Henskens v Rudd

[2020] NSWSC 533

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Henskens v Rudd [2020] NSWSC 533

Hearing dates:

8 May 2020

Decision date:

11 May 2020

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Adamson J

Decision:

(1)   Refuse leave to appeal.

 

(2)   Order the plaintiff to pay the sixth and seventh defendants’ costs of the proceedings.

 

(3)   Otherwise dismiss the second further amended summons filed on 6 April 2020.

 (4)   Remove the seventh defendant as a party to the proceedings.

Catchwords:

APPEALS — Application for leave to appeal from Local Court to Supreme Court — magistrate refused permanent stay of criminal proceedings in the Local Court — assurance given to accused person that he would not be charged — police officer who gave assurance unaware of separate charges relating to the taking and distribution of visual images of the complainant

  APPEALS — magistrate applied correct principles — factual findings open — principles of promissory estoppel do not apply in this context — leave refused

Legislation Cited:

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 3, 4, Sch 1
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 91P, 91Q
Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), s 53
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), ss 84, 91
Local Court Act 2007 (NSW), Pt 4

Cases Cited:

Adler v DPP [2004] NSWCCA 352
Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49
Jago v The District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23; [1989] HCA 46
L v Johnson & the DPP [2003] NSWSC 1246
R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677
Strickland (a pseudonym) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2018] HCA 53; (2018) 93 ALJR 1
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Peter G Henskens (Plaintiff)
Detective Jarrad Rudd (Sixth Defendant)
Senior Constable Leah Hughes (Seventh Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
Self-represented (Plaintiff)
K Curry (Sixth and Seventh Defendants)

  Solicitors:
Not applicable (Plaintiff)
Office of the General Counsel, NSW Police Force (Sixth and Seventh Defendants)

File Number(s):

2019/407914

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

Local Court

Date of Decision:

9 December 2019

Before:

Chicken LCM

File Number(s):

2019/11018

Judgment

Introduction

1. Peter Henskens (the plaintiff) seeks leave to appeal against the decision of Chicken LCM on 9 December 2019 refusing his application for a permanent stay of proceedings 2019/11018 (the image proceedings). His application is brought under s 53(3)(b) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) (the Act). Detective Jarrad Rudd, the sixth defendant, is the police informant in the image proceedings. The other named defendants, apart from the seventh defendant who is referred to below, were removed as parties by order of Campbell J on 17 March 2020.

2. The sixth defendant opposes the orders sought on the basis that no question of law amenable to review under s 53(3)(b) of the Act has been raised and the case is not an appropriate one for leave to be granted.

3. The plaintiff, in a second further amended summons filed on 6 April 2020, purported to join Senior Constable Leah Hughes as the seventh defendant. Senior Constable Hughes is the police informant in the proceedings 2017/324995 (the AVO proceedings). The seventh defendant opposes the plaintiff’s claim for a permanent stay of the AVO proceedings on two grounds: first, no application for a stay has been made in the AVO proceedings; and, second, even if it had been, the appropriate forum for an appeal is the District Court pursuant to s 84 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The seventh defendant’s submissions are well-founded. This Court has no jurisdiction to determine the plaintiff’s application for a stay of the AVO proceedings. This is the only basis on which the seventh defendant is a party to the proceedings. Accordingly, she should be removed as a party from the proceedings.

The facts

4. The following narrative of facts is derived from the evidence (in the form of statements) which was before Chicken LCM at the hearing of the plaintiff’s application for a stay on 9 December 2019. At that hearing there was no cross-examination of any of the makers of the statements, whose evidence can accordingly be taken to have been unchallenged.

The AVO proceedings

5. On 3 November 2017 Senior Constable Sally Butcher, who was stationed at the Toronto Police Station, received a complaint from the plaintiff’s then wife (the complainant) concerning the plaintiff. On 17 November 2017, after receiving further complaints, Senior Constable Butcher applied for an AVO, which was given proceedings number 2017/342995. The application included allegations that the plaintiff had hacked the complainant’s gmail account and that he continued to sexually assault, intimidate and harass her. The AVO application made no mention of any allegation that the plaintiff had intentionally recorded, or distributed, intimate images of the complainant.

6. On 21 November 2017 an Interim AVO was made by the Toronto Local Court and directions made for the filing of statements.

7. On 22 November 2017, the plaintiff sent an email to Senior Constable Butcher to which was attached a video of the plaintiff in a sexual encounter with the complainant. In the covering email the plaintiff said:

“Might I suggest you save us all the embarrassment of having this video viewed in open court, and instruct the prosecutors to withdraw the AVO. Otherwise I will be forced to instruct my solicitors to enter it into evidence, something I’m sure the Magistrate will not appreciate, particularly if he is told a copy has been provided to the Police beforehand.”

