HFPS Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) (No 1)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HFPS Pty Limited (Trustee) v Tamaya Resources Limited (In Liq) (No 1)

[2016] FCA 442

File number: NSD 529 of 2014
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 28 April 2016
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – whether, pursuant to s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and, in the circumstances of the present case and in the events which have happened, the Court ought grant leave to the plaintiffs to commence or to continue a proceeding instituted in contravention of that section
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 500(2)

Corporations Law, s 471B

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), Pt IVA

Cases cited:

Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (2000) 104 FCR 305

DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499

Eopply New Energy Technology Co Ltd v EP Solar Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 356

Oceanic Life Ltd v Insurance & Retirement Services Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1993) 11 ACSR 516

Re AJ Benjamin Ltd (In Liq) [1969] 2 NSWR 374; (1969) WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 107

Re Gordon Grant & Grant Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 314

Re Sydney Formworks Pty Ltd (In Liq) [1965] NSWR 646; (1965) 82 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 558

Vagrand Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Fielding (1993) 41 FCR 550

Date of hearing: 19 May 2015
Date of last submissions: 19 May 2015
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 101
Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Mr EAJ Hyde and Mr S Kanagaratnam
Solicitor for the Plaintiffs: O’Donnell Legal
Counsel for the First Defendant: Mr MS Henry SC and Mr JAC Potts
Solicitor for the First Defendant: Squire Patton Boggs
Counsel for the Second and Fifth Defendants: Mr MA Izzo
Solicitor for the Second and Fifth Defendants: Johnson Winter & Slattery
Counsel for the Fourth Defendant: Mr JRJ Lockhart SC
Solicitor for the Fourth Defendant: Wotton & Kearney
Solicitor for the Sixth Defendant: Mr D Liistro of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Eighth and Ninth Defendants: Mr RG McHugh SC and Mr A Shearer
Solicitor for the Eighth and Ninth Defendants: Ashurst

ORDERS

NSD 529 of 2014
BETWEEN:

HFPS PTY LIMITED (ACN 099 878 743) (AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HUNTER FACILITY PROJECT SERVICES PTY LTD SUPERANNUATION FUND (ABN 85 847 224 556))

First Plaintiff

ROSLYNDALE NOMINEES PTY LIMITED (ACN 060 121 691) (AS TRUSTEE FOR THE TONY FAY FAMILY TRUST)

Second Plaintiff

AND:

TAMAYA RESOURCES LIMITED (ACN 071 349 249) (IN LIQUIDATION)

First Defendant

HUGH LELAND JOHN CALLAGHAN

Second Defendant

RICHARD ANDREW PALMER (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Defendant

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 APRIL 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Upon condition that the plaintiffs will not seek to enforce any judgment which they may obtain against Tamaya Resources Limited (In Liquidation) (Tamaya), pursuant to s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the plaintiffs be granted leave to proceed with this…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 442
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of HFPS Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) (No 1) involved the plaintiffs, HFPS Pty Ltd, seeking leave to proceed with their legal action against Tamaya Resources Ltd, which was in liquidation. The application for leave to proceed was contested by the defendants, who argued that the plaintiffs had delayed in making their application and had not dealt with the court in a frank manner. The case was further complicated by the involvement of a litigation funder, International Litigation Partners No 2 Ltd (ILP), which had agreed to fund the plaintiffs and Tamaya in related proceedings. The legal issues at the heart of the case were whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to proceed with their claim against Tamaya and whether such leave should be granted nunc pro tunc. The court considered the plaintiffs' delay in making their application, the potential impact on the hearing date of the related proceedings, and the lack of interest from any group members in pursuing claims against Tamaya. Ultimately, the court decided to grant leave to the plaintiffs to proceed with their action against Tamaya, subject to certain conditions. The leave was not to be granted nunc pro tunc, and the plaintiffs were restricted to the claims made in their originating application and amended statement of claim. The costs of the application for leave to proceed were ordered to be costs in the proceeding. This decision highlights the importance of timely and transparent communication with the court and the potential consequences of delay in legal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Upon condition that the plaintiffs will not seek to enforce any judgment which they may obtain against Tamaya Resources Limited (In Liquidation) (Tamaya), pursuant to s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the plaintiffs be granted leave to proceed with this proceeding against Tamaya, such leave to operate and be effective from 5 February 2015.

2. Subject to any leave to amend hereafter granted by the Court, the claims which may be made by the plaintiffs against Tamaya be confined to those claims made by them against Tamaya in the Originating Application filed in this proceeding on 28 May 2014 and in the Amended Statement of Claim filed in this proceeding on 29 October 2014.

