Hand v District Council of Barunga West

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

HAND v DISTRICT COUNCIL OF BARUNGA WEST

[2013] SASC 182

Judgment of The Honourable Justice David

20 November 2013

EMPLOYMENT LAW - EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL AWARDS, AGREEMENTS OR LEGISLATION ON EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT - PARTICULAR CASES

EMPLOYMENT LAW - CONTRACT OF SERVICE - TERMS OF CONTRACT - IMPLIED TERMS

EMPLOYMENT LAW - DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT - TERMINABLE ON REASONABLE NOTICE

EMPLOYMENT LAW - TERMINATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT - NOTICE - ADEQUACY, REASONABLENESS ETC

Mr Hand was employed by the District Council of Barunga West as its CEO from about 1997 pursuant to a verbal contract of indeterminate duration. In mid 2012 Mr Hand announced that the relationship between he and the Mayor had broken down, and that he was proposing to retire at the end of 2013 or 2014. The Council and Mr Hand entered negotiations as to the terms on which he would leave the Council. On 13 November 2012 the Council terminated Mr Hand’s employment, providing him with 9 months’ notice.

Mr Hand claims his termination, and the notice he received, was void for non-compliance with s 97 of the Local Government Act 1999 (SA). Mr Hand seeks reinstatement as the Council’s CEO. Alternatively, he seeks damages. The Council contends that Mr Hand’s employment was terminated in accordance with an award or implied contractual term, and that the termination complies with s 97.

HELD:

(1) Mr Hand's employment was not covered by an award.

(2) An implied term of Mr Hand’s contract of employment was that it was terminable on reasonable notice.

(3) Where a Council CEO's employment contract is terminated pursuant to an implied term, termination will comply with s 97(1)(b) of the Local Government Act 1999 (SA).

(4) The Council was not entitled to summarily dismiss Mr Hand.

(5) The notice period provided to Mr Hand was not reasonable. Mr Hand is entitled to damages for the shortfall of notice, being $27,884.

Local Government Act 1999 (SA) s 3, s 97, s 98, s 99, s 103, s 107, s 110, s 302A; Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Part 3-2, s 117, s 382, s 385, s 392, s 545; Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) Part 6, s 90, s 91, s 105A, s 108, s 109, Schedule 8 cl 1; Public Sector Act 2009 (SA) s 25, s 35, s 38, s 48, s 54; Fair Work (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2009 (SA) s 6; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 22; Public Sector Management Act 1995 (SA) s 12; Local Government Act 1934 (SA) s 70, s 71, referred to.
Sydney City Council v Reed (1994) 34 NSWLR 506; Thorpe v South Australian National Football League (1974) 19 SASR 17; Byrne v Australian Airlines Limited (1995) 185 CLR 410; Richardson v Koefod [1969] 3 All ER 1264; Attorney General for South Australia v Bell [2013] SASCFC 88; Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd v Gowans (2005) 221 CLR 249; North v Television Corp Ltd (1976) 11…

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Details
Case
[2013] SASC 182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hand v District Council of Barunga West, the plaintiff, a long-serving public servant with a hearing impairment, sought to challenge his termination of employment by the defendant, a council in South Australia. The plaintiff, who had been employed by various councils over several decades, had not been provided with a written contract of employment. His role as CEO of the defendant became increasingly strained due to his relationship with the Mayor, particularly concerning the Mayor's involvement in a development application involving a company of which the Mayor's sister is a director. The plaintiff's concerns about the Mayor's actions and comments, including the motion that a council member accompany him to meetings, further deteriorated their working relationship.

The central legal issues the court had to address were whether the plaintiff was governed by an award, whether the statutory provision exhaustively stated the grounds for terminating a council CEO, and if the defendant had breached the statutory provisions in terminating the plaintiff's employment. The court also needed to determine the appropriate notice period that should have been given to the plaintiff and the remedy if the notice period was insufficient. The court examined these issues in the context of the plaintiff's employment history, the nature of his relationship with the Mayor, and the statutory framework governing council CEOs.

The court found that the plaintiff was not governed by an award and that the statutory provisions did not exhaustively state the grounds for terminating a council CEO. The court further held that the defendant had not breached the statutory provisions as there was an implied term in the plaintiff's employment contract permitting termination on notice, and the termination complied with the statutory requirements. However, the court determined that the notice given to the plaintiff was insufficient and should have been twelve months. Consequently, the plaintiff was awarded damages for the shortfall in the notice period.