8. On 23 November 2017, the plaintiff sent an email to the Toronto Local Court to which the video was also attached. The email was copied to Senior Constable Butcher.

9. On 24 November 2017, Senior Constable Butcher returned from a number of rest days leave and read the emails referred to above. That day she received a phone call from a friend of the complainant’s who told her that the plaintiff had posted a sex video on Facebook. Later that day, the plaintiff phoned Senior Constable Butcher and admitted that he had filmed the video and posted it on Facebook. She told him that she would be investigating whether his conduct amounted to an offence.

10. Ultimately, on 3 December 2017, Senior Constable Butcher emailed Gianacas Argiris McDonald Solicitors, the plaintiff’s solicitors (who had been copied into the other emails which the plaintiff had sent to her) and requested that the solicitors contact her if necessary and that the plaintiff cease contacting her directly.

11. On 5 December 2017 Senior Constable Butcher received an email from Alexander Kontekakis confirming receipt of the email of 3 December 2017. He said that he had advised the plaintiff not to communicate directly with her. Subsequent to this email, the plaintiff again tried to contact Senior Constable Butcher. At about this time, the matter was transferred to another police officer to manage. Senior Constable Butcher phoned Mr Argiris to inform him that she was no longer the officer-in-charge but that she believed that charges would be laid.

The sexual assault allegations

12. On 20 November 2017 the sexual assault allegations, which had been made by the complainant to Senior Constable Butcher, were transferred to Detective Ash Cooper at Maitland Police Station. However, he had not been appointed officer-in-charge of the AVO proceedings after Senior Constable Butcher had ceased performing that role. Detective Cooper made several attempts to contact the complainant in order to obtain a statement from her in support of the sexual assault allegations.

Further conduct of the AVO proceedings

13. I note that the chronology attached to the plaintiff’s statement dated 20 August 2019 made for the purposes of his motion for a stay includes the following entry for 22 January 2018:

22/01/2018

File Note: discussion between Solicitor Alex Kontekakis and police-

•   Brief not supplied

•   OIC Maitland is handling the case now

•   Deliberating whether to press charge of sexual assault in relation to the sexual assault/sharing of the video

14. The plaintiff was not a party to this conversation. The file note referred to in the entry was not tendered although Mr Argiris, the principal of the firm instructed by the plaintiff, made a statement in which no reference to that conversation was made. Mr Kontekakis did not give evidence in support of the stay and the police officer with whom he is alleged to have spoken on 22 January 2018 was not identified in the chronology extracted above.   

15. The AVO proceedings were again listed in the Local Court on 23 January 2018 at which time a brief of evidence was served on the plaintiff. The brief of evidence included a statement from the complainant which was dated 5 December 2017 but which was not actually signed until 13 January 2018. In this statement, the complainant deposed as to the sexual assaults which the plaintiff had committed against her. She also deposed that, prior to making the statement, Senior Constable Butcher had shown her the video which the plaintiff had provided to police. She said, in paragraph 16 of her statement:

“Senior Constable Butcher showed me the video before making this statement and it is the first time I have seen it and it made me feel sick and very upset to think that [the plaintiff] was going to video sex. It has distressed me very much to learn [the plaintiff] sent this video to Senior Constable Butcher, his lawyer and Toronto Local Court without my knowledge or permission.”

16. The matter was stood over to 20 February 2018 to enable any pending criminal charges to be considered.

17. On 20 February 2018 the Local Court directed the plaintiff to file his evidence in the AVO proceedings by 13 March 2018. According to Mr Argiris’s statement of 12 August 2019 (which was tendered in support of the stay application on 9 December 2019):

“From consultations with Lizzie McLaughlin, counsel for Mr Henskens, who appeared at the Toronto Local Court on the 20th February 2018 his Honour Mr Railton on the 20th February indicated a reluctance to give the matter a hearing date given that there may be further charges laid against Mr Henskens. Ms McLaughlin also advised Mr Railton at this hearing that until such time as confirmation had been received by police that no further charges would be filed against our client as it may well prejudice his position if any subsequent charges were laid.”

18. On 21 February 2018 the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to Detective Cooper and informed him that the plaintiff would not file evidence in the AVO proceedings until he had received written confirmation from police that no criminal charges would be pursued against him.

