to be sufficient, ought to be sufficient for a Court intrusted with the duty, not of finally deciding the case, but of determining whether there is evidence of an offence coming within that Act .sufficient to .satisfy the magistrate that the per.son charged was properly apprehended.

For these reasons I am of opinion that the .statement of the offence in the warrant is sufficient. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitor, for appellant, A. C. Secomb, Melbourne.

Solicitor, for respondent, Chiinness, Crown Solicitor for Victoria.

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Fcdthcrston v

[HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.]

HOLMES Ap pe l l a n t ;

ANGWIN R e spo n d e n t .

APPEAL FROM A COURT OF DISPUTED RETURNS IN THE

STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA.

Court of DUputed Returns—Electoral Acl (IF..4.), (Â o. 20 o / 1904), secs. 159-170—

H. C. of A.

Final and Conclusive Jurisdiction—"Supreme Court of a Slate’’— The

1906.

Constitution, {6.1 <0 64 Viet.), sec. 73—Special Tribunal.

'——̂'

P e r t h ,

Disputed elections in Western Australia are, under the Electoral Act 1904,

23 24

heard and determined by the “ Supreme Court,” this tribunal being con-

____

stituted by a single Judge in the special manner prescribed by the Act. By

"j’

sec. 167 the decisions of the tribunal are declared final and conclusive. This

Hijrgins, J J .

298 HIGH COURT

[1906.

H.C. OF A. tribunal having declared that a certain returned candidate was not properly

1906.elected, and that the election was void, the unsuccessful party appealed

direct to the High Court.

On motion to rescind the leave to appeal—

Holmk.s

Angwin.Held, that the Supreme Court iu the exercise of its jurisdiction under the

Electoral Act 1904 was not the “ Supreme Court” of the State of Western Australia within the meaning of sec. 73 of the Constitution, but, although consisting of a Judge of the Supreme Court, was a special tribunal to whose arbitrament Parliament had delegated the power of deciding the qualifica tions of persons to sit in those assemblies ; and that no appeal lay to the High

Court from its decisions.

•

The substantive…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Holmes v Angwin

Details

AGLC: Holmes v Angwin [1906] HCA 64
Case: [1906] HCA 64
Decision Date: 24 October 1906

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New South Wales, in the matter of *Holmes v Angwin*, considered a dispute concerning the finality of a decision made by a tribunal. The applicant, Holmes, sought to challenge a determination made by the respondent, Angwin, in their capacity as a tribunal.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the decision of the tribunal was final and conclusive, thereby precluding judicial review by the Supreme Court. This required the Court to interpret the relevant statutory provisions that conferred jurisdiction upon the tribunal and defined the scope of its decision-making powers.

The Court reasoned that the legislation establishing the tribunal intended for its decisions to be final and binding, thereby limiting avenues for appeal or review. Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the Court found that the language used in the relevant section indicated a clear intention to oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in relation to the tribunal's findings. Consequently, the Court held that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the application for review.

Orders