MELBOURNE, Local Government-By-law-Validity-Ultt wires-Regulation of processions- Nov. 14, 15,
Prohibition, unless with consent of council-Police regulation-Statute-Inter pretation-Judicial decision upon interpretation-Subsequent re-enactment of SYDNEY,
Sec. 197 of the Local Government Act 1915 (Vict.) provides that "Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained by-laws may be made for any municipal- ity for the purposes mentioned in this Act and for the purposes following
(10) Suppressing nuisances:
(22) Regulating traffic and processions:
(37) Generally for maintaining the good rule and government of the municipality." Sec. 6 of the Police Offences Act 1915 (Vict.) provides that " Any local authority may from time to time make rules and regulations for the route to be observed by all carriages carts vehicles and persons and for keeping order in the carriage and footways and public places and for preventing any obstruction thereof whether by the assemblage of persons or otherwise."
A by-law of the City of Melbourne provided that No processions of persons
shall, except for military or funeral purposes, parade or pass through any street unless with the previous consent in writing of the Council given under the hand of the Town Clerk and by the route specified in such consent, and unless and until the recipient of such consent has given at least twenty-four hours' notice with particulars of such consent and route to the officer in charge of the City Police."
Held, by Isaacs and Higgins JJ. (Knox C.J. dissenting), that the by-law was not authorized either by sec. 197 of the Local Government Act 1915 or by sec. 6 of the Police Offences Act 1915.
Rider v. Phillips, (1884) 10 V.L.R. (L.), 147; 6 A.L.T., 37, and Bannon V. Barker, (1884) 10 V.L.R. (L.), 200, distinguished.
Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria Barry v. City of Melbourne, (1922) V.L.R., 577; 44 A.L.T., 20, affirmed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Victoria.
The Council of the City of Melbourne on 9th November 1921 pur- ported to make a by-law (No. 162) which was in the following terms :-
" A by-law of the City of Melbourne, made under Part VII. Division 1 of the Local…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Melbourne Corporation v Barry [1922] HCA 56
Case
[1922] HCA 56
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Melbourne Corporation was the plaintiff and Barry was the defendant in this matter heard before the High Court of Australia, comprising Knox C.J., Isaacs and Higgins JJ. The dispute concerned the Melbourne Corporation's liability for injuries sustained by Barry, who was injured when his motor vehicle collided with a motor lorry owned by the Corporation. Barry alleged that the Corporation was negligent in its operation of the lorry, which was being driven by one of its employees.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Melbourne Corporation, as a statutory body, could be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts or omissions of its employee in the operation of a motor vehicle. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the employee's actions fell within the scope of his employment such that the Corporation could be held responsible for his negligence.
The Court considered the nature of the Corporation's statutory powers and duties, and the purpose for which the motor lorry was being used at the time of the accident. The reasoning focused on whether the employee's conduct was so disconnected from his authorised duties that it could not be considered an act done in the course of his employment. The Court applied principles of vicarious liability, examining the relationship between the employer and employee and the extent to which the employee's actions were authorised or incidental to the performance of his employment obligations.
The High Court found in favour of Barry, holding that the Melbourne Corporation was vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee. The Court determined that the employee's actions, despite any deviation from strict instructions, were sufficiently connected to his employment duties to render the Corporation liable.