19. On 1 March 2018 Mr Kontekakis rang Detective Cooper who told him that no formal statement had been made by the complainant but that if a statement was made a determination would be made about the charges. Mr Kontekakis made a file note of the conversation. Detective Cooper conducted a search of the plaintiff on the Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) but, as there was no link shown, he did not appreciate that there was a link between the plaintiff and the historical sexual assault allegations. Detective Cooper contacted the complainant who told him that she was happy that the AVO had been made and did not want to make a formal statement regarding the alleged sexual assault. She also told him that she was not ready to go to court on a sexual assault charge and only wanted to proceed with the AVO.

20. Following these conversations, Detective Cooper sent an email dated 1 March 2018 to Mr Kontekakis which read as follows:

“Alex,

I have spoken to the victim in this matter.

At this time no criminal proceedings will be commenced against the POI [person of interest] in this matter as any and all allegation[s] of sexual assault will remain a matter of record only.”

21. After further communications between the parties, Detective Cooper sent a further email to the plaintiff’s solicitors on 3 April 2018 which included the email he had sent on 1 March 2018 in which he said:

“Aleisha,

Please see the below email sent to Alex re this matter.

At this time there will be no criminal proceedings against the accused as the victim has not made a formal statement to police.”

22. Detective Cooper’s uncontroverted evidence about his state of mind at that time was:

“12.   I had formed the opinion that no charges will be laid against Peter Henskens. There were no charges laid in relation to the statement made on the 5th of December as I was not aware of its content. I have never seen this statement and was not aware of its existence. As far as I was concerned, I was investigating an allegation of historical sexual assault made by the victim. Once the victim has declined to make a formal statement to me in relation to this matter it was deemed there was insufficient evidence to proceed against Henskens and I have closed the case and informed the representatives from Gam Law of the outcome of the investigation.

13.    Throughout this investigation and with my communication to the defence I was referring to the investigation of a sexual assault. At no time was I referring to any charges of intentionally record intimate image without consent or Intentionally distribute image without consent. This was primarily due to the fact I was unaware of any such allegation. At no stage did I claim immunity from prosecution for the accused. I simply referenced my investigation which was based on the allegation of sexual assault.”

23. On 9 April 2018, Police Prosecutor Will Somers sent an email to Mr Argiris as follows:

“in relation to the AVO matter involving [the plaintiff] listed for mention at Newcastle Local Court on 19 April 2018, I can confirm that no charges are to be laid. Any hearing will only relate to the AVO, if the AVO is still contested.”

24. Police Prosecutor Somers had not spoken with the complainant. He was entirely unaware of any allegation that the plaintiff had taken and distributed intimate images of the complainant. The only matters concerning the plaintiff of which he was aware were the matters contained in the AVO application referred to above.

25. By letter dated 20 April 2018 Mr Argiris wrote to the plaintiff as follows:

“RE: APPREHENDED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORDER AGAINST YOU

We refer to the above matter and note our Mr Argiris appeared for you in the Newcastle Local Court on 19 April 2018, before His Honour Magistrate Stone.

We confirm our advice to you that the Police have indicated in writing (copy of email dated 9 April 2018 is enclosed) that no legal proceedings will be made.

You were ordered to file all of your material in response of the breach of AVO by 16 May 2018.

We suggest that you make some notes in relation to your statement and then contact our Mr Argiris within the next 10 days, so that we have sufficient time to finalise the statements with Lizzie McLaughlin.

If you have any enquiries, please do not hesitate to contact our Mr Kontekakis.

…”

26. On 17 May 2018 the plaintiff filed a statement in reply to the AVO brief. On 6 August 2018 the final AVO was made by consent.

The image proceedings

27. On 1 May 2019 the complainant attended Maitland police station and made a complaint regarding the plaintiff’s recording and distribution of the video. She said that she wanted charges to be laid regarding the matters concerning the video.

28. On 13 May 2019, Detective Rudd served the plaintiff with a court attendance notice which charged him with offences of intentionally recording and distributing an intimate image without consent contrary to ss 91P(1) and 91Q(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The recording of the plaintiff’s wife (the complainant) is alleged to have been made on 5 October 2017 (sequence 1); the image was alleged to have been intentionally distributed without her consent on 22 November 2017 (sequence 2) and on 23 November 2017 (sequence 3). These charges were the subject of the image proceedings.

