next entire portion of the same would have been payable if the same had not so determined, and not before.