Hachette Filipacchi Presse v Helen Huynh and Elle Derm Australia
[2020] ATMO 168
•28 October 2020
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
ReOppositions by Hachette Filipacchi Presse to registration of trade mark applications 1936157 (3) ELLÉ DERM FOR SCIENTIFICALLY BRIGHTER SKIN (fancy) and 1936161 (3, 5) ELLÉ DERM (fancy) in the names of Helen Huynh and Elle Derm Australia
Delegate: Robert Wilson
Representation: Opponent: Ben Fitzpatrick of Counsel, instructed by Spruson & Ferguson
Applicant: Geraldine Rimmer of Michael Buck IP
Decision: 2020 ATMO 168
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth): Section 52 opposition; s 44 established by opponent; registration refused
Background
Helen Huynh and Elle Derm Australia (‘the Applicants’) filed applications to register two trade marks; details of the applications are provided below. Registration of the trade marks was opposed by Hachette Filipacchi Presse (‘the Opponent’) pursuant to s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995.
Application Number:
1936157
Filing Date:
4 July 2018
Goods:
Class 3: (including) skincare cosmetics
The full specification is provided in the annexure.
(‘the 157 Goods’)
Trade Mark:
(‘the 157 Trade Mark’)
Application Number:
1936161
Filing Date:
25 June 2018
Goods:
Class 3: (including) cosmetic skin care products; non-medicated skin care products
Class 5: (including) medicated skin care preparations
The full specification is provided in the annexure.
(‘the 161 Goods’)
Trade Mark:
(‘the 161 Trade Mark’)
Any references to sections or regulations, below, are references to sections or regulations of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) or the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth), respectively, unless otherwise indicated.
Following the advertisement of acceptance of the applications for possible registration in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks, the Opponent filed Notices of Intention to Oppose the registrations followed by Statements of Grounds and Particulars (‘the SGPs’). The SGPs nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44 and 60. The Applicants subsequently filed Notices of Intention to Defend.
Evidence
The Opponent filed Evidence in Support of its opposition, being:
·Declaration made on 25 June 2019 by Mariette Colineau, Legal Counsel in charge of the Industrial Property Department of the Opponent, with Exhibits MC1 to MC25 (‘Colineau 157). This declaration was filed in respect of the opposition to the 157 Trade Mark; and
·Declaration made on 18 August 2019 by Mariette Colineau with Exhibits MC-1 to MC-25 (‘Colineau 161’). This declaration was filed in respect of the 161 Trade Mark.
The Applicant filed the same Evidence in Answer for both oppositions, being:
·Declaration made on 27 September 2019 by Helen Huynh, one of the Applicants, with Annexures HH-1 to HH-5 (‘the Huynh declaration’).
The Opponent filed the same Evidence in Reply for both oppositions, being:
·Declaration made on 18 March 2020 by Mariette Colineau.
Once the time allowed for filing evidence had ended the parties requested to be heard. I was delegated by the Registrar of Trade Marks to hear the matter, which I did, by telephone conference on 20 October 2020. Ben Fitzpatrick of counsel appeared for the Opponent. Geraldine Rimmer of Michael Buck IP represented the Applicant. The representatives’ oral submissions were supplemented by written submissions which were filed prior to the hearing.
The Opponent
According to the Colineau declaration:
[The Opponent], its subsidiary companies and licensees operate world-wide and are active in the field of beauty and fashion, starting from beauty and fashion magazines, on and off line and extended to a range of beauty and fashion goods and services.
In this respect, [the Opponent] owns the internationally famous ELLE Mark, used internationally as a beauty and fashion magazine since 1949. In 2014, there were some 45 editions of the magazine around the world, representing some 21 million readers …
The Opponent is the owner of the registered series of trade marks detailed below:
Trade Mark Number:
514892
Priority Date:
14 July 1989
Goods:
Class 3: All goods in class 3
(‘the Opponent’s Goods’)
Trade Marks:
(‘the Opponent’s Trade Marks’)
The Applicants
According to the Huynh declaration:
I am the joint Applicant and sole director of Elle Derm Australia Pty Ltd …
I came up with the name ELLÉ DERM in June 2018 as the name of a range of skincare products which I was in the process of developing. …
I registered the Applicant company on 22 June 2018, as well as the website ellederm.com.au.
