FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hempel (Wattyl) Australia Pty Ltd v United Workers Union [2024] FCAFC 98
Appeal from: United Workers Union v Hempel (Wattyl) Australia Pty Ltd [2023] SAET 53 File number: SAD 98 of 2023 Judgment of: RANGIAH, SNADEN AND ABRAHAM JJ Date of judgment: 22 July 2024 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeal from South Australian Employment Court – where primary judge found that employer contravened s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by failing to pay employees their wages and entitlements in accordance with enterprise agreements – where primary judge found that employees were appropriately classified at higher level – whether primary judge erred in holding that the employer wrongly classified and paid employees at lower level – interpretation of classification criteria – whether employees’ duties correspond to criteria – appeal allowed Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 12, 50, 539, 565 and 570
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24
Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) reg 1.05
Cases cited: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Berri Pty Ltd (2017) 268 IR 285
Choppair Helicopters Pty Ltd v Bobridge [2018] FCA 325
Commissioner for Public Service v Dunk (1999) 66 SAIR 401
Ghimire v Karriview Management Pty Ltd (No 2) (2019) 290 IR 331
James Cook University v Ridd (2020) 278 FCR 566
Logan v Otis Elevator Company Pty Ltd [1997] IRCA 200
Monash Health v Singh (2023) 327 IR 196
Ridd v James Cook University (2021) 274 CLR 514
Ware v O’Donnell Griffin (Television Services) Pty Ltd [1971] AR (NSW) 18
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: South Australia National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 211 Date of last submission: 30 November 2023 (joint statement of agreed facts) Date of hearing: 15 November 2023 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M Roder KC with Ms H Veale Solicitor for the Appellant: Thomson Geer Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Blewett Solicitor for the Respondent: United Workers’ Union ORDERS
SAD 98 of 2023 BETWEEN: HEMPEL (WATTYL) AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Appellant
AND: UNITED WORKERS’ UNION
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RANGIAH, SNADEN AND ABRAHAM JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 JULY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The judgment of the South Australian Employment Court in matter ET-22-04296 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that the application in each of that matter and another in that court, matter ET-22-04298, be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The facts
[9]
The 2014 Agreement
[19]
The Agreements
[21]
The reasons of the Employment Court
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- Case
- [2024] FCAFC 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court needed to decide involved the interpretation of the classification criteria within the enterprise agreements and whether the employees' actual duties corresponded to those criteria. The court was required to determine if the primary judge erred in holding that the employer wrongly classified and paid the employees at a lower level. The appeal necessitated a review of the agreed facts, the terms of the enterprise agreements, and the specific duties performed by the employees to ascertain their appropriate classification under the agreements.
The court concluded that the primary judge had erred in determining that the employees were appropriately classified at a higher level. The classification criteria focus on the duties actually performed by the employees, and if the requisite duties are not performed, the employees do not satisfy the criteria. The court found that the employees were correctly classified as Grade 3 Level 1 employees, not Grade 3 Level 2 or 3, based on their actual duties. Consequently, the employer had contravened certain clauses of the enterprise agreements by failing to pay the employees their wages and entitlements as Grade 3 Level 1 workers. The appeal was allowed, the judgment of the Employment Court was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Employment Court to determine any remaining issues, including pecuniary penalties and compensation.
The court's decision emphasised the importance of interpreting enterprise agreements purposively, considering the industrial context and the actual duties performed by the employees. By focusing on the employees' actual duties, the court found that the employees' appropriate classification was Grade 3 Level 1, contrary to the primary judge's determination. This conclusion led to the finding that the employer had contravened the enterprise agreements by underpaying the employees.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The judgment of the South Australian Employment Court in matter ET-22-04296 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that the application in each of that matter and another in that court, matter ET-22-04298, be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It may be seen that the ground of appeal begins by alleging that the primary judge reached the wrong conclusion and then goes on to allege four specific errors. Consideration The appeal is brought under s 565(1) of the FW Act, which provides that an appeal lies to the Federal Court from a decision of an eligible State or Territory court exercising jurisdiction under that Act. In Ghimire v Karriview Management Pty Ltd (No 2) (2019) 290 IR 331, Colvin J held at [19]–[21] that such an appeal is an appeal by way of rehearing. I respectfully agree. In an appeal by way of rehearing, the powers of the appellate court are only exercisable where the appellant demonstrates that the judgment is the result of error: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23]. In Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129, the plurality observed at [55]:A court of appeal is bound to conduct a “real review” of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge’s reasons for judgment to determine whether the trial judge has erred in fact or law. Appellate restraint with respect to interference with a trial judge’s findings unless they are “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” is as to factual findings which are likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence. It includes findings of secondary facts which are based on a combination of these impressions and other inferences from primary facts. Thereafter, “in general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge”.…(Footnotes omitted.) At first instance, the Employment Court declared that the Employer had contravened s 50 of the FW Act by failing to pay the Employees their wages and entitlements as Grade 3 Level 3 workers in breach of the Agreements. The central question in the appeal is whether the primary judge erred in holding that the Employer had wrongly classified and paid the Employees as Grade 3 Level 1 employees. That question requires consideration of whether their correct classification is in fact Grade 3 Level 3 or, alternatively, Grade 3 Level 2. It will be necessary to undertake a comparison of the duties stipulated under Grade 3 Levels 1, 2 and 3 with the duties actually performed by the Employees. There is little dispute about what duties they actually perform. What is in contest is how the classification criteria should be interpreted and whether the duties performed correspond to the criteria. The appropriate approach to construction of the classification criteria It is necessary to bear in mind the principles applicable to construction of an enterprise agreement. A number of relevant principles were summarised in WorkPac Pty Ltd v Skene (2018) 264 FCR 536 at [197] as follows:The starting point for interpretation of an enterprise agreement is the ordinary meaning of the words, read as a whole and in context. The interpretation “turns on the language of the particular agreement, understood in the light of its industrial context and purpose”. The words are not to be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities; rather, industrial agreements are made for various industries in the light of the customs and working conditions of each, and they are frequently couched in terms intelligible to the parties but without the careful attention to form and draftsmanship that one expects to find in an Act of Parliament. To similar effect, it has been said that the framers of such documents were likely of a “practical bent of mind” and may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in a way likely to be understood in the relevant industry rather than with legal niceties and jargon, so that a purposive approach to interpretation is appropriate and a narrow or pedantic approach is misplaced.(Citations omitted.)