Merrell Associates Ltd v HL (Qld) Nominees Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

MERRELL ASSOCIATES LTD v HL (QLD) NOMINEES PTY LTD

[2010] SASC 155

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Nyland, The Honourable Justice Gray and The Honourable Justice Vanstone)

28 May 2010

REAL PROPERTY - TORRENS TITLE - INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE

REAL PROPERTY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - REGISTRATION - WHAT IS CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION

SUPERANNUATION - INDUSTRY REGULATION

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSIDERATION - FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - ILLEGAL AND VOID CONTRACTS

EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MISTAKE - EFFECT ON CONTRACTS

EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE - FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION AS A DEFENCE OR ANSWER

Appeal from decision of Judge of Supreme Court against decision that a second mortgage over two certificates of title was valid and binding and that a priority agreement relating to those titles was enforceable - whether second mortgagee's title indefeasible - whether second mortgage validly vested - whether contended irregularity in registering mortgage invalidated registration - whether the conferral of legal title pursuant to section 69 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) inconsistent with provisions of the Superannuation (Industry) Supervision Act 1993 (Cth) and invalid pursuant to operation of section 109 of the Constitution - whether overall contractual arrangement frustrated - whether there had been a common mistake of such a nature that the transaction was not enforceable - whether priority agreement valid and enforceable - whether legally sufficient consideration passed in relation to the grant of priority - whether respondent, a third party beneficiary to the transaction, had standing to sue on the priority agreement - whether respondent could enforce rights under the priority agreement pursuant to the provisions of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) - whether priority agreement unenforceable as a consequence of frustration and common mistake.

Held: appeal dismissed - second mortgage valid and binding and priority agreement enforceable - the matters complained of were appropriately considered by the Judge.

Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 54, s 68, s 69 and s 115A; Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 133 and s 138; Trustee Act 1936 (SA); Commonwealth Constitution (Cth) s 109; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 55, referred to.
Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107, applied.
Coulls v Bagots Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460, discussed.
Mayer v Coe [1968] 2 NSWR 747; Bank of South Australia Ltd v Ferguson (1998) 192 CLR 248; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd & Ors v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529; Viskauskas v Niland (1983) 153 CLR 280; Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472; R v Brisbane Licensing Court; ex parte Daniell (1920) 28 CLR 23; Colvin v Bradley Brothers Pty Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 151, considered.

MERRELL ASSOCIATES LTD v HL (QLD) NOMINEES PTY LTD
[2010] SASC 155

Full…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 155
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Merrell Associates Ltd appealed a decision of the Supreme Court against a ruling that a second mortgage over two certificates of title was valid and binding and that a priority agreement relating to those titles was enforceable. The primary issues for the court were whether the second mortgagee's title was indefeasible, if the second mortgage had been validly vested, if there was any irregularity in registering the mortgage that invalidated the registration, and if the conferral of legal title under section 69 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) was inconsistent with the provisions of the Superannuation (Industry) Supervision Act 1993 (Cth). The court also needed to determine if the overall contractual arrangement was frustrated, if there had been a common mistake rendering the transaction unenforceable, if the priority agreement was valid and enforceable, if legally sufficient consideration had passed in relation to the grant of priority, if the respondent, a third-party beneficiary, had standing to sue on the priority agreement, and if the priority agreement could be enforced under the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld).

The court found that Merrell Associates failed to establish sufficient facts to suggest that the transaction was ineffective in constituting a valid superannuation guarantee contribution. The court held that the submissions did not identify any relevant inconsistency between the Superannuation (Industry) Supervision Act and the Real Property Act, but rather alleged an inconsistency between two State Acts, which did not engage section 109 of the Constitution. The court rejected the contention that the contractual arrangement was frustrated, noting that frustration, in the absence of fraud or dishonesty, could not defeat the indefeasibility of title. The court also rejected the submission that there had been a common mistake rendering the transaction unenforceable, and found that there was no inconsistency within the meaning of section 109 of the Constitution. The court held that the findings of the Judge were open and appropriate, and that frustration or common mistake could not be raised to defeat indefeasibility. The appeal against the priority agreement was dismissed.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal and agreed with the findings of the Supreme Court Judge. The court found that the submissions of Merrell Associates did not establish a relevant inconsistency between the Superannuation (Industry) Supervision Act and the Real Property Act, nor did they identify a common mistake or frustration that could defeat the indefeasibility of title. The court held that the priority agreement was valid and enforceable, and that the respondent had standing to sue on the priority agreement. The court found that the overall contractual arrangement was not frustrated or rendered unenforceable by a common mistake. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Supreme Court was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ultimately, Merrell Associates simply failed to establish the facts sufficient to establish that the transaction was not ineffective to constitute a valid superannuation guarantee contribution. Conclusion For the above reasons I would dismiss this appeal. VANSTONE J: I would dismiss the appeal. I agree with the reasons of Gray J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the Judge observed, the submissions of Merrell Associates did not identify any relevant inconsistency between the Superannuation (Industry) Supervision Act and the Real Property Act, but rather alleged an inconsistency between the provisions of two State Acts. That is not a matter which enlivens the operation of section 109 of the Constitution. There is no inconsistency within the meaning of section 109 of the Constitution. Frustration – Common Mistake Merrell Associates submitted that the entire contractual arrangement was frustrated as the Commissioner of Taxation and the Prudential Regulator were not prepared to accept the in specie contribution as a valid contribution to a superannuation fund. It was contended that this was the very purpose of the arrangement and that the non-acceptance led to the inevitable conclusion that the whole transaction was unenforceable. Even if correct, this would not, in my opinion, form a basis for contending that the title was not indefeasible. The Judge in rejecting this submission observed that frustration, in the absence of fraud or dishonesty, could not defeat the indefeasibility of title. However, the Judge went further. The Judge was not prepared to make a finding that the object and purpose of the transactions was to make an acceptable and effective contribution to Harts Staff Superannuation in accordance with the legislative requirements. The Judge was not satisfied that such an outcome was a fundamental concern, and in particular, noted that the arrangement was to ensure the best outcome for members by the placement of an asset into the superannuation fund. When addressing the same submission with respect to the priority agreement, the Judge rejected the contention that the first mortgagee, Merrell Associates, was concerned with compliance with the particular statutory regime. It was pointed out, that there were five linked agreements and that the argument advanced was that frustration would only affect two of the five agreements. The Judge doubted whether the doctrine of frustration could operate in such a way. Finally, the Judge emphasised that there were different parties to each of the five agreements and doubted whether in these circumstances the doctrine of frustration could apply. Similar submissions were made asserting that there had been a common mistake of such a nature that the transaction was not enforceable. It was said that the common assumption made by the parties was a mistake, as the in specie contribution was not ultimately effective. The Judge noted the close correlation of the concepts of common mistake and frustration and adopted similar reasoning to that referred to above in rejecting the contention. Importantly, the Judge was not prepared in any event to make a finding that there had in fact been a common mistake. A review of the evidence confirms that the Judge’s findings were open on the evidence. Further, my review confirms that they were the appropriate findings. In any event, frustration or common mistake could not be raised to defeat indefeasibility. The Appeal - The Priority Agreement