29. The matter came before a Registrar of the Local Court at Maitland on 4 July 2019. On that occasion, the plaintiff appeared for himself and sought to have the matter adjourned to 25 July 2019 in order that Mr Santone could appear on his behalf. The plaintiff alleged that the image charges had been laid in breach of an undertaking given to him by police. On the adjourned date, 25 July 2019, Mr Santone appeared on behalf of the plaintiff when the matter was mentioned before Chicken LCM. Mr Santone told the Court that the plaintiff intended to apply for a stay of the image proceedings. Directions were made for the filing of evidence. Mr Santone, on 25 July 2019, said to the magistrate, in relation to the AVO proceedings, at tr 6.21-23:

“For our part, because there are criminal proceedings on foot, I’d ask [that] the matter go over with those until those matters are finalised. That’s the matter that will be subject to the stay application proceedings earlier today.”

30. In support of his application for a stay of the image proceedings, the plaintiff made a witness statement dated 20 August 2019 in which he deposed:

“2.   With the assistance of my legal representatives I have prepared a Chronology of events relating to the matters before the Local Court at Maitland. I attach as Annexure “A”: a copy of that Chronology. I confirm the information contained therein is true & correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.”

3.   If the police dispute the contents of any of the documents referred to and/or from which extracts have been copied, I am prepared to tender them in evidence as exhibits.”

31. It is plain that the chronology was prepared for the purposes of legal proceedings and contains entries of communications to which the plaintiff was not a party.

The hearing in the Court below

32. The plaintiff’s application for a stay was heard by Chicken LCM on 9 December 2019. Mr Santone appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. The evidence tendered is summarised in the following table:

Party by whom tendered	Maker of statement	Date of statement	Exhibit
Plaintiff	James Argiris	12 August 2019	1
Plaintiff	Plaintiff	20 August 2019	2
Prosecutor	Detective Senior Constable Cooper	27 August 2019	3
Prosecutor	Senior Constable Somers	28 August 2019	4
Prosecutor	Complainant	5 December 2017	5
Prosecutor	Complainant	28 March 2019	6
Prosecutor	Senior Constable Butcher	5 December 2017	7
Prosecutor	Senior Constable Hatch (nee Butcher)	19 September 2019	8

33. The evidence was admitted without objection. No oral evidence was adduced and there was no cross-examination. The magistrate adjourned the court so that his Honour could read the material tendered. He returned to the bench at midday for submissions.

34. In submissions in the Court below, Mr Santone referred to previous proceedings for breach of the AVO which had been dismissed. He asked the Court rhetorically: “when is this going to stop?”. He continued, “Although it may not be the strongest of submissions, but the issue of delay is certainly alive here …”.

35. Also in the course of submissions, the magistrate asked Mr Santone to identify any prejudice to the plaintiff if the image proceedings were not stayed. At that point, the transcript (tr. 7.1) recorded the plaintiff as saying, “Well--”, to which his Honour responded:

“Mr Henskens, I’m not asking you. If I want to ask you, I’ll ask you. I’m asking Mr Santone, that’s why he’s here. If there’s something you want to say to him, I’ll give you that opportunity. Calling out does not help…”

36. Mr Santone submitted to the magistrate that there had been “general prejudice” but accepted that he was unable to articulate any specific prejudice. Shortly before the luncheon adjournment, at tr. 10.19, the magistrate asked Mr Santone if there was anything else he wanted to say. Mr Santone made further submissions. The magistrate then indicated that he would return after lunch to give a decision on the stay application. After the luncheon adjournment, the magistrate announced that he proposed to refuse the stay. His Honour then marked all the statements tendered as individual exhibits and gave reasons for his decision.

The reasons of the Court below

37. His Honour found that an undertaking was given by Detective Cooper that no charges would be laid, which raised an expectation in the plaintiff that there would be no criminal charges laid. His Honour accepted that Detective Cooper had no knowledge of the image allegations when he gave the undertaking although he had tried to find whether there were any other charges outstanding when he searched the COPS database.

38. His Honour characterised the basis for the application for a stay as being the allegation that it would be an abuse of process for the image charges to proceed. His Honour cited from L v Johnson & the DPP [2003] NSWSC 1246 (Hidden J), which, in turn, cited Jago v The District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23 (Jago) at 33-34 (Mason CJ); [1989] HCA 46. The magistrate cited the following passage from L v Johnson & the DPP:

“[10]   Mr Thangaraj’s submissions in this Court centred upon the withdrawal of the charges and the circumstances of their reinstatement. It was against that background that he mounted the challenge to his Worship’s approach to the delay, which it is convenient to deal with first. He relied upon the observation of Mason CJ in Jago (at 33) that ‘it should not be overlooked that the community expects trials to be fair and to take place within a reasonable time after a person has been charged’. However, that observation must be read in its context. The Chief Justice was there speaking about the ‘balancing process’ involved in the ‘test of fairness’, noting that ‘the interests of the accused cannot be considered in isolation without regard to the community’s right to expect that persons charged with criminal offences are brought to trial …’ (also at 33). His Honour went on to say (at 34) that ‘a permanent stay should be ordered only in an extreme case and the making of such an order on the basis of delay only will accordingly be very rare …’.”

