HL (Qld) Nominees Pty Ltd v Jobera Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

HL (QLD) NOMINEES PTY LTD v JOBERA PTY LTD & ANOR

[2009] SASC 165

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Layton

5 June 2009

REAL PROPERTY - TORRENS TITLE - INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE

REAL PROPERTY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - REGISTRATION - WHAT IS CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION

SUPERANNUATION - INDUSTRY REGULATION

CORPORATIONS - LEGAL CAPACITY AND RELATIONS WITH OUTSIDERS - EXECUTION OF DOCUMENTS

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSIDERATION - FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION

CONTRACTS - PARTICULAR PARTIES - PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - RATIFICATION

EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS - CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DUTY

EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE - RATIFICATION, AFFIRMATION AND WAIVER

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - ILLEGAL AND VOID CONTRACTS

EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MISTAKE - EFFECT ON CONTRACTS

EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE - FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION AS A DEFENCE OR ANSWER

Plaintiff appointed as trustee of a superannuation fund (“the fund”) for employees of a parent company and its subsidiaries pursuant to s 138 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (“SIS Act”) – property vesting order purported to vest the property of the fund in the plaintiff – the property included a second mortgage over land owned by the first defendant – the second mortgage had been granted to the fund as a consequence of a complex transaction comprising five major instruments – the transaction included a loan by the second defendant to the parent company, which loan was effected by a reduction of an amount owed by the first defendant to the second defendant under a first mortgage – the loan was to be repaid by the parent company and secured by a guarantee and indemnity from a subsidiary company – the transaction included an agreement that the second mortgage be given priority over the first mortgage – the plaintiff as a consequence of non-payment of the second mortgage sought to enforce the second mortgage and that it be given priority over the first mortgage – declarations and orders were sought.

Issues: issues included whether the second mortgage and the priority agreement were void and unenforceable – alleged deficiencies in the execution of the documentation – whether any consideration had been given to the first and second defendants – whether consideration had passed from the fund when it was granted the second mortgage with priority – whether a beneficiary who is not a party may enforce a transaction – s 55 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) ("PLA") – whether the property vesting order made pursuant to s 138 of the SIS Act was valid – whether the second mortgage had been validly registered under the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) (“RPA”) – whether the defendants’ claims were defeated by indefeasibility pursuant to s 69 of the RPA – whether there was a requirement to comply with ss 79 and 80 of the Trustee Act 1936 – whether there was…

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Details
Case
[2009] SASC 165
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, HL (Qld) Nominees Pty Ltd, the trustee of the Harts Staff Superannuation Fund, sought to enforce a second mortgage and a priority agreement over the Kadina property, which was owned by Jobera Pty Ltd and held as security by Merrell Pty Ltd. The defendants contested the enforceability of the second mortgage and priority agreement, alleging various issues such as voidness, lack of consideration, and misrepresentation. The court had to determine whether the second mortgage and priority agreement were valid, if the plaintiff could enforce them, and if the defendants' claims were barred by indefeasibility.

The court found that the second mortgage and priority agreement were valid and enforceable. The execution of the documents was ratified by the conduct of the parties, and each defendant received consideration within the context of the wider transaction. The trustee of the fund was entitled to enforce the second mortgage and priority agreement under s 55 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). The defendants were estopped from denying the enforceability of the documents, and their conduct ratified the execution of the mortgage and priority agreement. The court dismissed the defendants' counterclaims and granted the plaintiff's declarations and orders, including the right to enforce the second mortgage in priority over the first mortgage and to enter into possession of the Kadina property for non-payment.

