Huang v Abayawickrama

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Huang v Abayawickrama
[2012] FCA 1504


Citation: Huang v Abayawickrama [2012] FCA 1504
Appeal from: Huang v Abayawickrama & Anor (No 1) [2012] FMCA 746
Huang v Abayawickrama & Anor (No 2) [2012] FMCA 747
Parties: HONG CUI HUANG v CHAMINDA ABAYAWICKRAMA and UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
File number: NSD 1346 of 2012
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 14 November 2012
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 1.40(a), r 26.01(d)
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) s 51
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 1.05, 13.10(c), 13.03B(1)
Cases cited: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 applied
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 applied
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 applied
DA Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582 distinguished
Huang v Abayawickrama [2011] FMCA 235 referred to
Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 applied
Jeffrey & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75 applied
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 applied
Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 applied
Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 distinguished
Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 applied
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141
Tinkler v Elliott [2013] CP Rep 4; [2012] EWCA Civ 1289 applied
University of New South Wales v Huang [2012] FCA 308 referred to
University of Wollongong v Metwally [No 2] (1985) 960 ALR 68; 59 ALJR 481 applied
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 applied
Date of hearing: 14 November 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 51
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Chia
Counsel for the First Respondent: Did not appear
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Did not appear
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Ms N L Sharp
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Bartier Perry

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1346 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

HONG CUI HUANG
Appellant

AND:

CHAMINDA ABAYAWICKRAMA
First Respondent

UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 NOVEMBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in r 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1346 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

HONG CUI HUANG
Appellant

AND:

CHAMINDA ABAYAWICKRAMA
First Respondent

UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

14 NOVEMBER 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from the Transcript)

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court to dismiss, as an abuse of process and because of her default,…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1504
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Huang v Abayawickrama, the primary dispute involved the Federal Magistrates Court's handling of the plaintiff's proceedings against the University and Mr Abayawickrama, which were deemed to be an abuse of process due to the plaintiff's non-compliance with court orders and her failure to properly identify her claims. The matter was appealed to the Federal Court, where the plaintiff sought leave to appeal the decision of the Federal Magistrate, arguing that the Magistrate erred in not finding the University estopped from raising the claim that the proceedings were an abuse of process and in considering the plaintiff's earlier default in compliance with a specific order. The plaintiff also contested the Magistrate's decision not to recuse herself due to an alleged apprehension of bias.

The court examined the legal issues concerning the application of issue estoppel and the inherent power of the court to control its processes and prevent abuse. The court considered whether the Magistrate erred in not finding the University estopped from raising the claim of abuse of process and whether the Magistrate's decision not to recuse herself was justified. The court also evaluated the arguments related to the new ground of appeal concerning the apprehension of bias, which was not raised before the trial judge.