Grounds of Opposition, Onus and Standard of Proof
As indicated above, in the SGP the Opponent nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42, 44, 60. All grounds were pressed at the hearing. To successfully oppose registration the Opponent need establish only one ground of opposition. As will become apparent, it is necessary that I consider only the ground pursuant to s 44 in respect of both opposed trade marks.
The onus of proof in an opposition rests upon the Opponent.[1] The relevant standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard based on the balance of probabilities.[2] The dates at which the rights of the parties are to be determined are: 4 July 2018 in respect of the 157 Trade Mark and 25 June 2018 in respect of the 161 Trade Mark—those being the filing dates of the applications (‘the Relevant Dates’).[3] The Relevant Dates are also the priority dates for the purposes of s 44.
Discussion
[1] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32].
[2] Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [132]-[133].
[3] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd [1954] HCA 82, [2].
Section 44
Relevant provisions of s 44 are reproduced below:
Section 44 - Identical etc. trade marks
(1)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant's goods) must be rejected if:
(a)the applicant's trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:
(i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or
(ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and
(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.
Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.
Note 2: For similar goods see subsection 14(1).
Note 3: For priority date see section 12.
Note 4: The regulations may provide that an application must also be rejected if the trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, a protected international trade mark or a trade mark for which there is a request to extend international registration to Australia: see Part 17A.
(2)…
(3)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied:
(a)that there has been honest concurrent use of the 2 trade marks; or
(b)that, because of other circumstances, it is proper to do so;
the Registrar may accept the application for the registration of the applicant's trade mark subject to any conditions or limitations that the Registrar thinks fit to impose. If the applicant's trade mark has been used only in a particular area, the limitations may include that the use of the trade mark is to be restricted to that particular area.
Note: For limitations see section 6.
(4)If the Registrar in either case is satisfied that the applicant, or the applicant and the predecessor in title of the applicant, have continuously used the applicant's trade mark for a period:
(a)beginning before the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of:
(i) the similar goods or closely related services; or
(ii) the similar services or closely related goods; and
(b)ending on the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark;
the Registrar may not reject the application because of the existence of the other trade mark.
Note 1: An authorised use of the trade mark by a person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark (see subsection 7(3)).
Note 2: For predecessor in title see section 6.
Note 3: For priority date see section 12.Section 10 - Definition of deceptively similar
For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
In the SGP the Opponent nominated the Opponent’s Trade Marks in respect of s 44. Subject to ss 44(3) and 44(4), to successfully oppose the applications pursuant to s 44 the Opponent must establish that at least one of the Opponent’s Trade Marks:
· is registered by a person other than the Applicant (‘the first requirement’); and
· has a priority date which is earlier than the Relevant Dates (‘the second requirement’);
· is in respect of at least some goods which are similar to the goods, or closely related to the services, claimed by the Applicant (‘the third requirement’); and
· is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to one or both of the Applicant’s Trade Marks (‘the fourth requirement’).
The first requirement
The Opponent’s Trade Marks are registered by a person other than the Applicant, thus satisfying the first requirement.
The second requirement
Being a series of trade marks, the Opponent’s Trade Marks both have the same priority date which is earlier than the Relevant Dates. The second requirement is, therefore, satisfied.
The third requirement
Classification of goods (and services) for the purposes of trade marks uses the Nice Classification.[4] The Nice Classification is updated periodically. An effect of this is that what constituted all goods in class 3 in 1989—when the Opponent’s Trade Marks were applied for—is not the same as ‘all goods in class 3’ as at the Relevant Dates. The Nice Classification which was applicable at the Relevant Dates is the 11th edition. In 1989 the 5th edition was applicable. Where a specification in a registration is worded ‘all goods in this class’ or ‘all goods in class 3’, what goods or services that refers to does not change over time. The Opponent’s Goods remain what constituted ‘all goods in class 3’ as per the 5th edition of the Nice Classification.[5] It is worth mentioning that claims such as, ‘all goods in this class’ are no longer permitted in new applications.
[4] The International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of Registration of Marks, established by an Agreement at the Nice Diplomatic Conference, 15 June 1957.
[5] Cal-U-Test [1967] FSR 39.