The court also addressed the defendants' argument that the property vesting order under s 138 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) was invalid, and that the registration of the second mortgage and vesting order in the plaintiff attracted indefeasibility of title under s 69 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA). The court found that the property vesting order was valid, and that there was no fraud alleged. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the second mortgage in priority over the first mortgage.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Merrell had a subsidiary company in Australia called Merrell Associates Australia Pty Ltd. Klooger was Merrell’s lawyer in relation to Australian transactions and also was a director and secretary of the Australian subsidiary. Background In order to fully appreciate the context in which the dispute between the parties arose, it is necessary to first explain the background to the events of July 2001. The Kadina property On 7 November 1995 Jobera, in its own capacity and as trustee of the Telecom Kadina Trust, mortgaged the Kadina property in favour of Perpetual Trustees Australia Limited (“Perpetual”). This mortgage (“the First Mortgage”) was registered as mortgage number 8021269 at the Lands Titles Office on 19 January 1996. The First Mortgage names six guarantors, one of whom is Hart. The sum of $1,200,000 is secured by the mortgage and guarantees, and a due date of 15 September 1998 is provided. Of particular relevance are clauses 1.2 and 2 of Annexure A to the First Mortgage which provide as follows: 1.2The Mortgagor acknowledges that for reasons given in clause 1.1 the Mortgagee and the Investors will suffer damage if the Principal Sum is repaid early or repaid after the Due Date in the circumstances contemplated by clauses 3 and 4 and, accordingly, the provisions of such clauses are essential terms governing the advance of the Principal Sum.2.HIGHER RATEFor the purposes of this Mortgage the Higher Rate shall be the higher of:(a)the Lower Rate plus 4% per annum; and(b)the Bank Bill Rate plus 4% per annum The “Lower Rate” is prescribed in the Schedule to the First Mortgage as 10.4%. It was common ground between the parties that in respect of monies secured remaining unpaid after the due date, the penalty interest was at least 14.4%. By Memorandum of Transfer dated 22 December 2000, the First Mortgage was transferred by Perpetual to Cardinal for “valuable consideration”. The Memorandum of Transfer is signed by Hart and Stevens as the director and secretary of Cardinal respectively. On the same date as executing the Memorandum of Transfer, Cardinal assigned its interests under the First Mortgage to Merrell by the execution of a Declaration of Trust, and a second Memorandum of Transfer giving effect to this declaration was later executed. Both Memoranda of Transfer were registered on the title on 13 December 2001, being the same date of the registration of a second mortgage to HSS, details of which are discussed hereafter. The Harts Staff Superannuation Fund Prior to the appointment of HSS as trustee, the Fund was a member of a pooled investment arrangement (commonly known as a “23F pool”) along with numerous other superannuation funds related to the Harts Group. The trustee of the pooled arrangement was Fidelity. Following an investigation by the precursor to APRA, the Insurance and Superannuation Commission, the assets held by the pool were frozen, and an agreement was reached whereby the 23F pool arrangement was unwound, and each fund appointed its own trustee. The purpose of this agreement was to ensure the various funds and trustees adhered to the requirements of the SIS Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the centre of the dispute are a number of separate transactions, involving five documents, entered into over the course of a few days in July 2001. For ease of comprehension of these reasons, I reproduce herein relevant extracts from the five documents, along with extracts from other documents relevant to the claim. Evidence The evidence largely consisted of documentary material of some six volumes, together with additional documentary exhibits. The plaintiff, in support of its case, called three witnesses, Mr Ian Stevens (“Stevens”), Mr Graham Stewart (“Stewart”) and Mr Bruce McDonald (“McDonald”). The first defendant called no witnesses, and the second defendant called Mr Michael Horne (“Horne”). Conduct of the trial On the first day of trial the first defendant made an application for the Court to deliver a ruling on the standing of the plaintiff to bring the action. After some discussion it was conceded by counsel for the first defendant that the application ought not to be framed in the terms of a