Hebei Jikai Industrial Group Co Ltd v Martin

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hebei Jikai Industrial Group Co Ltd v Martin

[2015] FCA 228  

Citation: Hebei Jikai Industrial Group Co Ltd v Martin [2015] FCA 228
Parties: HEBEI JIKAI INDUSTRIAL GROUP CO LTD  v VINCENT MARTIN & ORS
File number(s): NSD 442 of 2014
Judge(s): WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 17 March 2015
Catchwords:

ARBITRATION – international commercial arbitration – where arbitrator decided jurisdiction as a threshold issue – where applicant challenges award – applicant challenges award on basis that it was unable to present its case – article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law - where award challenged on basis that arbitrator failed to conduct the arbitral procedure in accordance with the agreement of the parties- article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law – where award challenged on basis of denial of procedural fairness – article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law – where respondent contends that a negative jurisdiction finding by the arbitrator is final by reason of s 16(3) of the Model Law – judicial restraint in international commercial arbitration

CONTRACTS – circumstances in which a report of an expert appointed under contract may be challenged - where applicant claims that expert report by auditor was not in accordance with contract, or expert asked himself the wrong question or misconceived his jurisdiction

EQUITY – declaratory relief – discretionary considerations – where declaration sought will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties – where the declaratory relief sought would be inconsistent with the upholding of the arbitral award – whether a collateral attack on the arbitral award

Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459G
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 131, 131(1), 131(2)(f)
International Arbitration Act1974 (Cth), ss 15, 16, 18(3), 19(b), 39, 39(1)(a)(v)
Cases cited: AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v SPI Networks (Gas) Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 173
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 406
Barescape Pty Limited v Bacchus Holdings Pty Limited (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 984
Bayview Irrigation District #11 v United Mexican States 2008 CanLII 22120 (ON SC)
Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1214
Emerald Grain Australia Pty Ltd v Agrocorp International Pte Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 299; [2014] FCA 414
Gardner v Dairy Industry Authority of New South Wales (1977) 18 ALR 55
Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund (1996) 70 FCR 452
Hansmar Investments Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 61 ACSR 321
Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd [1999] 2 HKC 205
Legal & General Life of Australia Ltd v A Hudson Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 314
McGrath v McGrath [2012] NSWSC 578
POS Media Online Ltd v B Family Pty Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 533
PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR 597; [2006] SGCA 41
Quintette Coal Limited v Nippon Steel Corporation 1990 CarswellBC 232, 50 BCLR(2d) 207, [1991]…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 228
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved Hebei Jikai Industrial Group Co Ltd (HJI) applying for an order setting aside an arbitral award, or alternatively, seeking a declaration that the report produced by an auditor was not in accordance with the terms of the Deed. Martin, the respondent, sought an order that the retained funds be paid to him in accordance with the Deed. The dispute originated from a settlement agreement (the Deed) executed on 24 November 2012, which involved HJI purchasing shares in RUS Holdings from Martin and other parties, and included provisions for an audit and arbitration concerning potential breaches of duty by Martin.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the arbitral award could be set aside under article 34(2)(a)(ii), (a)(iv), and (b)(ii) of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, and whether the court should grant a declaration that the auditor's report was not an audit report for the purposes of the Deed. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether a declaration sought by HJI would amount to a collateral attack on the arbitral award.

The court found that the arbitral tribunal had correctly interpreted the Deed and did not err in finding that the audit report did not satisfy the requirements of clause 10.1. The court emphasised the principle of judicial restraint in international commercial arbitrations, indicating that courts should not intervene unless provided for by the Model Law. The court also noted that a negative jurisdiction finding by the arbitrator is final under s 16(3) of the Model Law. Consequently, the court dismissed HJI's application to set aside the arbitral award and ordered the release of the retained funds to Martin in accordance with the Deed. The court further ordered HJI to provide any necessary approvals, consents, and authorities for the release of funds and to pay Martin's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The originating application for relief under the Model Law is dismissed.

