Heffernan v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 14
PARTIES:HEFFERNAN, ANDREW CRAIG
v
THE QUEEN
TITLE OF COURT: COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO:CA 24 of 2004
DELIVERED: 13 October 2005
HEARING DATES: 25 AUGUST 2005
JUDGMENT OF: MARTIN (BR) CJ, MILDREN & THOMAS JJ
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW
Appeal against conviction – miscarriage of justice – failure of trial Judge to order an investigation into accused’s fitness to stand trial – Crown duty – trial Judge failing to direct the jury as to defences of insanity and diminished responsibility – statutory scheme for mental impairment and questions of fitness to stand trial – presumption of competence – appeal dismissed.Criminal Code 1983 (NT); Criminal Code Amendment (Mental Impairment and Unfitness To Be Tried) Act 2002 (NT).
Rodway v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515 at 521; Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 117-118, 132-133; Van Den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158 at 161-162, followed.
Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230 at 244, 245; Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1 (p 50); R v Taylor (1992) 77 CCC (3d) 551 ( 53), considered.
R v Presser [1958] VR 45 at 48 (p 51), referred to.
R v Berry (1978) 66 Cr App R 156 (158), applied.
Fittock v The Queen (2001) 11 NTLR 52 at [33] (p 66), applied.REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:Mr D Grace QC
Respondent: Mr W J Karczewski QC & Dr N Rogers
Solicitors:
Appellant:Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission
Respondent: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment category classification: A
Judgment ID Number: Mar0519
Number of pages: 74
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINHeffernan v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 14
No. CA 24 of 2004
BETWEEN:
ANDREW CRAIG HEFFERNAN
Appellant
AND:
THE QUEEN
Respondent
CORAM: MARTIN (BR) CJ, MILDREN & THOMAS JJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 13 October 2005)
The Court:
Introduction
On 12 August 2004 after a trial before a jury in which the appellant was unrepresented, the appellant was convicted of murder. He appeals against that conviction on the basis that there has been a miscarriage of justice by reason of his mental state at the time of the trial and the failure of the trial Judge to order an investigation into his fitness to stand trial. In addition, the appellant argued that the trial was unfair by reason of a failure by the Crown to comply with its duty and that the trial Judge erred in failing to direct the jury as to defences of insanity and diminished responsibility.
It is common ground that for many years the appellant has suffered from a condition of paranoid schizophrenia. In order to understand the position of the trial Judge at trial and to put the grounds of appeal in their proper context, it is necessary to canvass the history of the appellant’s mental state and the…
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- Heffernan v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 14
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge erred by not initiating an inquiry into the appellant's fitness to stand trial, despite a history of mental illness, and whether the judge was obligated to direct the jury on the defences of insanity and diminished responsibility, particularly when the appellant indicated he did not wish to rely on them. The court also considered the statutory framework governing mental impairment and fitness to stand trial, including the presumption of competence.
The court reasoned that the Crown had fulfilled its duties and that the appellant had consistently demonstrated an understanding of the proceedings and actively participated in his defence, even raising novel arguments. While acknowledging the appellant's history of Chronic Paranoid Schizophrenia and a prior finding of unfitness to stand trial, the court noted that a subsequent jury had found him fit. Crucially, the appellant had explicitly instructed his counsel not to rely on defences of insanity or diminished responsibility and did not want medical practitioners called in relation to his mental condition. The court found no evidence that the appellant's mental state at the time of the trial impaired his judgment, reasoning, ability to follow proceedings, or capacity to participate in his defence.
The appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In summary the following key factors emerge from the background circumstances:·The appellant has a long history of mental illness. At relevant times he was suffering from Chronic Paranoid Schizophrenia which included complex delusional systems. The illness was resistant to treatment.·In December 2001 the appellant’s delusional beliefs included a belief that his lawyer was, at times, disguised as an Army agent being the same agent who had attempted to castrate the appellant when he was aged 15 years. The appellant told Dr Tabart in April 2002 that there was an additional occasion on which he had believed that his persecutors had seen him while masquerading as his legal counsel. In the view of Dr Tabart, this delusional belief was a symptom of Capgras Syndrome which is one of the misidentification delusional systems common in some forms of Paranoid Schizophrenia.·The appellant has demonstrated both a desire not to discuss his symptoms and an ability to mask those symptoms.·On occasions the appellant has chosen to be selectively mute. The last recorded such occasion was October 2003 when Dr Westmore attempted to examine the appellant and the appellant eventually refused to speak to his solicitor.·In February 2003, notwithstanding that the appellant possessed a good understanding of various matters associated with a criminal trial, he was unfit to stand trial by reason of his ongoing psychosis which impaired the appellant’s judgment, reasoning, ability to follow the proceedings and capacity to participate in his defence and rationally respond to evidence raised in a trial.·The appellant does not possess, and has never possessed, any insight into his illness or the need for medication. At all relevant times the appellant did not believe that he had an illness or needed medication.·In late August 2003 the appellant’s treating psychiatrist formed the opinion that the appellant was fit to stand trial.·In February 2004, for the purposes of the investigation before a jury as to fitness to stand trial, the appellant instructed his counsel that he was fit to stand trial and counsel conducted the investigation in accordance with those instructions.·In February 2004 a jury found that the prosecution had not established on the balance of probability that the appellant was unfit to stand trial. Both the treating psychiatrist and the medical practitioner who had the supervision of the appellant within the Corrections system gave evidence that although the appellant had been unfit to stand trial 12 months previously, and notwithstanding the ongoing presence of delusions and lack of insight into his condition, as at February 2004 the appellant was fit to stand trial.·In the opinion of the treating psychiatrist the appellant possesses an above average intelligence and would understand everything that was occurring in the court.·On more than one occasion the appellant terminated his instructions to his solicitors. The last such occasion was 13 July 2004.·At the first appearance before the trial Judge on 13 July 2004, the appellant maintained that he did not wish to be legally represented. ·Throughout the trial the appellant consistently demonstrated a good understanding of legal and factual issues and conversed with the Judge politely and in a manner both responsive and relevant to the issues under discussion. The appellant did not display any reluctance to ask questions.·At no time during the trial did the appellant outwardly display any symptom of his mental illness or mental illness generally.·The appellant did not cross-examine any witnesses who gave evidence before the jury. The appellant appropriately cross-examined witnesses on a voir dire examination relevant to his objection to the reception of evidence of a statement made by him upon his arrest.·In a record of interview conducted shortly after his arrest the appellant maintained that he did not kill the deceased. In subsequent medical examinations, the appellant confirmed that version.·In his final address to the jury, the appellant submitted that the prosecution had not proved that the body discovered by the roadside was that of the deceased, Stuart Rhodes. This issue had not been raised previously. In addition, the appellant submitted to the jury that the jury had not heard “any condemning evidence of any crimes being committed by the accused, therefore imposing a reasonable doubt.”·The Judge directed the jury that it seemed to him that the essence of the appellant’s contention was that there was no direct evidence to connect him with the death and that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to exclude any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.·Throughout the trial the appellant maintained that he did not want to rely upon any defence of diminished responsibility or insanity and did not want any medical practitioner called to give evidence on the voir dire or in the presence of the jury in connection with his mental condition.·The appellant told police and medical practitioners that he was not involved in the death of the deceased. The appellant said that the deceased was getting into the car of a friend when the appellant last saw him.·The Crown advised the Judge that the material in its possession did not support the defences of insanity or diminished responsibility.·The appellant said in an interview conducted by police two weeks after the killing that he suffered from schizophrenia and had not taken his medication for three weeks. Nothing was said about the effects of the mental illness, the effects of not taking the medication or the appellant’s mental state at about the time of the killing.·The only material which specifically addressed the appellant’s state of mind at the time the deceased was killed is found in the reports of Doctors Robertson and Westmore. Dr Robertson reported that he was convinced that the appellant was psychotic at the time of the offence, but Dr Robertson did not address the criteria applicable to insanity and diminished responsibility. Dr Westmore said he was unable to obtain information or history supporting Dr Robertson’s proposition. Having examined the video of the record of interview conducted two weeks after the deceased was killed, Dr Robertson found no demonstrable evidence that the appellant was psychotic at the time of the interview.·None of the witnesses who saw the appellant before and after the deceased was killed gave evidence of any behaviour suggestive of mental illness or a psychotic episode.·Before the trial Judge in the pre-trial hearings and during the trial, no mention was made of the appellant’s fitness to stand trial.Issues for consideration