Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (No 5) [2022] FCA 1510

File number: WAD 250 of 2019
Judgment of: JACKSON J
Date of judgment: 15 December 2022
Catchwords:

COSTS - indemnity costs - Calderbank offer - principles relating to Calderbank offers in proceedings with multiple respondents - offer incapable of acceptance by each respondent independently - offer did not differentiate between the different positions of the different respondents - judgment result potentially less favourable to successful party - conduct of respondents' defence did not go beyond bounds of appropriateness - indemnity costs orders not made

COSTS - two successful respondents and two unsuccessful respondents - 'rule of thumb' relating to jointly represented parties where some are successful and some are unsuccessful - reduction in costs awarded to successful respondent who engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct - other successful respondent awarded proportionate share of costs

COSTS - consideration of principles relating to Sanderson orders - when unsuccessful respondent pays costs of successful respondents - reasonable for successful respondent to be joined - conduct of unsuccessful respondent does not make it fair for it to bear successful respondents' costs - Sanderson order not made

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Schedule 2 (Australian Consumer Law) ss 18, 236, 237

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 500

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N

Cases cited:

Amadio Pty Ltd v Henderson (1998) 81 FCR 149

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 112

Archer v Archer (No 2) [2000] NSWCA 315

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v One Tech Media Ltd (No 6) [2020] FCA 842

Civil Properties Pty Ltd v Miluc Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 195

Currabubula & Paola v State Bank of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 232

Darshn v Avant Insurance Limited (No 3) [2021] FCA 1035

Frigger v Trenfield (No 12) [2022] FCA 900

Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (No 2) [2020] FCA 604

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (No 3) [2020] FCA 1054

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (No 4) [2022] FCA 105

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller [2020] FCAFC 229; (2020) 282 FCR 530

Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Nicoletti [2022] FCAFC 179

Hazeldene's Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2) [2005] VSCA 298; (2005) 13 VR 435

Johnson's Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Shire of Maffra (1948) 77 CLR 544

Lackersteen v Jones (No 2) [1988] NTSC 72; (1998) 38 NTLR 101

Morris v Riverwild Management Pty Ltd [2011] VSCA 283; (2011) 38 VR 103

Popovic v ACN 098 054 678 Pty Ltd (Costs Ruling) [2012] VSC 612

Rafferty v Time 2000 West Pty Limited (No 5) [2010] FCA 873

Re Employ (No 96) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWSC 456

Sanderson v Blyth Theatre Co [1903] 2 KB 533

Steppke v National Capital Development Commission (1978) 21 ACTR 23

Thorne v…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1510
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (No 5), the Federal Court addressed the complex issue of costs apportionment among multiple respondents in a litigation concerning allegations of misleading or deceptive conduct. The case involved five respondents, with Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd as the plaintiff, alleging breaches of the Australian Consumer Law by the respondents, including misleading or deceptive conduct. The first two respondents, Simon Tiller and Dimension Agriculture Pty Ltd, were found liable for misleading or deceptive conduct, but no damages were awarded due to the plaintiff's failure to prove loss or damage caused by the conduct. The court was tasked with determining the costs incurred by the parties during the litigation and how these costs should be apportioned.

The court had to consider several legal issues, including the principles governing indemnity costs in relation to Calderbank offers, the appropriate method for apportioning costs among jointly represented parties where some are successful and some are not, and the circumstances under which a Sanderson order might be appropriate. Specifically, the court had to decide whether the unsuccessful respondents should bear any of the successful respondents' costs, and if so, to what extent. The court also needed to address the implications of a misleading and deceptive conduct finding against one of the successful respondents and its impact on the costs apportionment.

The court ruled that indemnity costs orders were not appropriate given the nature of the Calderbank offer, which did not cater to the differing positions of the respondents. The court applied the 'rule of thumb' for jointly represented parties, awarding the successful respondents a proportionate share of the costs, taking into account the differing roles and outcomes for each respondent. It was determined that Mr. Nicoletti, involved as a principal in the misleading conduct, and Mr. Bryce, who performed administrative functions, should not be treated as a single entity for costs purposes. Mr. Bryce, who was wholly successful in defending against the claims, was awarded 25% of the respondents' costs. The court also ruled out a Sanderson order, finding that the unsuccessful respondents' conduct did not warrant them bearing the successful respondents' costs.

The final orders of the court included that the first two respondents were to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceeding, the plaintiff was to pay a portion of the respondents' costs to the third and fourth respondents, and the plaintiff was to bear the costs of the third and fourth respondents in respect of the judgment, subject to assessment. These orders reflect the court's careful consideration of the unique circumstances of each respondent and the principles of fairness in costs apportionment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent and the second respondent must pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding (excluding the costs in respect of this judgment), to be assessed if not agreed.

2. The applicant must pay to the third respondent 10% of the Respondents' Costs, being the respondents' costs of the proceeding, excluding the costs in respect of this judgment, to be assessed if not agreed.

3. The applicant must pay to the fourth respondent 25% of the Respondents' Costs.

4. The applicant must pay the third and fourth respondents' costs in respect of this judgment (including the hearing of 20 June 2022), to be assessed if not agreed.