2. The retained funds, as defined in clause 8 of the Deed executed by, inter alia, the applicant/cross-respondent and the first respondent/cross-claimant on 24 November 2012, are to be released to the first respondent/cross-claimant in accordance with clause 10.2 of the Deed.

3. The applicant/cross-respondent is to provide all such approvals, consents and authorities required to ensure that the retained funds are released in accordance with Order 2.

4. The applicant/cross-respondent is to pay the costs of the first respondent/cross-claimant in relation to the application and cross-claim as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

HJI now applies for an order setting aside this arbitral award. In the alternative, it seeks a declaration that the report produced by the auditor is not an audit report for the purposes of the Deed. Mr Martin, on the other hand, seeks an order that the retained funds be paid to him in accordance with the terms of the Deed. BACKGROUND The relevant background and facts are not in dispute. The Deed It is unnecessary to say anything further about the commercial dispute that was settled by the Deed. The Deed was executed on 24 November 2012. The parties to the Deed are HJI, Mr Martin, RUS Holdings, RUS Mining, two other shareholders in RUS Holdings (Valzan Pty Limited and Yeahnaah Pty Limited), Mr Christopher Laffey (a director and shareholder in Yeahnaah and a director of RUS Holdings) and Australian Mining Machinery Group (AMM) Pty Ltd. HJI named each of the parties to the Deed as respondents to these proceedings, along with the auditor and the arbitrator. Other than Mr Martin, none of the respondents played an active role in the proceedings. The majority of the other respondents filed submitting appearances. The basic structure of the settlement effected by the Deed was that HJI would purchase the shares in RUS Holdings held by Mr Martin, Valzan Pty Limited and Yeahnaah Pty Limited for agreed sums. Mr Martin and Mr Laffey would resign as directors of RUS Holdings and RUS Mining and Mr Martin would resign as general manager of RUS Mining. The parties agreed to discontinue the Supreme Court proceedings in New South Wales and Queensland. The Deed also provided that various other sums were to be paid or offset against amounts that were otherwise payable under the terms of the Deed. Relevantly, clause 8 provided that $500,000 was to be retained from monies otherwise payable to Mr Martin under the Deed. These retained funds were to be held in trust pending the outcome of the agreed mechanisms to determine claims or disputes concerning whether Mr Martin had breached his duties as a director of RUS Holdings or RUS Mining and, if so, whether those breaches had caused any loss to either company. Those agreed mechanisms were set out in clauses 9 and 10 of the Deed. Clauses 9 and 10 of the Deed provide as follows: 9. Audit of RUS Holdings and RUS Mining HJI, Mr Martin, RUS Holdings, RUS Mining agree that any claim, dispute or cause of action by HIJ, RUS Holdings and RUS Mining in respect of or in connection with any alleged breach of duty by Mr Martin in his capacity as a director of RUS Holdings or RUS Mining and any alleged consequential loss, is to be determined solely and in accordance with mechanisms as set out in this clause and clause 10 below. 9.1 Appointment of Independent Auditor HJI will appoint, at its own costs, an Independent Auditor to perform an audit of RUS Holdings and RUS Mining in the period for which Mr Martin held appointments as director of RUS Holdings and RUS Mining. 9.2 Provision of audit report The Independent Auditor is to provide HJI and Mr Martin with the audit report within seven (7) Business Days of that report being completed, but in any event, within twelve (12) months of the exchange of this Deed. 10. Right to Set-Off 10.1 Findings of audit report In the event that at the conclusion of the audit undertaken, the audit report prepared discloses a basis for a breach of a legal duty by Mr Martin to RUS Holdings and RUS Mining and that such breach has caused loss to RUS Holdings or RUS Mining, then: (a)Mr Martin will be entitled to dispute any finding contained in the audit report that discloses a basis for a breach of a legal duty or that he has breached his duties as a director, or that any such alleged breach has caused loss to RUS Holdings or RUS Mining. In the event that Mr Martin disputes any such finding(s) contained in the audit report, HJI will not be entitled to any offset alleged loss from the Retained Funds until such time as the dispute resolution procedure identified in clauses 10.1(c) to 10.1(e) is completed; (b)if no dispute is raised by Mr Martin in respect of any finding contained in the report completed by the auditor, then HJI will be entitled to offset any losses identified by the auditor in that report that are referrable to any