Many of the goods listed in Classes 3 and 5 of the Nice Classification are, in a sense, related. Class 3 contains various non-medicated versions of goods, whereas Class 5 contains the medicated versions of those goods. For example, currently (in the 11th edition) non-medicated products for skin care is listed in Class 3 and medicated skin care preparations appear in Class 5. I note that this delineation was not always so clear cut, for example, in the 5th edition of the Nice Classification, medicated soap appeared in Class 3. This is no longer the case as medicated soap appears in Class 5 in the 11th edition. A further complication arises because there are goods in Class 3 which are not specifically qualified as ‘non-medicated’, for example, soap appears in Class 3 in the 11th edition. The term ‘soap’ clearly encompasses ‘medicated soap’. That soap is listed in Class 3 does not excluded the term from encompassing medicated soap.
I note that what constitutes the relevant versions of the Nice Classification and the potential implications were not addressed by either party. Nevertheless, it is not controversial that the Opponent’s Goods are similar to the 157 Goods and the Class 3 goods of the 161 Goods. For the sake of completeness, I will briefly address this comparison. The 5th edition of the Nice Classification includes the broad term cosmetics in Class 3. This term encompasses the 157 Goods. The third requirement is therefore satisfied in respect of the 157 Trade Mark. The 5th edition of the Nice Classification also includes skin care (cosmetic preparations for -) in Class 3. This item is similar to the Class 3 goods of the 161 Goods, which includes goods such as non-medicated skin care beauty products.
The parties disagree in respect of the similarity of the Opponent’s Goods with the Class 5 goods of the 161 Trade Mark. There are some decided cases to assist us here. In Re Vono Limited’s Application the Assistant-Comptroller found, ‘I am in no doubt that the Applicant’s unmedicated toilet preparations must be regarded as goods of the same description as the Opponent’s medicated toilet preparations.’[6] In Re BENSYL Trade Mark it was found that medicated soaps are goods of the same description as pharmaceutical preparations.[7] In Chanel Ltd v Produits Ella Bache Laboratoire Suzy, the delegate of the Registrar found that medicated and non-medicated cosmetics are goods of the same description; Mr Williams stated:
[T]here seems to be very little difference in the natures, uses and trade channels of medicated cosmetic formulation for acneic skin on the one hand and cosmetics on the other. …
[T]he goods of the application in class 5 are in conflict … with the opponent’s cosmetics in class 3.[8]
[6] (1949) 66 RPC 305, 308.
[7] (1992) 109 RPC 529.
[8] (1993) 27 IPR 245, 250.
The conclusions in the cases cited above concur with the view that I would have formed in the absence of those cases, and I find no reason to depart from them. I am satisfied that the Opponent’s Goods are similar to the Class 5 goods of the 161 Goods. The third requirement is, therefore, satisfied in respect of the 161 Trade Mark.
It is necessary that a loose end be tied. At the hearing, the Applicant asserted that the Opponent’s use of its trade marks is almost entirely, if not entirely, in connection with its ELLE magazine and that this should influence the assessment of deception or confusion under s 44. It is well established that for the purposes of s 44 it is notional use of the relevant trade marks in respect of all of the goods (or services) that is to be considered rather than what actual use might have been made of the trade marks.
The fourth requirement
The Opponent’s Trade Marks constitute a series consisting of two trade marks. The only apparent difference between the two being that in the first case the word ‘ELLE’ is in a common uppercase serifed typeface, and in the second the word is in a slightly stylised uppercase serifed typeface. It is necessary that I consider only the former as it is this trade mark which is most likely to be found to be similar to the Applicant’s trade marks. If the first is not found to be at least deceptively similar, neither will the second. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the first as ‘the Opponent’s Trade Mark’.
Deceptive similarity
Guidance for determining whether trade marks are deceptively similar is generally found in the judgment of Windeyer J in Shell Co (Aust) Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd:
On the question of deceptive similarity, a different comparison must be made from that which is necessary when substantial identity is in question. The marks are not now to be looked at side by side. The issue is not abstract similarity, but deceptive similarity.
Therefore the comparison is the familiar one of trade mark law. It is between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of the plaintiff’s mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have; and, on the other hand, the impressions that such persons would get from the defendant’s [trade mark].[9]
[9] [1963] HCA 66, [13].
Further guidance is to be found in Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v Kingsgate Hotel Group Pty Ltd, wherein Jacobson J stated:
Without seeking to reformulate the various statements of principle stated in the Full Court authorities, it is sufficient for present purposes to identify the critical elements which seem to me to inform the issue of deceptive similarity in the present case. There are nine elements.
