Guo and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration)

Link copied
Case Copied 20 min read

Guo and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2016] AATA 901 (27 September 2016)

Division

GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s)

2014/6365; 2015/1261

Re

Qi Guang Guo (No 3)

APPLICANT

And

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

RESPONDENT

And

New South Wales Crime Commission

New South Wales Commissioner of Police

NON-PARTIES

DECISION

Tribunal Justice Duncan Kerr, President
Prof Robert Deutsch, Deputy President
Date 27 September 2016
Date of written reasons 14 November 2016
Place Sydney

The Tribunal rejects the Applicant’s objections to the tender of the witness statements of Mr O’Connor.

......................[Sgd]............................................

Justice D Kerr, President

......................[Sgd]............................................

Prof R Deutsch, Deputy President

CATCHWORDS

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – Applicant’s objection to tender of a witness’ statement under s 80 of the New South Wales Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) – applicant submitted the witness’ earlier dissemination was made in breach of s 29 of the New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985 (NSW) – where no dispute that the witness currently holds a delegation made under s 13(a) – dissemination properly authorised by s 13(a) taking into account ordinary meaning of “intelligence” – statutory construction on the NSW Crime Commission’s power to authorise dissemination under s 13(a) cannot be read down to materials capable of disclosure under s 10(1)(c) – whether s 80(3) is a bar to the tender of a statement made on a voluntary basis – even if evidence was obtained improperly or illegally the Tribunal’s discretion to admit evidence – applicant’s objection rejected

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 40A

Commonwealth Constitution s 109

Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 138

Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 12

New South Wales Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) ss 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 80

New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985 (NSW) s 29

CASES

Commissioner of Taxation v Donaghue (2015) 237 FCR 316

Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146

Denlay v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 193 FCR 412

P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583

Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388

Robinson v Woolworths (2005) 64 NSWLR 612

SECONDARY MATERIALS

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

REASONS FOR DECISION

The Hon Justice D Kerr, President
Prof R Deutsch, Deputy President

27 September 2016

  1. These are reasons for the Tribunal’s oral ruling[1] rejecting the Applicant’s submission that the Tribunal is prohibited from admitting into evidence a statement made by, and permitting examination and cross-examination of, a witness whose testimony will relate to information obtained in the course of his employment with the New South Wales Crime Commission (the Commission).

BACKGROUND

[1] Revised for expression.

The challenged evidence

  1. It is uncontentious that the Applicant, Mr Guo, has been convicted of a small number of crimes of varying degrees of seriousness since his arrival in Australia. Whether those convictions themselves might justify this Tribunal concluding that the Applicant is not of good…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Guo and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migr... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] AATA 901
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) considered an objection by an applicant to the tender of a witness's statement. The applicant argued that the dissemination of this statement was in breach of the *New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985* (NSW). The AAT noted that the witness held a delegation under s 13(a) of the *New South Wales Crime Commission Act 2012* (NSW), and that the dissemination was properly authorised under that section, interpreting "intelligence" in its ordinary meaning. The Tribunal held that the statutory construction of the Crime Commission's power to authorise dissemination under s 13(a) was not limited to materials capable of disclosure under s 10(1)(c) of the Act.

The AAT was required to determine whether s 80(3) of the *New South Wales Crime Commission Act 2012* (NSW) barred the tender of a statement made voluntarily, and whether the Tribunal had a discretion to admit evidence even if it was obtained improperly or illegally. The Tribunal considered the principles governing the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence under the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth) and its state counterpart, noting that the AAT is not bound by these provisions.

The Tribunal reasoned that while the AAT is not bound by the *Evidence Act*, any exclusion of otherwise probative evidence must be decided on a principled basis, considering the AAT's review jurisdiction. The AAT stands in the shoes of the original decision-maker and can exercise all their powers and discretions. The Tribunal found no reason why the Minister or delegates would not be entitled to consider information volunteered by NSW law enforcement agencies relevant to their powers. Applying these principles, the Tribunal concluded that it would be wrong to suggest the AAT is obliged to exclude probative evidence, unless it was obtained as a result of conscious maladministration. The Tribunal found no factor of impropriety or unfairness in this case, and therefore overruled the applicant's objections.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The position in federal and New South Wales courts is governed by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act) and its state counterpart. Section 138 provides that evidence obtained improperly or in contravention of an Australian law or in consequence of such a breach is not to be admitted, unless the desirability of admitting it outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in the way it has been obtained. The Tribunal is not bound by those provisions. Moreover we are of the view that they cannot be applied by simple analogy to an administrative body such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Whether otherwise probative evidence should be excluded by the Tribunal must be decided on a principled basis having regard to the AAT’s review jurisdiction in question. In the ordinary course the AAT reviews decisions of ministers and government agencies. The Tribunal ‘stands in the shoes of the decision maker’ with the power to make a substitute decision. In doing so it may exercise all of the powers and discretions open to the original decision maker. We note that the Full Court of the Federal Court, Keane CJ, Dowsett and Reeves JJ in Denlay v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 193 FCR 412 at [81]-[82], rejected the contention that the Commissioner of Taxation could not rely on evidence (in that case financial data) alleged to have been misappropriated from a Liechtenstein bank to make an assessment. (See also Commissioner of Taxation v Donaghue (2015) 237 FCR 316 per Kenny and Perram J at [74].) We discern no reason why the Minister and/or his delegates would not be entitled to have regard to information volunteered to them by the NSW law enforcement agencies relevant to the exercise of their powers. If the primary decision maker would be entitled to, and properly could, take into account such evidence, absent compelling reasons, so too is the Tribunal. For that reason we are of the view it would be wrong to suggest that the AAT is obliged to exclude this otherwise probative evidence. We do however accept the Tribunal could exclude evidence obtained as a result of conscious maladministration (see Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146). It is not necessary for the purpose of these reasons to delineate the outer bounds beyond that circumstance where the power might be exercised. It is sufficient to state that we have not identified any factor of impropriety or unfairness which would require us to explore those limits. Applying what we think to be the correct principles, the objections made on behalf of the Applicant must be overruled. There is nothing to suggest that the Respondent should not have had regard to, or should not have reached conclusions based on, the information supplied to him by the Commission. There was no conscious maladministration on the Respondent’s part; there was nothing on the face of the materials sent to the Respondent even to hint at a want of authority in its dissemination.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established