alleged breach or basis for breach by Mr Martin of his duties as a director of RUS Holdings or RUS Mining from the Retained Funds. Any remaining balance after such deduction is to be immediately paid to Mr Martin and HJI agrees that it will immediately provide any approval, consent or authority required to ensure that Mr Martin is paid the balance of any monies that remain in the Trust Fund established in accordance with clause 8.2(a) above; (c)in the event that Mr Martin disputes an alleged breach, basis for a breach or loss which is identified in the audit report, then the matter will be referred to a binding arbitration which will, among other matters, determine whether a breach occurred and if so, whether RUS Holdings or RUS Mining have incurred loss as a result of the alleged breach or basis for breach and if so, what the quantum of the alleged losses are; (d)without limitation, the audit report is to be tendered in such arbitration proceedings; (e)in the event that the arbitration proceedings determine that RUS Holdings or RUS Mining have suffered loss as a result of any alleged breach or basis for breach of Mr Martin’s duties as a director as identified in the audit report, then the quantum of that loss as determined in those arbitration proceedings, is to be offset from the Retained Funds and the balance, if any, is to be immediately paid to Mr Martin; (f)any arbitration proceedings is to be initiated within fourteen (14) days of the provision of the audit report by the Independent Auditor to Mr Martin; (g)any arbitration initiated will be conducted in accordance with: The Institute of Arbitrators & Mediators Australia Rules for the Conduct of Commercial Arbitrations. 10.2 Release of Retained Funds or balance thereof after set-off (a)If, at the expiration of twelve (12) months of the exchange of this Deed, no audit has been undertaken of RUS Holdings and RUS Mining, then: (i)the Retained Funds are to be immediately released to Mr Martin and HJI will provide any approval, consent or authority required to ensure that Mr Martin is paid the Retained Funds;(ii)it is acknowledged by Mr Martin and Mr Laffey that the Retained Funds released to Mr Martin will be dealt with by agreement between Mr Martin and Mr Laffey and that Mr Laffey is not entitled to and will not make any claims for the Retained Funds against HJI;(iii)RUS Mining and RUS Holdings will release Mr Martin from all claims, allegations or causes of action past or future arising out of or in connection with his directorship of RUS Holdings and RUS Mining, except for claims arising as a result of Mr Martin breaching the terms of this Deed; (iv)HJI will release Mr Martin from all claims, allegations or causes of action past or future that it may have had against him but for this Deed, except for claims arising as a result of Mr Martin breaching the terms of this Deed.(b)At the conclusion of arbitration proceedings contemplated in clauses 10.1(c) to 10.1(e), or where an audit is undertaken, but the audit report does not disclose a basis for a breach of legal duty by Mr Martin to RUS Holdings and RUS Mining, then: (i)the Retained Funds are to be immediately released to Mr Martin; and HJI will provide any approval, consent or authority required to ensure that Mr Martin is paid the Retained Funds; (ii)it is acknowledged by Mr Martin and Mr Laffey that the Retained Funds released to Mr Martin will be dealt with by agreement between Mr Martin and Mr Laffey and that Mr Laffey is not entitled to and will not make any claims for the Retained Funds against HJI; (iii)RUS Mining and RUS Holdings will release Mr Martin from all claims, allegations or causes of action past or future arising out of or in connection with his directorship of RUS Holdings and RUS Mining, except for claims arising as a result of Mr Martin breaching the terms of this Deed; (iv)HJI will release Mr Martin from all claims, allegations or causes of action past or future that it may have had against him but for this Deed, except for claims arising as a result of Mr Martin breaching the terms of this Deed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Martin objected to the admission into evidence of the correspondence on the basis of relevance and because the communications were privileged under s 131 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act). The admissibility of these documents was not determined at the hearing. Rather, it was indicated that the admissibility would be dealt with in the final judgment. To a certain extent the question of the admissibility of the correspondence is somewhat academic. That is because, even if admitted, the correspondence is of very marginal relevance. The context provided by the correspondence does not greatly assist in resolving the question of construction of clause 10.1 of the Deed and ultimately does not establish that the arbitrator’s