FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Huang v Abayawickrama
[2012] FCA 1504
Citation: Huang v Abayawickrama [2012] FCA 1504 Appeal from: Huang v Abayawickrama & Anor (No 1) [2012] FMCA 746
Huang v Abayawickrama & Anor (No 2) [2012] FMCA 747Parties: HONG CUI HUANG v CHAMINDA ABAYAWICKRAMA and UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES File number: NSD 1346 of 2012 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 14 November 2012 Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 1.40(a), r 26.01(d)
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) s 51
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 1.05, 13.10(c), 13.03B(1)Cases cited: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 applied
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 applied
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 applied
DA Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582 distinguished
Huang v Abayawickrama [2011] FMCA 235 referred to
Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 applied
Jeffrey & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75 applied
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 applied
Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 applied
Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 distinguished
Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 applied
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141
Tinkler v Elliott [2013] CP Rep 4; [2012] EWCA Civ 1289 applied
University of New South Wales v Huang [2012] FCA 308 referred to
University of Wollongong v Metwally [No 2] (1985) 960 ALR 68; 59 ALJR 481 applied
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 appliedDate of hearing: 14 November 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 51 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Chia Counsel for the First Respondent: Did not appear Solicitor for the First Respondent: Did not appear Counsel for the Second Respondent: Ms N L Sharp Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Bartier Perry
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1346 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: HONG CUI HUANG
AppellantAND: CHAMINDA ABAYAWICKRAMA
First RespondentUNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 NOVEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in r 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1346 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: HONG CUI HUANG
AppellantAND: CHAMINDA ABAYAWICKRAMA
First RespondentUNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE:
14 NOVEMBER 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the Transcript)
This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court to dismiss, as an abuse of process and because of her default,…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 1504
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legal issues concerning the application of issue estoppel and the inherent power of the court to control its processes and prevent abuse. The court considered whether the Magistrate erred in not finding the University estopped from raising the claim of abuse of process and whether the Magistrate's decision not to recuse herself was justified. The court also evaluated the arguments related to the new ground of appeal concerning the apprehension of bias, which was not raised before the trial judge.
The court concluded that the earlier decision by the Federal Magistrate Cameron did not create an issue estoppel that would prevent the University from asserting that the proceedings were an abuse of process. The court held that the decision to reject an application to dismiss proceedings as an abuse of process is interlocutory and does not finally decide rights. The court also found that the Magistrate was correct in rejecting the application for her to recuse herself, as the plaintiff's complaint of apprehension of bias was based on a misconceived premise and was not supported by the evidence. The court further held that the plaintiff's inability to properly identify her claims and comply with court orders rendered the proceedings an abuse of process.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the second respondent's costs. The court emphasised that the administration of justice requires that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial, and that an appeal is not a rehearing of the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in r 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The occasion recorded in the transcript occurred in circumstances where, after a considerable number of warnings that Ms Huang should remain silent and stop interrupting, as she plainly had been on a fair reading of the transcript, her Honour told Ms Huang that if she continued, she would be removed from the Court. Ms Huang ignored her Honour’s warning and her Honour, in order to control the proceedings, had her removed for a short time.Consideration of new grounds not put below and grounds 4 and 5 I refused the application to add the new ground and to allow counsel to continue to develop the ground relating to the argument of apprehension of bias that went beyond what had been put to her Honour in support of that claim. It is essential to the administration of justice that a distinction is kept firmly in mind between proceedings at first instance and on appeal. In Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ said that:“To say that an appeal is by way of rehearing does not mean that the issues and the evidence to be considered are at large. It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.”Their Honours then cited with approval what six justices had said in University of Wollongong v Metwally [No 2] (1985) 59 ALJR 481 at 483 in the following passage (162 CLR at 8):“It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so.” I consider the arguments on the new ground and the assertion of bias that was not put to her Honour, to be of no substance. Her Honour correctly rejected Ms Huang’s application that she recuse herself because that was put on a misconceived premise. Contrary to Ms Huang’s assertion, her Honour never said that the case had no prospects of success. Accordingly, Ms Huang’s complaint of apprehension of bias failed at the threshold. As I have already held, the new way in which counsel for Ms Huang sought to argue that her Honour should have recused herself was never put by Ms Huang to the trial judge. In any event, the new argument is equally without merit. Her Honour merely observed, as was unarguably correct, that given the way Ms Huang had put the substance of her case on 30 March 2012, that case did not have sufficient prospects of success to justify the appointment of a pro bono lawyer.That was not an indication from which a reasonable person in the position of an observer of the proceedings would have concluded that there was any apprehension that her Honour would not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the issues.