standing argument, but rather as an application pursuant to Rule 75.02 of the Supreme Court Rules (1987), whereby the Court may address a preliminary question of fact before the trial proper. Submissions regarding the application were made by all parties on 1 July 2008, after which I delivered a ruling rejecting the application for the issue to be dealt with as a preliminary point. Following the 1 July 2008 ruling, the first defendant through its counsel sought and obtained leave to withdraw prior to the evidence stage of the proceedings. The first defendant had already provided extensive written submissions; many arguments sought to be addressed by the first defendant were similar to those of the second defendant; the outcome of the major issues did not so directly affect the rights of the first defendant as it did the second; and there was no counterclaim by the first defendant. It was therefore submitted by counsel for the first defendant that it was commercially pragmatic and in his client’s interest for him to withdraw until the time came for closing submissions. For the above reasons I gave that leave.Approach to findings of fact The approach that I have taken to findings of fact relies essentially upon documents supplemented by oral evidence. On the whole there were very few contested areas of fact. I set out hereafter my findings on the balance of probabilities and indicate, where relevant, areas in which I have made findings on contested facts. The parties The plaintiff, HL (Qld) Nominees Pty Ltd (“Qld Nominees”) is incorporated pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“Corporations Act”). Qld Nominees was appointed the trustee for Harts Australia Staff Superannuation Fund (“the Fund”) by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”) on 25 October 2001. Qld Nominees claims to be vested with the benefit of the second mortgage pursuant to s 138 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (“the SIS Act”) and also with the benefit of the priority agreement.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Therefore this argument also fails for other reasons apart from its foundation being incorrect.Conclusion For the reasons set out above, I reject all of the arguments of the defendants as to their defence and their counterclaims. I am satisfied on the evidence that Qld Nominees is the registered mortgagee of the Second Mortgage on the Kadina property and is entitled to enforce the Second Mortgage. I am also satisfied that Qld Nominees is entitled to enforce the Second Mortgage in the terms in which it is expressed in the document dated 27 July 2001.[121][121] Travinto Nominees Pty Ltd v Vlattas (1973) 129 CLR 1,17; Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Naylor (1936) 55 CLR 423, 434-435; PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 643,681; Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd v French (2007) 235 CLR 81, 100. I am also satisfied that the Priority Agreement is valid and binding in accordance with its terms and that Qld Nominees is entitled to have the Second Mortgage given priority over the First Mortgage registered on the Kadina property. As a consequence Qld Nominees is entitled to certain declarations. In addition, Qld Nominees has sought an order that it is at liberty to take and enter into possession of the Kadina property. This order is sought by reason of the following facts which were largely admitted by the defendants in their defences. By letter dated 11 March 2002 Qld Nominees served a Notice of Default on Jobera, pursuant to the Second Mortgage.[122] In a letter dated 22 March 2002, Jobera advised Qld Nominees that Merrell intended to contest the Priority Agreement and the Second Mortgage and proposed payment of interest into a solicitor’s trust account, pending resolution of the dispute. I do not know whether this has occurred.[122] CD(4) 1135-6. On 22 July 2003, Qld Nominees by letter demanded that Jobera pay the principal sum of $900,000 together with outstanding interest of $179,345.64. By letter dated 25 July 2003 Jobera rejected Qld Nominees’s claim.[123] On 29 July 2003 Merrell, through its solicitor, advised Qld Nominees that it regarded the Second Mortgage as unenforceable.[124][123] CD(5) Tab 15.