Hong v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HONG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 3500
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Partner visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal was required to consider interests of the child – where the Tribunal failed to disclose certificate – whether failure to disclose certificate was material to outcome – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5F, 359A, 375A, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg. 1.15A, cl.801.221 of sch.2

Cases cited:

AOK17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 1971

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174
AZAEH v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 414
AZAEY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 193
Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600
BEG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 198
Bui v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 234
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 159
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
He v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 206
Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2016) 244 FCR 305
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 178 ALR 421
Minister of State for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Tumil-Ang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1824

Applicant: LONGDY HONG
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: PEG 101 of 2016
Judgment of: Judge Kendall
Hearing date: 27 November 2019
Date of Last Submission: 27 November 2019
Delivered at: Perth
Delivered on: 5 December 2019

REPRESENTATION

Applicant: In Person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S J Oliver
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitors for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 101 of 2016

LONGDY HONG

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. By application filed in this Court on 1 March 2016, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) dated…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 3500
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Hong, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) concerning a partner visa. The Minister for Immigration was the respondent. The core of the dispute involved the AAT's handling of a certificate and whether its contents, which were not initially disclosed to the applicant, constituted a failure to provide natural justice or jurisdictional error. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia before Judge Kendall.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the AAT was required to consider the interests of a child in its decision-making process, and whether the Tribunal's failure to disclose a particular certificate to the applicant was a material error that vitiated its decision. The applicant also raised concerns about apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal.

Judge Kendall, referencing the principles established in *Tumil-Ang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs* [2019] FCA 1824, found that the AAT was not required to disclose the certificate to the applicant. This was because the information contained within the certificate was already part of the delegate's decision, which had been provided to the Tribunal. Therefore, the exception under section 359A(4)(b) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) applied, meaning the Tribunal's omission did not constitute a failure to comply with the natural justice hearing rule. The Court also rejected the claim of apprehended bias, holding that the Tribunal's reference to the certificate's contents, which were already before it, would not lead a fair-minded observer to apprehend that the Tribunal lacked impartiality.

The application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister referred the Court to the decision in Tumil-Ang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1824 at [13]-[14], wherein the Federal Court stated:13. In the present case, the fact that the certificate and transcript reportedly issued by Saint Louis University were bogus documents was obviously information that the Tribunal considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision that was under review. The Tribunal did not put that information to Mr Tumil Ang in any letter under s 359A. However, the information formed an important part of the decision of the delegate of the Minister which was the subject of the Tribunal's review. The nature and substance of the information and its importance to the question of the refusal of the visa application was set out clearly in the delegate's decision.14. As part of the normal process of initiating a review, the delegate's decision was then given to the Tribunal in order for it to conduct its review. The Minister submits, and I accept, that this means that the Tribunal was not required to give Mr Tumil Ang particulars of the information in question, namely the information which was an important part of the reason for affirming the decision that is under review to, by reason of the exception in s 359A(4)(b). The Tribunal's omission to provide that information is therefore not a failure to comply with the natural justice hearing rule, as modified and stated exhaustively in relation to this subject in Division 5, Part 5 of the Migration Act. Apart from that, neither before the Federal Circuit Court or in this court has Mr Tumil Ang identified any information that was required to be disclosed by the Tribunal under s 359A. Here, the information to which the certificate related was referred to in the delegate’s decision and informed an important part of the delegate’s reasons for refusing the visa. The Court does not accept that the adverse information in the certificate was required to be put to the applicant as it was, as the Minister submits, exempt under s.359A(4)(b) – that is, because the applicant provided the delegate’s decision to the Tribunal. Finally, the applicant indicated that the Tribunal was “biased” because it referenced the contents of the certificate without asking for comment. Although not entirely clear, the Court understands the applicant to be suggesting that the Tribunal displayed apprehended bias. The test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded and appropriately informed lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not bring a fair, impartial and independent mind to the determination of the matter on its merits: SZRUI at [2]. Here, the Court does not accept that the certificate or the information the subject of the certificate would cause a fair-minded and appropriately informed lay observer to apprehend that the Tribunal was not impartial. The information the subject of the certificate did not disclose any additional material that was not already before the Tribunal either in the form of the delegate’s decision or the applicant’s own submissions: CNY17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 159 at [134] and [136].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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