The court concluded that the earlier decision by the Federal Magistrate Cameron did not create an issue estoppel that would prevent the University from asserting that the proceedings were an abuse of process. The court held that the decision to reject an application to dismiss proceedings as an abuse of process is interlocutory and does not finally decide rights. The court also found that the Magistrate was correct in rejecting the application for her to recuse herself, as the plaintiff's complaint of apprehension of bias was based on a misconceived premise and was not supported by the evidence. The court further held that the plaintiff's inability to properly identify her claims and comply with court orders rendered the proceedings an abuse of process.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the second respondent's costs. The court emphasised that the administration of justice requires that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial, and that an appeal is not a rehearing of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the second respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in r 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It follows that the grounds that alleged that her Honour should have recused herself have no prospect of success and are without substance.The background for proposed grounds 1 and 2 After the proceedings had been remitted to her Honour, earlier this year, she sought to apply some active case management. Justice Reeves had noted that during the nearly eight years to that time, Ms Huang’s proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court had not been conducted on pleadings. He said that as a result Ms Huang had not been required, up to that point, to identify those causes of action she was pursuing under the Sexual Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the material facts she sought to rely upon to establish those causes of action. His Honour observed that a consequence of this lack of pleadings was that any assessment of her Ms Huang’s prospects of success had to be directed to the material she had filed in the Court below, to date, which essentially reduced to assertions she had made in the various affidavits she had filed: Huang [2012] FCA 308 at [35]. Her Honour directed herself to that question and sought to clarify what the real issues were in the course of the directions hearings. Federal Magistrate Cameron and Reeves J had also found that Ms Huang had committed a default in compliance with an order made by Cameron FM on 31 July 2010 because she had only filed affidavits, on 24 March 2011, five months later than provided for in that order: Huang v Abayawickrama [2011] FMCA 235 at [4], and on appeal, [2012] FCA 308 at [7], [26]-[35]. The first two proposed grounds of appeal asserted that her Honour erred because she did not find that the University was estopped from first, raising a claim that the proceedings at the time they were before her Honour were an abuse of process and secondly from placing any reliance on that earlier default by Ms Huang in compliance with the order of 31 July 2010. In addition, Ms Huang contended that because of the findings by Cameron FM and Reeves J on the University’s earlier application, the University could never again assert that the proceedings were subsequently being conducted as, or amounted to, an abuse of process. Ms Huang argued that a mere minor change in the facts would not get round an issue estoppel created by Cameron FM’s earlier decision, based on DA Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582, particularly at 604 per Hayne JA.Consideration – proposed grounds 1 and 2 In my opinion, that decision is distinguishable. It is clear that the categories of abuse of process are not closed. An application that proceedings be dismissed as an abuse of process is interlocutory: Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 at 4 [9]-[10]. There McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that an order staying or dismissing an action or refusing leave to commence or proceed with an action because it is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse in the process of the Court or does not disclose a reasonable cause of action, is interlocutory. In my opinion, the same position necessarily must apply where the action is allowed to continue. That is to say, the decision to reject, for example, an application to dismiss proceedings as an abuse of process is interlocutory and so does not finally decide rights. Nor can it decide that, no matter what happens later, that the continued proceedings can never be an abuse of process. Of course, the decision that the conduct of the proceedings up to the time at which Cameron FM decided the application of the University in March 2011 could not be re-visited by itself in the proceedings before her Honour and, having regard to Reeves J’s decision, on appeal. But it would be unrealistic to consider that merely because of the prior finding, subsequent conduct of Ms Huang in the proceedings could not be capable of ever amounting to, or being characterised as, an abuse of a process of the Court. So to hold would take out of the Court’s powers to control its own processes and to prevent abuse, a very important inherent or implied power that every Court must possess and continue to possess throughout proceedings before it, notwithstanding that at an earlier stage in litigation it had held that a litigant had not been proved to have conducted the case, or to have been engaged in proceedings which were, an abuse of the process of the Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Her Honour was entitled to manage the proceedings under the Federal Magistrates Court’s case management procedures. Ms Huang’s proceedings had become unmanageable by reason of Ms Huang’s failure to comply with orders and directions and to cooperate with the Court and the University in their conduct. Since Ms Huang’s claims against the University were based on its assistance in, or vicarious liability for, Mr Abayawickrama’s conduct, Ms Huang’s inability to identify properly her claims against both respondents in a statement of claim or an affidavit that complied with her Honour’s orders, meant that by the time her Honour heard the application the whole proceedings were an abuse of process. Accordingly, proposed ground 3 has no substance. Her Honour’s reasons were clearly correct.Conclusions For these reasons, I am of opinion that the application for leave to appeal does not demonstrate any sufficient reason to doubt her Honour’s conclusion or that any, let alone any substantial, injustice would flow from a refusal of the grant of leave to appeal: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at 231 [29] per McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ. Indeed, in my opinion, her Honour’s decision was plainly correct. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The occasion recorded in the transcript occurred in circumstances where, after a considerable number of warnings that Ms Huang should remain silent and stop interrupting, as she plainly had been on a fair reading of the transcript, her Honour told Ms Huang that if she continued, she would be removed from the Court. Ms Huang ignored her Honour’s warning and her Honour, in order to control the proceedings, had her removed for a short time.Consideration of new grounds not put below and grounds 4 and 5 I refused the application to add the new ground and to allow counsel to continue to develop the ground relating to the argument of apprehension of bias that went beyond what had been put to her Honour in support of that claim. It is essential to the administration of justice that a distinction is kept firmly in mind between proceedings at first instance and on appeal. In Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ said that:“To say that an appeal is by way of rehearing does not mean that the issues and the evidence to be considered are at large. It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.”Their Honours then cited with approval what six justices had said in University of Wollongong v Metwally [No 2] (1985) 59 ALJR 481 at 483 in the following passage (162 CLR at 8):“It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so.” I consider the arguments on the new ground and the assertion of bias that was not put to her Honour, to be of no substance. Her Honour correctly rejected Ms Huang’s application that she recuse herself because that was put on a misconceived premise. Contrary to Ms Huang’s assertion, her Honour never said that the case had no prospects of success. Accordingly, Ms Huang’s complaint of apprehension of bias failed at the threshold. As I have already held, the new way in which counsel for Ms Huang sought to argue that her Honour should have recused herself was never put by Ms Huang to the trial judge. In any event, the new argument is equally without merit. Her Honour merely observed, as was unarguably correct, that given the way Ms Huang had put the substance of her case on 30 March 2012, that case did not have sufficient prospects of success to justify the appointment of a pro bono lawyer.That was not an indication from which a reasonable person in the position of an observer of the proceedings would have concluded that there was any apprehension that her Honour would not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the issues.