[124] CD(5) Tab 16. It is common ground that Jobera has not paid either the capital sum or the interest due under the Second Mortgage. Section 137 of the RPA permits a mortgagee to enter, take possession or bring an action for recovery of land for non-payment of a principal and interest. Qld Nominees has sought relief which is expressed as though it was seeking a declaration, without so specifying it. By reason of matters indicated earlier, I consider that Qld Nominees is entitled, pursuant to s 137 of the RPA to enter into possession of the Kadina property as sought. It does not have to obtain a court order before it can take this action, however it appears that it wished to obtain a court assurance that this action would be valid given the overall issues in the case. I regard this as being an appropriate subject for a declaration. I therefore make the following orders:1A declaration that Mortgage No 9189316 registered on Certificates of Title Volume 5316 Folio 674 and Volume 5291 Folio 876 is a valid and binding Mortgage and enforceable according to its terms.2A declaration that Mortgage No 9189316 on Certificates of Title Volume 5316 Folio 674 and Volume 5291 Folio 876 became vested in HL (Qld) Nominees Pty Ltd, which vesting is validly registered on the said Certificates of Title by instrument No 9597989.3A declaration that the Priority Agreement dated 27 July 2001 is valid and binding on the parties in accordance with its terms. Further that HL (Qld) Nominees Pty Ltd is entitled to have Mortgage No 9189316 registered on Certificates of Title Volume 5316 Folio 674 and Volume 5291 Folio 876, and given priority over Mortgage No 8021269 which was transferred to Merrell Associates and registered by instrument No 9189315.4A declaration that Qld Nominees is entitled pursuant to s 137 of the Real Property Act 1886, to enter into possession of the land contained in Certificates of Title Volume 5316 Folio 674 and Volume 5291 Folio 876. 5A injunction restraining Jobera Pty Ltd and/or Merrell Associates Ltd from dealing with the land comprised in Certificates of Title Volume 5316 Folio 674 and Volume 5291 Folio 876.6I dismiss each of the counterclaims of the defendants.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is not necessary for me to delve into the complexities as to whether the alleged representations were the conveyance of opinion rather than a predictive representation which would attract the evidentiary provisions of s 51A of the TPA. Nor is it necessary for me to discuss the complexities of the conveyance of information through intermediaries. The argument of Merrell fails from the outset.Effect of deregistration of HSS This final submission of Merrell’s, as with the majority of the others, depends on my determination as to whether the Second Mortgage vested in law in Qld Nominees. Although I have found that this was the case, I will consider Merrell’s final argument for the sake of completeness. Merrell submitted that, assuming Qld Nominees had at best an equitable interest in the Second Mortgage under s 138 of the SIS Act, this interest was extinguished when HSS was deregistered because at that point HSS’s interest in the Second Mortgage vested in the Crown pursuant to s 601AD of the Corporations Act. Counsel for Merrell submitted that this gave the Crown a legal title over the property and that this was superior to Qld Nominees’ equitable title, and therefore Qld Nominees was unable to enforce the Second Mortgage. A discussion of this argument renders it necessary to ignore the fact that I have found that the Second Mortgage vested in law in Qld Nominees by virtue of the Property Vesting Order issued by a delegate of APRA on 25 October 2001, perfected by the subsequent registration of the vesting in accordance with the RPA. The relevant dates for consideration of this order are as follows. Qld Nominees was appointed trustee of the Fund on 25 October 2001. On the same date the property of the Fund was vested in Qld Nominees by virtue of the Property Vesting Order issued by a delegate of APRA. The Property Vesting Order was registered on the title on 4 June 2003. HSS was not deregistered until 25 August 2003. Merrell submitted that the Property Vesting Order provided Qld Nominees with at best an equitable interest in the Second Mortgage, and that HSS maintained its legal title to the Second Mortgage until its deregistration on 25 August 2003. At that time, Merrell submitted that the Crown obtained legal title or at least an equitable title to the Second Mortgage pursuant to s 601AD. Section 601AD(1A) provides:On deregistration, all property that the company held on trust immediately before deregistration vests in the Commonwealth… Section 601AD(3) provides that upon deregistration, the Crown takes only the same property rights as the company itself held, subject to any security, interest or claim already existing over the property at the time of the company’s deregistration. The Property Vesting Order imposed by APRA on 25 October 2001 was a vesting of the whole of the property held by HSS in Qld Nominees. In this respect the wording of s 138 of the SIS Act is the same as s 601AD(1A). In my view, this vesting order altered the property rights of HSS over the second mortgage. HSS no longer had any beneficial interest in the Second Mortgage.