39. The magistrate found that the issue of delay was not a matter of particular concern. His Honour identified the issue as being whether to allow the prosecution to proceed would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. His Honour cited Strickland (a pseudonym) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2018] HCA 53; (2018) 93 ALJR 1 (Strickland). His Honour read from [99] of Strickland where the plurality (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Nettle JJ) said:

“As Kirby J aptly summarised the position in Truong v The Queen:

‘relief is not confined to cases of deliberate and knowing misconduct, although that may be sufficient to enliven the jurisdiction. It extends to serious cases where, whatever the initial motivation or purpose of the offending party, and whether deliberate, reckless or seriously negligent, the result is one which the courts, exercising the judicial power, cannot tolerate or be part of.’”

[Footnotes omitted.]

40. His Honour also read out [100] from Strickland as follows:

“No doubt, society and therefore the law ordinarily looks [sic] more askance on instances of deliberate or advertent reckless disregard of a duty or obligation than upon the accidents of incompetence. As a rule, the former are conceived of as entailing greater moral culpability and for that reason their condonation is conceived of as more likely to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. But ultimately it is a question of degree which substantially depends upon the nature of the duty or obligation. If a duty or obligation is of no more than peripheral significance, condonation of its breach, even of an intentional breach, may appear justified in the interests of relatively more pressing considerations of justice. The power to stay proceedings is not available to cure venial irregularities. But if, as here, the duty or obligation is of a kind that goes to the very root of the administration of justice, condonation of its breach will bring the administration of justice into disrepute regardless of the culprit's mentality. Ultimately, these appeals turn on that distinction.”

41. His Honour continued at tr. 14-15:

“At the end of the day, it comes down to this, it seems to me, that the competing public interests are, ‘The public need to bring to conviction those who commit criminal offences and the public interest in the protection of the individual from unlawful and unfair treatment.’ This is at para 159 and it is Gageler J I think who in fact gave a minority decision in respect of this particular decision.

‘The rationale for the existence of a judicial discretion to exclude evidence on a balancing of those considerations has been variously explained in terms of the public policy of not giving the appearance of curial approval to wrongdoing on the part of those whose duty it is to enforce the law and the public policy that it is better that a possibly guilty accused be allowed to go free than that society or the courts sanction serious illegality or other serious impropriety on the part of officials in gathering the evidence in which to convict the accused.’

…

The balance here, it seems to me, favours the prosecution being allowed to continue. I am not satisfied that this is an exceptional case. I am satisfied that whilst it was disclosed initially and at an early point in time in the allegations identified by [the complainant], that was not something that was covered by the undertaking given by Detective Cooper. If I was of the view that Detective Cooper had that information available for him and made the undertaking, then it seems to me that my decision would be different. But what he says and - it seems to me that Mr Somers' statement really takes the matter no further because he relied entirely upon the instructions given to him by Detective Cooper.

Detective Cooper was clearly confining his undertakings to the sexual assault proceedings, the sexual assault proceedings which are indeed recited in the application. It is of importance, I think, to note that there is no recitation in the application itself of the allegations surrounding the dissemination of the video. As I have already made clear, I have no doubt that it was within the [purview], within the knowledge of the police, that this allegation in relation to the video existed, but as I say, I am satisfied that that was not adverted to by Detective Cooper when he gave the undertaking which was then again communicated through Mr Somers, the prosecutor, to the applicant's solicitors.

In a circumstance such as that, where in my view, it comes about as a consequence of inadvertence, I am not satisfied that such inadvertence allows me to categorise these matters as so exceptional as to stay proceedings, because as has been emphasised in all of the prior authorities, exceptional and extreme cases are those only in relation to which stays of proceedings, permanent stays, will be granted.

It seems to me that those authorities also restrict permanent stays where an unfairness can be identified. That test of exceptional and extreme seems to me even higher, where in a particular unfairness has not been identified. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that this is a matter which is appropriate for a permanent stay to be issued and

I DECLINE TO PERMANENTLY STAY THESE PROCEEDINGS.”