interpretation of clause 10.1 was erroneous. Nevertheless, to avoid any doubt, it should be made clear that Mr Martin’s objection to the admissibility of the correspondence is overruled and the documents are admitted in evidence. The correspondence is potentially relevant to the surrounding circumstances, though for the reasons already given, ultimately it is of only marginal relevance and is to be afforded little weight. It should also be noted that the correspondence was, in any event, before the arbitrator. It is probably relevant and admissible on that basis alone. To the extent that the documents may fall within s 131(1) of the Evidence Act, the exception in s 131(2)(f) may be taken to apply. That paragraph should not be narrowly construed and can encompass proceedings where the interpretation of a settlement agreement is in issue. HJI’s submission that the arbitrator erred in concluding that the findings in Mr Tsang’s report, such as they were, did not satisfy the minimum requirements of clause 10.1 also has no merit. It was open to the arbitrator to conclude that the report did not sufficiently disclose any “basis” for a breach by Mr Martin, or disclose a link to any consequential loss. The conclusion that the arbitrator did not err in construing the Deed, or in finding that the audit report did not engage clause 10.1, is also fortified by the principle of judicial restraint that generally applies in relation to international commercial arbitrations. Section 39 of the IA Act relevantly provides, in effect, that where the Court is considering an application under article 34 of the Model Law (see s 39(1)(a)(v) of the IA Act) the Court must, in doing so, have regard to the objects of the IA Act and the fact that arbitration is an efficient, impartial, enforceable and timely method by which to resolve commercial disputes and the fact that awards are intended to provide certainty and finality. Those considerations indicate that there should be a degree of judicial restraint in relation to challenges to international arbitral awards. Judicial restraint in this context is supported by both Australian and international authority: Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1214 at [34]-[35], [50] (Castel Electronics); Emerald Grain at [7]-[12]; Quintette Coal Limited v Nippon Steel Corporation 1990 CarswellBC 232, 50 BCLR(2d) 207, [1991] 1WWR 219 at [27]-[33] and the cases there referred to and cited. Although decisions of courts in other countries which give effect to the Model Law are not binding, there is an obvious importance in taking them into account to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of the Model Law: Castel Electronics at [36]; Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd [1999] 2 HKC 205 at 216.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Before turning to consider the conduct of the arbitration and the arbitral award, it is necessary to refer to the law and rules pursuant to which the arbitration was conducted. The International Arbitration Act 1974 and the Model Law In Australia, the conduct of international arbitrations is governed by the provisions of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (the IA Act). Section 16 of the IA Act provides that the Model Law has the force of law in Australia. The Model Law is defined in s 15 of the IA Act to mean “the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985 and amended by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 7 July 2006, the English text of which is set out in Schedule 2” to the IA Act. Article 1(1) of the Model Law provides that it applies to international commercial arbitration. An arbitration is international if, inter alia, the parties to an arbitration agreement have their places of business in different States: article 1(3)(a) of the Model Law. Article 7(1) defines “arbitration agreement” as follows: “Arbitration agreement” is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. It is common ground that the Deed is an “arbitration agreement” as defined in article 7(1) of the Model Law, and that the parties to the Deed had their places of business in different States. HJI’s place of business was in China. There is accordingly no dispute that the Model Law applied to the arbitration. Article 5 of the Model Law provides that in matters governed by the Model Law, “no court shall intervene except where provided in this Law”. Article 16 of the Model Law deals with the competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and the circumstances in which a court may be asked to decide that matter. It provides as follows: Article 16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction(1)The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. (2)A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified.(3)The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.