Workers' Compensation (Cth)—Entitlement to weekly payments for partial incapacity—Right of employee to request lump sum redemption in lieu of weekly payments after certain period—Other provisions for lump sum payments for certain permanent times—Weekly payments to terminate on payment of lump sum—Relationship between right to redemption and other lump sum provisions—Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth), ss. 27(4), 39, 46, 49(1), 50.

Decisions

October 28.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
MASON AND WILSON JJ. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia on a question of law referred to it in accordance with s. 94A(1) of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth), as amended ("the Act"). The question concerns the entitlement to compensation of the appellant, Mr. Heath. (at p78)

2. Between 1969 and 1974 Mr. Heath suffered a series of compensable injuries which left him with a twenty per cent permanent loss of the efficient use of the left leg at or above the knee and a twenty-five per cent permanent loss of the efficient use of the right leg at or above the knee. These injuries resulted ultimately in a continuing partial incapacity for work. After receiving weekly payments in respect of his partial incapacity for work for a period Mr. Heath, pursuant to s.49 of the Act, requested the payment of a lump sum in redemption of the liability of the Commonwealth to continue making those weekly payments. It is unnecessary to trace in detail the course of events in relation to that request. On 30 November 1978 the Chief Delegate of the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation ("the Commissioner") determined of his own motion that, pursuant to s. 39 of the Act, Mr. Heath was entitled to compensation in respect of the physical injuries to his legs and awarded him a total lump sum of $5,212.50. He then refused the request for redemption, on the basis that by reason of s. 46(5) of the Act any entitlement to weekly payments during partial incapacity ceased on payment of the lump sum, with the consequence that there was no further liability of the Commonwealth in that regard to be redeemed. (at p79)

3. The decision of the Chief Delegate is said by his counsel to have very serious implications for Mr. Heath. He was then thirty-seven years of age. He had been receiving weekly payments of approximately fifty dollars in respect of his partial incapacity, and the prospect was that in the absence of a determination under either s. 39 or s. 49 that entitlement would continue until he attained sixty-five years of age, by which time the total compensation he would have received could be expected to exceed seventy thousand dollars. (at p79)

4. In accordance with s. 90 of the Act,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Heath v Commonwealth

Details

AGLC: Heath v Commonwealth [1982] HCA 61
Case: [1982] HCA 61
Decision Date: 28 October 1982

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Heath (the applicant) sought a writ of prohibition against the Commonwealth (the respondent) to prevent the respondent from proceeding with a prosecution against the applicant in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The applicant alleged that the prosecution was an abuse of process. The High Court of Australia was required to determine whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales had jurisdiction to entertain the application for a writ of prohibition, and if so, whether the prosecution constituted an abuse of process.

The central legal issue was whether the applicant could invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to restrain a criminal prosecution on the ground of abuse of process. This involved considering the scope of the writ of prohibition and its availability in circumstances where a court is alleged to have acted in excess of its jurisdiction or where the process of the court is being misused. The court also had to consider the principles governing the exercise of discretion to grant such a writ.

The High Court held that the Supreme Court of New South Wales did possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the application for a writ of prohibition. However, the Court found that the applicant had not established that the prosecution constituted an abuse of process. The Court reasoned that the applicant's arguments regarding the alleged impropriety of the prosecution's conduct did not, in themselves, demonstrate that the prosecution was vexatious or an abuse of the court's process. The Court emphasised that the writ of prohibition is a remedy to prevent a court from acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the mere fact that a prosecution might be ill-advised or based on questionable evidence does not, without more, amount to an abuse of process warranting prohibition.

The application for the writ of prohibition was dismissed.

Orders