First, the judgement of likelihood of deception is a practical one. It requires an assessment of the effect of the challenged mark on the minds of potential customers.[10]
Second, the question of deceptive similarity is not to be decided by a side-by-side comparison. It is to be determined by a comparison of the impression based on recollection of the opponent’s mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have, and the impression that those persons would get from the opposed trade mark.[11]
Third, allowance must be made for imperfect recollection.[12]
Fourth, the effect of the spoken description must be considered.[13]
Fifth, it is necessary to show a real tangible danger of deception or confusion.[14]
Sixth, a trade mark is likely to ‘cause confusion’ if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are ‘caused to wonder’ whether the two products come from the same source.[15] …
Seventh, all surrounding circumstances must be taken into consideration. The circumstances include those in which the marks will be used, and in which the goods or services will be bought and sold, as well as the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services.[16]
Eighth, the question of whether there is a likelihood of confusion is not to be answered by reference to the manner in which a party has used the mark, but by reference to what an applicant can do. That is to say, the use to which it can properly put the mark if registration is obtained.[17]
Ninth, if a registered trade mark includes words which can be regarded as an ‘essential feature’ of the mark, another mark that incorporates those words may cause a tangible danger of deception or confusion by reason of consumers retaining an imperfect recollection of those words.[18] However, care must be taken to not too readily characterise words in a composite trade mark as an ‘essential feature’ because to do so may effectively convert a composite mark into something different.[19] [20]
[10] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020, [49]; Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd [1937] HCA 51, 658.
[11] Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196, [73]; Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd [1963] HCA 66, 415 (Windeyer J).
[12] Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196, [74].
[13] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020, [49]; Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196, [75]; Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd [1937] HCA 51, 658.
[14] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020, [43], [50]; Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196, [76]; Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 594–5.
[15] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020, [50]; Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 595.
[16] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020, [50]; Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196, [86]–[89]; Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 595.
[17] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020, [50]; Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc [1973] HCA 43, 632 (Mason J).
[18] Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196, [79].
[19] Ibid [100].
[20] [2012] FCA 1022, [37]–[46].
In respect of deceptive similarity, the Opponent submitted:
The central feature—or ‘dominant cognitive cue’[21]—of the respective marks is ‘ELLE’. It is the first portion of the Opposed Marks and the entirety of [the Opponent’s Trade Mark]. The addition of purely descriptive wording in the Opposed Marks does not serve to relevantly distinguish the marks.
[21] Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 56; Pham Global Pty Ltd v Insight Clinical Imaging Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 83.
The Applicant submitted that the relevant trade marks are not deceptively similar. Central to the Applicant’s submissions are asserted contrasting meanings and pronunciations of ‘elle’ vs ‘ellé’. It is stated in the Huynh declaration:
I came up with the name ELLÉ DERM in June 2018 as the name of a range of skincare products which I was in the process of developing. In particular I wanted to create a range of skincare products which would have multiple benefits, including brightening skin tone. The name ELLÉ DERM was chosen by me because the word ‘ellé means ‘bright’ in Greek, which was a good fit for the intended effect of using those products, whilst the word ‘derm’ is obviously a reference to ‘dermis’ meaning skin. Ellé is also a derivative of my name Helen, and pronounced ‘ellie’ due to the presence of the acute accent (as opposed to elle), which is how the name is traditionally pronounced in Greek. The name is not intended to be a reference to the French meaning of ‘elle’ to mean ‘she’ since my products are targeted towards both men and women.
The Opponent submitted in respect of Ms Huynh’s statements above:
Contrary to Ms Huynh’s assertions, ‘Elle’ has no apparent meaning in Greek. The word for ‘bright’ in modern Greek is ‘lampros’.[22] Moreover, Ms Huynh has failed to explain why she uses the accented ‘e’ in the Opposed Marks which [according to Collineau 161] evokes a French originated product. … Further, the relevant consuming public in Australia would not be familiar with either modern or ancient Greek. Accordingly, the Greek derivation of the term, even if accepted, does not in any way reduce the likelihood of confusion.
[22] >
In response, the Applicant submitted:
[T]he impressions created by the stylised ELLE and the stylised ‘ellé derm’ Trade Marks are quite different. The additional elements of DERM and FOR SCIENTIFICALLY BRIGHTER SKIN to each mark, make the marks very different visually and aurally. The have different meanings, and are not likely to be confused, or create similar impressions in any way. The word ‘ELLE’ is the French word for ‘girl’ or ‘she’, whereas, … the word ellé (pronounced ‘Ellie’) has Greek origins meaning ‘shining light’, and the addition of the words DERM and FOR SCIENTIFICALLY BRIGHTER SKIN refers to skin and a very specific type of skin care. The impressions created by these words and marks overall, are quite different.