Relevant legislation

42. Section 53(3)(b) of the Act provides that any person against whom an interlocutory order has been made by the Local Court in relation to the person in summary proceedings, may appeal to this Court against the order, but only on a ground that involves a question of law alone, and only by leave of the Court.

Consideration

43. The plaintiff, in his second further amended summons raised several grounds of appeal. In substance, these grounds are as follows:

1. The magistrate erred in failing to properly consider the plaintiff’s evidence and incorrectly applied Jago.

2. The police dishonestly and unethically presented evidence on 9 December 2019.

3. The magistrate’s conduct of the proceedings prejudiced the plaintiff.

4. The police, by stealth or incompetence, gave a clear assurance to the plaintiff that no charges would be laid in relation to the allegations in the AVO application.

5. The magistrate failed to take into account that the plaintiff suffered prejudice by giving evidence in response to the AVO application in reliance on the assurance by police.

6. The magistrate was biased and denied the plaintiff procedural unfairness.

7. The history of the matter and previous abuses by the police and the complainant.

8. The file notes made by the plaintiff’s solicitors which are alleged to indicate that they were seeking assurances regarding both the sexual assault and image charges.

9. The plaintiff had a viable defence to the allegations and should not be put to the additional expense of defending the image proceedings.

10. The police did not include the allegation of sharing the video on social media which suggests that the police are sceptical of the veracity of the charges.

11. The image proceedings were commenced by court attendance notice rather than by arresting the plaintiff which indicates that the police regard the prosecution evidence as insufficient to warrant a conviction.

12. [The plaintiff did not press this ground.]

13. The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

14. The plaintiff was tried in the AVO matter on 6 August 2018, which included the AVO brief, which raised the image charges, thereby raising the issue of double jeopardy.

15. The magistrate failed to consider applicable case law.

16. The plaintiff was not asked whether he agreed to a continuation of the interim AVO orders which were continued at the conclusion of the hearing.

17. The continuation of the image proceedings constitutes an abuse of process.

44. These grounds fall into 6 categories, which will be addressed in turn.

1. His Honour misapplied the applicable legal principles, including those set out in Strickland (grounds 15 and 17) and was in error in failing to find that the police ought be held to their representation that no charges were to be laid (grounds 1, 4, 5 and 8);

2. His Honour conducted the hearing unfairly and was biased (or guilty of apprehension of bias) against the plaintiff (grounds 3, 6 and 16);

3. The police resisted the stay application in an unfair and improper way (ground 2);

4. The allegations made by the complainant were false and the plaintiff ought not have to face false allegations (grounds 7, 9, 10 and 11);

5. The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of a promissory estoppel in accordance with Waltons Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7 (ground 13);

6. The plaintiff will be, unlawfully, subject to the principle of double jeopardy if he is required to face the images charges (ground 14).

45. I note that ground 12 has been withdrawn.

Category (1): alleged misapplication of legal principles to the evidence (grounds 1, 4, 5, 8, 15 and 17)

46. The plaintiff argued that the magistrate failed to apply the correct legal principles in Strickland and that, had his Honour applied the principles correctly, the stay would have been granted. It is apparent from his Honour’s reasons that his Honour was aware of, and had considered, Strickland. His Honour cited from it and other authorities. The magistrate approached the application on the basis that an undertaking had been given and that the plaintiff had understood from the content of the undertaking that he would not be charged in relation to the images and that it was on this basis that the plaintiff had given evidence in opposition to the AVO application (to which he subsequently consented).

47. His Honour carefully considered the evidence as to how it came about that Detective Cooper had failed to appreciate that evidence relating to the images was included in the complainant’s statement dated 5 December 2017. However, his Honour accepted Detective Cooper’s unchallenged evidence that he had not read that statement and was entirely unaware that any images had been taken when he gave the undertaking. His Honour correctly identified the competing interests in a consideration of whether a stay ought be ordered.

48. The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any question addressed or legal principle applied by the magistrate was wrong. To the contrary, the magistrate’s reasons indicate that his Honour was aware of the governing principles and applied them to the facts of the present case.

49. As referred to above, there are substantial forensic difficulties relating to the entry for 21 January 2018 which affect its weight. It is neither a business record, nor supported by a business record; the police officer who was alleged to be party to the conversation has not been identified and Mr Kontekakis did not give evidence. The weight to be attributed to particular pieces of evidence was a matter for the magistrate. His Honour’s findings about what was known and appreciated by each party were findings of fact. His Honour accepted, in the plaintiff’s favour, that the plaintiff had an expectation that he would not be charged.