5. Liberty to apply in relation to paragraph 4 on or before 10 January 2023.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It will also be necessary to refer to the judgment given in relation to the costs of the proceeding up to and including the Trial Judgment that was published as Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (No 3) [2020] FCA 1054 (First Costs Judgment). The delivery of this judgment has been deferred pending the outcome of an appeal from the Remitter Judgment. That was done at the suggestion of the applicant, Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd, made at a hearing in relation to the costs issues held on 20 June 2022. The two respondents who appeared at the hearing, Giovanni Nicoletti and Damian Bryce, did not oppose it. On 8 November 2022, that appeal was dismissed in the Second Appeal Judgment.The history of the proceeding in brief The present reasons will assume familiarity with each of the judgments just mentioned. Nevertheless, it is helpful to recap the course of the proceedings at a high level. (In this judgment, defined terms will be used as in my previous judgments.) Harvard brought the proceeding against five respondents based on allegations of misleading or deceptive conduct in breach of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). Those allegations were, however, made only against the first four respondents; the fifth respondent, Felicity Tiller, appears to have been joined only because she had been a party to leases and related agreements which might have been affected by the relief that Harvard sought. In the Trial Judgment, Harvard succeeded in establishing misleading or deceptive conduct against the first two respondents, Simon Tiller and Dimension Agriculture Pty Ltd. That conduct occurred in conversations between Mr Tiller and a director of Harvard that took place on 31 January 2019. Harvard also established that the first three respondents (Mr Tiller, Dimension and Mr Nicoletti) engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct by failing to disclose deeds dated 15 February 2019 between Mr Tiller and Dimension. But Harvard did not obtain any relief because I found that it had not established that these two instances (or courses) of misleading or deceptive conduct had caused it to suffer loss and damage. In the First Costs Judgment, costs orders in consequence of the dismissal of the claim were made. Then, in the First Appeal Judgment, the Full Court held that the first instance of misleading or deceptive conduct, concerning the representations of 31 January 2019, did cause loss or damage to Harvard that sounded in s 236 and s 237 of the ACL. Mr Tiller and Dimension were thus liable in respect of that conduct. The orders made in the Trial Judgment and the First Costs Judgment were set aside and the matter was remitted to me. The main issue on that remitter was whether, as a result of the First Appeal Judgment, Mr Nicoletti should also have been held liable in respect of non-disclosure of the 15 February Deeds. That issue was also the subject of the second appeal to the Full Court. Following the Second Appeal Judgment, the outcome was that only Mr Tiller and Dimension were liable in respect of the January Conduct, and no party was liable in respect of non-disclosure of the 15 February Deeds.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to Mr Bryce, Harvard submits that its case against him was that he was the means by which Mr Nicoletti engaged in the misleading conduct in January in setting up Dimension 'by steps calculated to conceal' Mr Nicoletti's involvement in Dimension, as well as conduct in not disclosing the 15 February Deeds. Harvard submits that Mr Bryce's defence did not take on a separate character to Mr Nicoletti's defence. It says that the only issue was 'his personal knowledge of the fraudulent purpose, so as to attract personal liability'. It submits that given the manner in which Mr Bryce presented his case, it would be inappropriate to regard him as having any entitlement to costs separate to that of Mr Nicoletti and the two should be considered as a single party for the purpose of costs. Harvard relies on Re Employ at [39] in that regard. It says this is consistent with the approach taken in the First Costs Judgment of treating the jointly represented respondents as an indivisible whole as far as their costs were concerned. Harvard submits that in that joint context, Mr Bryce should not be entitled to any order in relation to costs.Consideration I do not accept Harvard's submissions and I consider that it is appropriate to apply the rule of thumb in the proportions submitted by Mr Nicoletti and Mr Bryce, namely 10% and 25% respectively. That is essentially for the reasons given in their submissions (other than that summarised at [40(5)], as it is not correct to say that Harvard failed completely in its allegations against Mr Nicoletti or that it failed to establish its allegations akin to fraud). While each case depends on its own circumstances, it is instructive that in the passage from Re Employ on which Harvard relies (at [39]) Black J said he would 'adopt a broad brush approach, starting with the application of the rule of thumb to a costs order … but making several adjustments to secure justice between the parties'. That is the appropriate approach here. But unlike the position in Re Employ, I do not consider that Mr Nicoletti and Mr Bryce should be treated as if they are one party for the purposes of making costs orders. In Re Employ, the defendants who were treated as one were both sued in their capacity as partners in a partnership. Here, the capacities in which Mr Nicoletti and Mr Bryce were sued were quite different. In the broad brush terms suitable to an apportionment of costs, it can be said that Mr Nicoletti was involved as a principal in relevant misleading or deceptive conduct, but Mr Bryce solely performed certain administrative functions on Mr Nicoletti's instructions. There was no basis disclosed in the evidence to think that Mr Bryce engaged in any misleading conduct himself or, for that matter, knew that Mr Nicoletti or anyone else proposed to engage in any conduct of that kind. There were issues specific to Mr Bryce that were quite different to those in respect of Mr Nicoletti. But at the same time Mr Bryce was forced to take part in the broader defence against Harvard's claims. It will do justice between the parties to award Mr Bryce 25% of the costs of defending the proceeding, unless some adjustment to that is warranted by Mr Bryce's conduct of the proceeding (considered below). He was wholly successful in defending the claims made against him and in the absence of evidence to the contrary the Court should proceed on the assumption that as one in four respondents (excluding Mrs Tiller), one quarter of the respondents' costs will fairly compensate him.