The court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff damages for the shortfall in the notice period. The specific amount of damages was to be determined based on the plaintiff's entitlement to notice under the terms of his employment, as implied by the court. This decision underscored the importance of providing adequate notice in employment terminations, especially in the context of public service roles where statutory provisions and employment contracts play a critical role in defining the terms of employment.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The evidence at trial was largely uncontested. Evidence in chief was given by affidavit. The plaintiff gave evidence. Mr Ward, the acting CEO of the defendant, was called by the defendant. The defendant also called the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor, Mr Rooney. Background The plaintiff was 59 years of age when he gave evidence. He lives in Port Broughton, in the mid north of South Australia. Since birth he has been deaf in his left ear and has between 30 per cent and 35 per cent hearing in his right ear. In December 1973, the plaintiff started working at the Corporation of Prospect. In January 1975, he moved to the District Council of Morgan. In October 1978, he began work with the District Council of Port Broughton. In May 1997, that Council was amalgamated with another, becoming the defendant. After the amalgamation, the plaintiff was appointed as CEO of the defendant, with the title of District Manager. On 10 November 2009 his title was changed to CEO. At no time since his appointment has the plaintiff had a written contract of employment. From about mid 2010 the plaintiff found it increasingly difficult to work with the Mayor of the Council. The plaintiff was concerned about the Mayor’s involvement in a development application involving a company of which the Mayor’s sister is a director. The Mayor has declared the conflict of interest. In a council meeting, the Mayor moved that an elected member should accompany the plaintiff to meetings concerning the development application. That motion was carried at a later meeting. The motion disappointed the plaintiff, who believes the motion was moved because the Mayor did not trust the plaintiff’s ability to hear what was going on at the development application meetings. The Mayor’s evidence was that the plaintiff would always be accompanied by a councillor to the meetings and that this was not a matter of the plaintiff’s ability to hear. The plaintiff was also concerned with the Mayor’s references to the plaintiff’s hearing impairment. The plaintiff found these condescending and offensive. In evidence the plaintiff accepted that the Mayor had only twice made reference to his hearing, once being in a vehicle and on another occasion in the plaintiff’s office. The Mayor’s evidence was consistent with this. The plaintiff said that he had “issues” with the Mayor trying to tell council staff how to do their job. The plaintiff did not believe this was the Mayor’s role. In cross-examination the plaintiff was asked about his relationship with the Mayor. He accepted that, as CEO, he was required to meet with the Mayor on what was often a daily basis. He accepted that, in a managers’ meeting in early 2012, he had interrupted the Mayor, and said words to the effect of “You are an observer” and “You’re welcome at this meeting but you’re here to listen.”[1] There were three managers at the meeting together with the plaintiff and his personal assistant. [1] T26. Mr Ward, the Deputy CEO of the defendant, worked for the defendant between 2003 and 2006, and again from 2011 onwards. During Mr Ward’s first period of employment, he was aware that the plaintiff would get frustrated with the Mayor’s involvement in operational matters. When Mr Ward resumed employment with the defendant in 2011, he observed that the relationship between the plaintiff and the Mayor had deteriorated further, the plaintiff having lost patience with the Mayor.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The principal issues in the trial are as follows (with my conclusions in brackets):1Is the plaintiff governed by an award? (No)2Does s 97 exhaustively state the grounds on which a council CEO may be terminated? (Not necessary to decide – see 3)3Has the defendant breached s 97? (No – there is an implied term in the plaintiff’s employment contract permitting termination on notice. The plaintiff’s termination on notice complies with s 97(1)(b)) 4If the defendant has breached s 97, what, if any, remedy should the plaintiff receive? (Not necessary to decide)5If the defendant has not breached s 97, what notice should have been given to the plaintiff? (reasonable notice – in this case, being 12 months’ notice)6If the notice given was not sufficient, what remedy should the plaintiff receive (Damages for the shortfall in notice)The evidence The evidence at trial was largely uncontested. Evidence in chief was given by affidavit. The plaintiff gave evidence. Mr Ward, the acting CEO of the defendant, was called by the defendant. The defendant also called the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor, Mr Rooney. Background The plaintiff was 59 years of age when he gave evidence. He lives in Port Broughton, in the mid north of South Australia. Since birth he has been deaf in his left ear and has between 30 per cent and 35 per cent hearing in his right ear. In December 1973, the plaintiff started working at the Corporation of Prospect. In January 1975, he moved to the District Council of Morgan. In October 1978, he began work with the District Council of Port Broughton. In May 1997, that Council was amalgamated with another, becoming the defendant. After the amalgamation, the plaintiff was appointed as CEO of the defendant, with the title of District Manager. On 10 November 2009 his title was changed to CEO. At no time since his appointment has the plaintiff had a written contract of employment. From about mid 2010 the plaintiff found it increasingly difficult to work with the Mayor of the Council. The plaintiff was concerned about the Mayor’s involvement in a development application involving a company of which the Mayor’s sister is a director. The Mayor has declared the conflict of interest. In a council meeting, the Mayor moved that an elected member should accompany the plaintiff to meetings concerning the development application. That motion was carried at a later meeting. The motion disappointed the plaintiff, who believes the motion was moved because the Mayor did not trust the plaintiff’s ability to hear what was going on at the development application meetings. The Mayor’s evidence was that the plaintiff would always be accompanied by a councillor to the meetings and that this was not a matter of the plaintiff’s ability to hear. The plaintiff was also concerned with the Mayor’s references to the plaintiff’s hearing impairment. The plaintiff found these condescending and offensive. In evidence the plaintiff accepted that the Mayor had only twice made reference to his hearing, once being in a vehicle and on another occasion in the plaintiff’s office. The Mayor’s evidence was consistent with this.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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