50. None of the grounds in category (1) has been made out and none warrant a grant of leave.

Category (2): alleged unfair hearing of the plaintiff’s application in the Court below (grounds 3, 6 and 16)

51. The plaintiff alleged in this Court that he had been “gagged” by the magistrate because, when he tried to address the Court directly, he was prevented from doing so as the magistrate allowed him only to address the Court through his representative, Mr Santone. I reject this submission. A person who has chosen to appear by a legal representative, is not entitled to address the court directly, but must speak through the legal representative. The plaintiff is bound by the conduct of his legal representative: R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 at 684-685 (Gleeson CJ, McInerney J agreeing). Mr Santone, having been alerted to something which the plaintiff wanted to communicate to the court, did not seek (as far as the transcript revealed) to consult his client before concluding his submissions on his behalf. There was no further obligation on the magistrate to allow this to occur in the absence of a request from Mr Santone.

52. The plaintiff further alleged that he ought not to have been required to serve his evidence in support of his stay application before the police were required to serve their evidence in opposition to the application or the brief of evidence in the image proceedings. The order of proceedings in a criminal hearing or trial (where the prosecutor must adduce all evidence first before the accused person is called upon to respond) does not apply to interlocutory applications. As the plaintiff was the applicant for the stay, he was obliged to tender his evidence first and make his submissions first. The magistrate adopted an entirely orthodox approach. Further, Mr Santone did not raise any issue with this approach at the hearing.

53. The plaintiff contended that there had been a denial of procedural fairness by reason of his not having been asked whether he agreed to a continuation of the interim AVO orders at the conclusion of the hearing on 9 December 2019, before they were in fact continued. As set out above, Mr Santone, on 25 July 2019, had asked that the other matters be stood over until after the determination of the stay application. In these circumstances the interim AVO orders were to be continued until a date after the determination of the stay application. The magistrate did not have to concern himself with the interim AVO orders, which were continued as a matter of course. Such orders, as with continuation of bail orders, are made to avoid any doubt and to confirm the status quo, even though no application to vary the existing orders was made. No denial of procedural fairness has been made out.

54. It was alleged that the matters referred to above revealed bias by the magistrate or gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. I reject this submission. The magistrate’s conduct was consistent with the orderly and orthodox conduct of a hearing.

55. None of the grounds in this category has been made out and none warrants a grant of leave.

Category (3): alleged unfair conduct by NSW Police of the hearing before the magistrate (ground 2)

56. Ground 2 contains an allegation that the police dishonestly tendered, in opposition to the stay, statements which supported the images charges and failed to tender all of the evidence relating to those charges. The brief in relation to the images charges had not been served at the time the proceedings were heard by the magistrate.

57. Once again, the principle that the plaintiff is bound by the conduct of his legal representative applies. There was no objection to the material tendered by the police in opposition to the stay, either as to relevance or form. Had Mr Santone considered that any further evidence ought be tendered in reply, he could have tendered any such evidence. Ground 2 has not been made out and does not warrant a grant of leave.

Category (4): alleged lack of merit in the prosecutor’s case on the images charges (grounds 7, 9, 10 and 11)

58. As referred to above, in the Court below, Mr Santone raised that one of the earlier alleged breaches of the AVO had been dismissed. He conceded that it was not his strongest submission. Mr Santone did not make any submission that the evidence in the images proceedings was other than strong. Nor was any such submission open. Although not all of the emails the plaintiff had sent to Senior Constable Butcher were in evidence, Senior Constable Butcher had extracted the relevant text in her statement dated 5 December 2017. Further, her statement contained admissions by the plaintiff that he had filmed the complainant and sent the video to the police and to the Court. It is understandable that Mr Santone did not make submissions about the strength of this evidence, particularly in circumstances where the brief of evidence for the image offences had not yet been served.

59. The plaintiff also argued that it was significant that the police did not include the allegation that the plaintiff shared the video on social media in the current images proceedings which suggested that the police were sceptical of the veracity of the allegations. He further argued that the fact that he was served with a court attendance notice rather than arrested indicated that the police did not regard their evidence as sufficiently strong to result in a conviction. The formulation of charges is a matter for the prosecutor and is not subject to review by a court: Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49 at [30] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). It would not be appropriate to speculate as to the content of the charge, its formulation and its particulars. Further, this matter was not raised by Mr Santone in the Court below and ought not be entertained here. I do not regard the distinction between the service of a court attendance notice and the arrest of an accused person as bearing on any conclusion that might be reached as to the prosecutor’s view of the strength of the prosecutor’s case.