3. The costs of and incidental to the application made by the plaintiffs herein for leave to proceed against Tamaya be costs in the proceeding as between the plaintiffs and Tamaya.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the present case, Senior Counsel for the Deloitte defendants submitted that, because the plaintiffs had delayed in making their application for leave to proceed and had done so in circumstances which betrayed a less than frank dealing with the Court on the subject, leave to proceed should be refused. It was submitted on behalf of the Deloitte defendants that the litigation was being conducted under the close control and supervision of a litigation funder, International Litigation Partners No 2 Ltd (ILP) not for the benefit of the plaintiffs in the present proceeding but rather for the benefit of Tamaya in the other three proceedings, ILP having agreed to fund Tamaya and its liquidator in those proceedings. ILP has also agreed to fund the plaintiffs in this proceeding. THE FACTS RELIED UPON BY THE PARTIES In this section of these Reasons, I propose to set out as briefly as possible the facts relied upon by the parties in support of their respective contentions directed to the present application. The plaintiffs read and relied upon two affidavits affirmed by Mr Coves: The first was the affidavit affirmed by him on 4 February 2015 and the second was the affidavit affirmed by him on 10 February 2015. The facts were established by Mr Coves’ two affidavits, by two affidavits affirmed by Ms Goodman, the solicitor for the Deloitte defendants, and by the exhibits to those affidavits. The affidavits of Ms Goodman were affirmed on 20 April 2015 and on 19 May 2015 respectively. The documents contained in Exhibit SG3 to the first of Ms Goodman’s affidavits, the documents contained in the annexures to her second affidavit and other documentary tenders made during the course of the hearing have all been used as sources for this summary. I now turn to set out the facts as demonstrated by the evidence. Although this proceeding was commenced on 28 May 2014, it was not until early September 2014 that all defendants had been served with the Originating Application and Statement of Claim. The Deloitte defendants were served a little earlier, on 15 August 2014. Notwithstanding that service had not been effected upon all defendants, the Court held the first directions hearing in the proceeding on 22 August 2014. On 20 August 2014, two days before that directions hearing, Mr Coves sent an email to Mr Lindholm, the representative of ILP with whom he had dealt at all relevant times in respect of this proceeding. In that email, Mr Coves sought instructions from Mr Lindholm as to whether (inter alia) the plaintiffs should seek a direction requiring the filing of an Interlocutory Application for leave to proceed against Tamaya. On 21 August 2014, Mr Coves again sought instructions as to whether an application for leave to proceed against Tamaya should be made. In his response to Mr Coves, Mr Lindholm described this proceeding (referred to in the email as “this class action”) as “… the tail of the dog, not the head”. At the directions hearing held on 22 August 2014, I was told by the legal representative for the plaintiffs who appeared on that occasion that the plaintiffs needed to seek the leave of the Court to proceed against Tamaya. For this reason, an order was made on that occasion that any interlocutory application in which such relief was to be sought should be filed by 19 September 2014.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

During the hearing, I marked as MFI-1 a bundle of emails and other documents tendered by the plaintiffs as a complete record of all relevant communications internally within their camp with a reservation to these Reasons for Judgment of the question of whether or not I should limit the use to which those documents should be put. As the argument developed, I reconsidered that ruling and admitted all of the documents without limitation as Exhibit 3.CONCLUSIONS For all of the above reasons, I propose to grant leave to the plaintiffs to continue the present proceeding against Tamaya. I will not make an order that they have leave to commence this proceeding nunc pro tunc. Although I have decided not to refuse leave to proceed, I have done so in part because of subsequent events. Further, the plaintiffs have failed to obtain an order for leave to proceed nunc pro tunc. This may or may not turn out to be significant. In any event, the plaintiffs were, at the very least, dilatory in making the necessary application. It was that dilatoriness which was at the heart of the Deloitte defendants’ resistance to the making of the orders sought. That resistance was not unreasonable in the circumstances. Nor was the opposition put up by the other defendants. I think, in all the circumstances, that the appropriate order for costs is that the costs of the application for leave to proceed be costs in the proceeding. There will be orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Senior Counsel for the Deloitte defendants made the following submissions:(a)There has been inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the plaintiffs in making their application for leave to proceed against Tamaya. That application should have been made either before the proceeding was commenced on 28 May 2014 or very soon thereafter. Orders were made on 22 August 2014 designed to advance that application but those orders were ignored. (b)On 8 October 2014, the Court was informed that the plaintiffs did not intend to seek leave to proceed against Tamaya. That communication was made on instructions notwithstanding that, the day before the directions hearing (viz 7 October 2014) and early in the morning of the directions hearing, Mr Lindholm was apparently seeking to keep ILP’s options open as to whether or not an application for leave to proceed would ultimately be made. His plan was to negotiate a settlement of the plaintiffs’ claims with Tamaya and its insurer, if at all possible.(c)At the time I conducted the hearing of the plaintiffs’ application for leave to proceed, the final hearing of all of the four proceedings was fixed to commence on 12 October 2015. Thus, delay had significant implications for that hearing date. (d)The change of position notified to the Court on 19 December 2014 was explained on that occasion as being the result of the plaintiffs’ desire to “tap into” Tamaya’s D&O policy of insurance. There is no real advantage in the plaintiffs’ doing so because the directors have first call on the proceeds of that policy and it is unlikely that Tamaya would ever secure indemnity thereunder. (e)The only identifiable benefit that could potentially arise in relation to leave being granted is to ILP. The damages report served in proceeding NSD 327 of 2014 reveals that Tamaya was approximately $10 million better off as a result of continuing to trade after 31 March 2008. In that proceeding, in order to generate a compensable loss, Tamaya’s expert (Mr Searby) was asked to assume that Tamaya would be made liable for the entire loss claimed by the plaintiffs in this proceeding (approximately $30 million). Once this assumption is made, the estimated loss for continuing to trade after 31 March 2008 is approximately $20 million. This assumption was instructed to be adopted even though no leave to proceed had been granted against Tamaya. In order to generate substantial fees as a result of funding Tamaya in the related proceedings and the plaintiffs in the present proceeding, ILP needed the plaintiffs in this proceeding to pursue their claims against Tamaya in order to keep the other proceedings alive and to generate significant loss.(f)The grant of leave to proceed would seriously jeopardise the 12 October 2015 hearing date. (g)No group member has ever expressed any interest in pursuing any claim against Tamaya and there is no suggestion that any such person has lodged a proof of debt. In those circumstances, the Court ought not exercise its discretion to grant leave to pursue a claim to be made by someone who has never expressed an interest in pursuing such a claim. (h)Any grant of leave ought not, in the circumstances, unfairly alter substantive rights by reference to limitation periods.(i)The Court was misled on 8 October 2014 when it was informed that the plaintiffs did not intend to pursue any application for leave to proceed against Tamaya. The Court ought not countenance such behaviour.CONSIDERATION