I am inclined to the Opponent’s view. The Opponent’s Trade Mark consists solely of the word ELLE. This is also the dominant cognitive cue of the Applicant’s trade marks. I am not persuaded, firstly, that the effect of the accent on the ‘e’ in ‘ellé’ would cause the average Australian whose first language is other than French or Greek to pronounce the word any differently to the way they would pronounce ‘elle’. Nor am I persuaded that the average Australian is likely to attribute differing meanings to ‘elle’ and ‘ellé’—if any meaning is attributed to those words at all.
The additional words in the Applicant’s trade marks lack distinctiveness in relation to the goods we are concerned with here. In her declaration, Ms Huynh, in describing how she came up with her trade marks, made the statement, ‘the word “derm” is obviously a reference to “dermis”, meaning skin’. I agree with this assessment and that is how the element is likely to be interpreted in the both of the Applicant’s trade marks. DERM will be taken to indicate that the goods are for use on the skin. In the 157 Trade Mark, the words FOR SCIENTIFICALLY BRIGHTER SKIN, while having a flavour of puffery, merely indicate the purpose of the goods. These additional elements are insufficient to detract from the distinctive nature of the word ‘elle’—even taking into account the addition of the accent on the ‘e’. I am satisfied that both the 157 Trade Mark and the 161 Trade Mark are deceptively similar to the Opponent’s Trade Mark. The fourth requirement is therefore established and it is not necessary that I also consider whether the trade marks are substantially identical.
The Applicant has not submitted that the provisions of ss 44(3) or 44(4) might be applied in this case. Neither is there anything before me that satisfies me that those provisions ought to be applied. I am satisfied therefore that s 44 is established.
Decision
Section 55 relevantly provides:
55Decision
(1)Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:
(a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or
(b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;
having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.
Note:For limitations see section 6.
I have found the Opponent has established the ground of opposition it raised pursuant to s 44. As the Delegate of the Registrar I accordingly refuse to register the 157 Trade Mark and the 161 Trade Mark.
Costs
The Opponent has sought an award of costs in its favour. I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. As the Opponent has established a ground of opposition, I award costs against the Applicant under s 221 in line with the amounts in Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995, with costs for the second of the two oppositions to be assessed as set out in the table attached to the Hearing Officer’s decision in James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Hume Industries (Malaysia) Berhad.[23]
[23] (2001) 53 IPR 591.
Robert Wilson
Hearing Officer
Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks
28 October 2020Annexure
The 157 Goods
Class 3: skincare cosmetics; skincare preparations (cosmetic); moisturisers (cosmetics); cosmetic moisturisers; facial moisturisers (cosmetic); skin balms (cosmetic); facial care products (cosmetic); cosmetic acne cleansers; skin care products (cosmetic); cosmetic creams; skin care creams (cosmetic); facial scrubs (cosmetic); facial creams (cosmetic); skin cleansing cream (cosmetic); dermatological cosmetic preparations; facial toners (cosmetic); facial washes (cosmetic); facial preparations (cosmetic); skin cleaners (cosmetic); cosmetic masks; moisturising skin lotions (cosmetic); cosmetic products for skin care; moisturising lotions (cosmetic); moisturising skin creams (cosmetic); moisturising body lotion (cosmetic); moisturising creams (cosmetic); skin lightening compositions (cosmetic); non-medicated facial lotions (cosmetic); eye masks (cosmetic); non-medicated skin care lotions (cosmetic); body creams (cosmetics); moisturising gels (cosmetic); tonics (cosmetic); facial masks (cosmetic); eye moisturisers for cosmetic use; skin cleansing preparations (cosmetic); cosmetic creams for wrinkles; skin care preparations (cosmetic); facial packs (cosmetic); skin creams (cosmetic); cosmetic skin care products; cosmetic acne creams; cosmetics
The 161 Goods
Class 3: Cosmetic skin care products; Cosmetic products for skin care; Non-medicated skin care beauty products; Non-medicated skin care lotions (cosmetic); Non-medicated skin care products; Skin care creams (cosmetic); Skin care products (cosmetic)
Class 5: Medicated skin care preparations; Pharmaceutical preparations for skin care; Powders for skin care (for medical use); Skin care creams for medical use; Skin care lotions (medicated); Skin care oils (medicated); Skin care preparations (medicated); Skin care products (medicated); Sun skin care products for medical purposes
0
12
0