60. The grounds in this category have not been made out. None warrants a grant of leave.

Category (5): alleged promissory estoppel in favour of the plaintiff (ground 13)

61. There is no authority to support the proposition that a promissory estoppel, such as was recognised in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher applies in the present circumstances. Indeed, authorities such as Strickland make it clear, as a matter of necessary implication, that the principles of promissory estoppel do not apply. Accordingly, there is no substance to this ground, which does not warrant a grant of leave.

Category (6): alleged application of the principle of double jeopardy (ground 14)

62. The principle of double jeopardy, relevantly, prohibits a person being charged twice for the same offence. It is difficult to see how this arises in the present case. The images charges have not been proceeded with previously. The plaintiff argued that the AVO application was a criminal matter and that it covered the images charges. First, an AVO application constitutes “civil proceedings” within the meaning of ss 3 and 4 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and therefore does not constitute criminal proceedings: Sch 1 to the Civil Procedure Act, which refers to s 91 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act, for which the Local Court has special jurisdiction under Part 4 of the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW). In these circumstances the principle of double jeopardy does not apply: Adler v DPP [2004] NSWCCA 352 at [40]. Secondly, the AVO application made no mention of the images charges. There is no merit to this ground and accordingly no grant of leave is warranted.

Conclusion

63. The plaintiff has failed to persuade me that leave ought be granted under s 53(3)(b) of the Act in respect of any of the grounds. In order to address the question of jurisdiction (whether a question of law alone is involved) and whether leave ought be granted it has been necessary to review the grounds. In doing so I have addressed the merit of the grounds in this context. For the reasons given above, I am not persuaded that any of the grounds warrants a grant of leave.

Further matters

64. During the hearing of the matter, the plaintiff contended that the court book which had been prepared by the sixth defendant was deficient in that it contained a statement of Senior Constable Butcher dated 5 December 2017 to which the wrong documents had been annexed. In order to rectify this, I allowed the annexures in the court book to be removed and replaced by pages supplied by the plaintiff (which formed part of Annexure “E” to his evidentiary statement filed on 8 April 2020). Ms Curry, who appeared for the sixth (and seventh) defendants, accepted that the substitution ought be made.

65. In an email sent to my Associate on Sunday 10 May 2020, the plaintiff made allegations about the conduct of police in failing to have the correct annexures attached to the statement which was in the court book. In a further email dated 11 May 2020, the plaintiff has noted that the image charge documents are in a different format in the court book than those attached to his affidavit (which I rejected). He also contended that he understood that this Court’s decision was to be limited to the documents which were before the magistrate.

66. I note that it was the plaintiff’s obligation to provide the documents to the court for his proceedings. The plaintiff, instead, chose to file an affidavit of 8 April 2020, which was objected to because it contained material which was not before the magistrate. It was in this context that the sixth defendant indicated to the Court that he would provide a court book with the material which was before the magistrate. Ms Curry accepted that there had been an error in this process which was limited to the annexures to Senior Constable Butcher’s statement referred to above. I have no reason to believe that the error was other than inadvertent. The annexures which had been included in error in the court book were the emails sent by the plaintiff, which were extrapolated in the statements in any event.

67. As to the charge documents, the versions in the court book are three separate court attendance notices. The document annexed to the plaintiff’s affidavit contains the three charges in the one notice. The offences charged are otherwise identical. Nothing turns on the differences. It was appropriate that this Court have the charge documents before it for the purposes of the application for leave to appeal.

68. In these circumstances, the matters raised by the plaintiff in his emails do not affect the questions for my determination. It has, in these circumstances, not been necessary to hear from the sixth defendant on the plaintiff’s further submissions and observations.

Costs

69. Ms Curry sought costs if the sixth defendant was successful. The plaintiff submitted that, even if he were unsuccessful, he should not be required to pay the sixth defendant’s costs because of the error relating to the contents of the court book. As referred to above, the error in the court book was immaterial and apparently inadvertent. It provides no reason why the plaintiff ought not be ordered to pay the sixth defendant’s costs of the proceedings.

70. As referred to above, the seventh defendant was not a proper party to the proceedings and ought be removed as a party. In these circumstances, the plaintiff ought be ordered to pay the seventh defendant’s costs of the proceedings as well as those of the sixth defendant.

Orders

71. For the reasons given above, I make the following orders:

1. Refuse leave to appeal.

2. Order the plaintiff to pay the sixth and seventh defendants’ costs of the proceedings.

3. Otherwise dismiss the second further amended summons filed on 6 April 2020.

4. Remove the seventh defendant as a party to the proceedings.

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Decision last updated: 11 May 2020